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3 | Abstract 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The occurrence of cases motivated by fraud is becoming more prevalent in companies 
with weak internal control policies and security vulnerabilities. On one hand, internal 
fraud is usually carried out by top management or accounting positions which have 
higher privileges, and thus, more capabilities in the system to commit fraud. On the 
other hand, external fraud is managed by hackers who gain access to the internal 
information system through stealing employee credentials. 
This project presents a solution to prevent fraud in companies. This proposal consists in 
controlling and managing user’s authorizations through an Access Control principle: 
Segregation of Duties. Following this security philosophy, it is defined a role based 
architecture.  
Furthermore, a detailed process on Segregation of Duties is carried out from a risk-based 
approach. Conflicts among critical tasks lead to significant risks in the system. Those risks 
become the core of the study. With an emphasis on risk management lifecycle, it is 
described every phase developed for achieving an implementation that complies with 
Segregation of Duties. 
Based on the design proposed, it is depicted the methodology of a project, by using a 
tool that integrates and streamline risks, compliance, corporate governance and access 
control policies, which is SAP GRC Access Control. 
Taking into consideration the security measures defined, costs of its implementation 
were calculated to be compared with the great losses occasioned by fraud and data 
breaches. The results showed that the percentage invested in security is almost 
imperceptible, ranging from 0.002% to 0.7% of the economic losses that fraud involves. 
Finally, from the results presented and the methodology of the project performed, 
conclusions and recommendations are presented for enterprises to avoid fraud, through 
its detection and control. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Fraud is an important issue since there are many companies whose information systems 
are being attacked. Two key problems are the lack of internal control policies and the 
capability of fraudsters (hackers or employees) to commit fraud. 
Currently, there are many users in the system who have access to different tasks in the 
same business process or in different business processes which can lead to perform 
conflicting tasks in the system. In order to build access control policies and reduce 
fraudsters’ capabilities of committing fraud, it is needed to understand the Segregation 
of Duties (SoD) concept. This concept relies on the fact that a single person should not 
be able to record, authorize and settle a transaction.  This thesis investigates the 
potential use of a model based on Segregation of Duties as a solution to prevent fraud. 
A tool that is being used in this research is SAP GRC Access Control which allows to 
implement Access Control as a security mechanism to analyze and identify risks, 
evaluate them, process and automatize rules for risk controlling, and monitoring of risks, 
among others. 
 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
Notable fraud accounting scandals as well as significant data security breaches have 
represented the starting point of this study.  Nowadays, almost every enterprise has 
suffered fraud once, or even several times. Moreover, its appearance and occurrence is 
expected to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. 
By using complex hacking techniques, or using simple social engineering, intruders can 
‘easily’ compromise the information systems of an enterprise. Security holes and weak 
internal control policies can determine the perfect scenario for fraudsters and hackers. 
Analyzing the types of fraud and its causes, as well as the failures that many enterprises 
present in terms of control, security and policies create the basis for identifying the 
weaknesses of the company. 
The motivation of this thesis is to analyze the solutions to prevent fraud and design a 
methodology which could be developed in a project form in companies. 
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1.3 Objectives 
 
The impact that fraud causes in corporations is extremely high, nevertheless the risk of 
fraud is not generally well managed and valued by companies. Enterprises can suddenly 
lose significantly their brand’s reputation and consumer trust due to internal accounting 
fraud or hacking attacks. That’s why it is relevant to study Internal Control measures to 
prevent it, and provide a process where fraud risks can be mitigated and controlled. 
The objectives defined to achieve through this research are the following: 
Fraud prevention through Internal Control & ERPs 
 Recognize main failures of companies that have been affected by fraud issues 
 Comprehend the reasons that led hackers and fraudsters to commit fraud 
 Identify measures to prevent fraud by companies 
 Analyze internal control policies and regulation that support these measures 
 Acknowledge the benefits of ERPs to identify business processes 
Fraud prevention through Segregation of Duties in a security architecture 
 Define a security architecture that supports a Segregation of Duties model 
 Determine the extent of Segregation of Duties as a security tool to manage 
access control in companies 
 Identify risks through Segregation of Duties and find out a process that describes 
the evolution and management of risks 
Fraud prevention through a project based on Segregation of Duties & GRC 
 Represent and determine the phases of a project based on Segregation of Duties 
 Analyze the concept of GRC (Governance, Risk Management and Compliance) as 
a methodology for a SoD project 
 Analyze the workflow of a SoD process and cooperation techniques when 
managing a project where different teams of different types are involved, such 
as internal control, IT security and financial departments have to work together 
for achieving integrated results 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
12 | Introduction 
 
Fraud prevention through a project deployed in an ERP such as SAP based on 
Segregation of Duties & GRC 
 Use an ERP such as SAP to provide a project of implementation of Segregation of 
Duties and Access Control 
 Analyze security levels and authorizations that will provide a well-configured 
Access Control model 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
The present project is structured in 12 sections. The first 6 sections comprise the 
analysis, design of a solution, adjustment to current policies and regulations and a 
project methodology based on the solution proposed. The section 7 defines the planning 
and costs, whereas the section 8 include conclusions resulted from the project. In 
addition, section 9 includes an executive summary of the whole project. Finally, sections 
10, 11 and 12 determine Appendixes A, B and C of the project, respectively. 
Section 2 describes the current State of the Art of the involved technologies. It starts 
with a detailed description of an ERP, its origin and main features, types and advantages 
and disadvantages of using ERPs. Then, follows with a review on SAP structure based on 
modules and a short advance of SAP HANA. The next preliminary concept is the SAP 
Security architecture based on roles, profiles, authorization objects, clients…  All these 
basic security terms are explained in further detail to fully understand the concept about 
how transactions are contained in roles which are assigned to users. The last preliminary 
concept is GRC (Governance, Risk Management and Compliance) which describes the 
work paradigm where different teams and business areas collaborate in the same 
project to identify, mitigate risks and to comply with the applicable regulation, within a 
corporate governance scheme. The tool proposed for carrying out all the functionalities 
mentioned is SAP GRC Access Control, which is described along with its main tools. 
In Section 3 a description of the main types and causes of fraud is provided, as well as a 
review of a selection of fraud and accounting cases where fraud is involved and cases 
with significant security data breaches. The analysis of these cases provides the main 
failures and firms’ weaknesses that lead to fraud. These provide the key points to design 
a model that reinforce such weaknesses. 
Section 4 is devoted to the study of strategies that can prevent fraud, such as current 
regulations for Internal Control and Corporate Governance, and security principles for 
access control as the Segregation of Duties (SoD) concept. 
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In Section 5, it is implemented a Segregation of Duties process from a risk-based 
approach. Based on the risk management lifecycle, the SoD process is described. In the 
risk identification phase, functional and technical matrixes are defined to search SoD 
conflicts, thus, risks within business processes. In the next phase, risks are assessed 
based on the materiality of risk and it is analyzed its impact and probability. Then, in the 
action plan stage, anti-fraud strategies are implemented, so mitigating controls are 
established. In the implementation phase, mitigating controls, critical transactions, risks 
and rules are defined and included in the SAP GRC AC tool to set them out and 
automatically generate them. The last step is to monitor and continue measuring risks 
which have not been mitigated. The security process to build SoD is adaptive and 
continuous over time. 
Section 6 states the methodology of a project based on Segregation of Duties, using 
tools such as SAP GRC Access Control. The project structure was based on an analysis-
design-implementation-testing-maintenance scheme. Throughout every project phase, 
there are different tasks involved. The earlier stages are focused on SoD tasks, business 
processes and risks, but the next steps determine the Role Based Access Control 
architecture. This determine compliant business roles, using SAP BRM. The 
implementation phase is when this architecture goes live and consultants or support 
members can start assigning new roles to users so they can access their day-to-day 
transactions. The testing stage is when this model is created, modified and tested before 
being transported to the Production environment. The last phase is maintenance, which 
determine the ability for users monitoring when accessing critical tasks in the system. 
Section 7 describes the planning of the whole project and the total estimated cost 
related to the work developed throughout this project. 
Finally, Chapter 8 contains the conclusions extracted from the work done in this project 
and the work that has been left for future studies on the topic. In addition, section 9 
includes an executive summary of the whole project for a complete vision of the 
objectives, conclusions and the analysis and results performed. 
At the end of this thesis, there have been collected some additional information about 
SAP security configuration, a complete analysis of the most critical authorization objects 
in the SAP CCO module, and some solutions for users’ access denial. These form the 
Appendixes A, B and C, respectively. 
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2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS 
2.1 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
 
In this era of competition and economic crisis, innovating and communicating are 
essential verbs in every strategic plan of a company that tries to strengthen its image 
and competitive advantage. The way of communicating has changed. Managing social 
networks and constant innovation are steps that are transforming companies. Firms are 
focused on finding new solutions to their business problems, under the motto Renovate 
or Die. Regarding how firms manage their business these days, it has nothing to do with 
how companies coordinated processes or motivated people at work last century. 
Nowadays we do not understand a business without a computer nor a business without 
a computerized software to manage its information.  
 
2.1.1 Origin of ERP 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems started in the 1960s. ERP was born from its 
predecessor, Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP) which was designed as an 
organizational and scheduling tool for manufacturing firms.  First ERP systems widened 
the original MRP functionality beyond manufacturing firms’ internal use, and included 
customers and suppliers. Then, other industries realized the benefits of ERP systems and 
started transforming its information systems. (The Resource Group, 2015) 
In the 1970s, hardware and first PCs gained ground, shifting consequently business 
processes. Companies such as Oracle, JD Edwards and SAP formed. (The Resource 
Group, 2015) IBM presented MRP II: a closed-loop business process system, a cyclic 
business strategy based on 4 steps: 1. strategizing, 2. planning, 3. monitoring/analyzing 
and 4. acting/adjusting. (Turban, Sharda, Delen, & King, 2010) 
The 1990s became the new era for ERPs with the rapid growth of technology on both 
software and hardware. (The Resource Group, 2015) ERP software systems integrated 
business processes through every functional area. It became an extensive system to 
manage multiple aspects of business operations: human resource management, finance 
management, operations management, manufacturing…This major evolution in ERPs 
resulted in the end of many vendors, however, others gained that competitive 
advantage, such as Oracle and SAP that weathered the storm and became the largest 
ERP vendors’ firms, satisfying ERP’s continuous functional changes. 
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2.1.2 Main features of a ERP system 
An ERP system aims to optimally manage the resources of a company. That is why 
businesses in industries ranging from manufacturing companies to catering use ERPs to 
their benefit. The truth is that any business can realize a real ROI from the use of an 
integrated Enterprise Resource Planning system.  ERPs streamline administrative 
functions and processes of business, making for higher efficiency and productivity – and 
less chance of error. 
Most business can benefit from ERP, since such systems bring real-time visibility, 
control, insight, adaptability, flexibility and scalability.  
ERPs streamline administrative functions and business processes, making for higher 
efficiency and productivity. Precisely because of that, ERP can be used in a variety of 
industries such as non-profits, retail, manufactures, governmental agencies, financial, 
etc.  
 
2.1.3 Types of ERP 
An ERP must fit essentially the enterprise needs, either having specific ERP modules that 
fit our needs by using a modular ERP, or a customized ERP solution. 
Customized ERP solutions are specifically created for a company. Development and 
implantation are more expensive and risky than a modular ERP, however the resultant 
application will be perfectly adapted to the business. The risk of this solution is that it 
will be designed by a specific technological consulting company, so the maintenance and 
any additional solution to the existing ERP will be highly tied to this company. In these 
cases, it will be necessary to require to the consulting company a complete 
comprehensive documentation of the design, implementation and maintenance of the 
ERP solution deployed, so other future consultants can understand and work in other 
parts of the system efficiently. 
The modular ERP solution is the most used since it is cheaper and faster to implement. 
The enterprise can hire as many modules or packages as required, that is why it is called 
ERP modular, since the business can hire only the purchasing module, or financial 
accounting module, CRM (Customer Relationship Management) module, warehouse 
management module… These modules are standard, so any consulting company will be 
able to help us to implement it or maintain it. Every module costs differently and fits 
different business needs. 
Depending on where our ERP solution storage is located, we can distinguish between 
on-premise and cloud based solutions. 
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On-premise software installations reside on a dedicated server which is located within 
the enterprise intranet and maintained by the organization’s IT department. This type 
of hosting provides additional control and validation. The IT department is responsible 
for managing this server, in addition to additional specific controls and validations that 
the company can set up for further security. 
The on-premise solutions are the most used since there are still many companies which 
do not feel comfortable with cloud hosting and prefer the security that an on-premise 
solution provides. 
On the other hand, cloud hosting is suitable for companies that do not want to worry 
about acquiring, installing, monitoring, upgrading and maintaining any hardware; 
besides not having an IT department dedicated for these tasks. 
Cloud hosting software installation reside on a third-party server. Every update, backup, 
monitoring and upgrade is handled by the third-party at no additional charge. In order 
to access this server, the company will require Internet connection. 
Cloud solutions are becoming more popular because of a lower initial cost, faster 
deployment than on-premise solutions, upgrades are managed by the service provider, 
they require a smaller IT team and scaling up this solution becomes easier since it is 
based on a pay as you go model. 
SMEs usually use cloud solutions that can be rented, or even source ERP systems like 
Open ERP, Odoo, ERPNext… since Cloud ERPs is a more affordable solution for smaller 
companies with simple needs and tight budget. 
Others solutions for SMEs with a higher budget could be using SAP Business One, A3 
ERP, SAGE X3, Microsoft Navision, Solmicro Expertis… which can cost from €40,000 to 
€80,000. In contrast, ERPs for large enterprises such as SAP, Oracle or Microsoft 
Dynamics cost €100,000 and above. All these solutions can be either cloud or on-
premise installed. 
 
2.1.4 Reasons to acquire an ERP system 
Many companies already have installed ERP software in their systems. Every year, 
hundreds of businesses look for advice in order to find an ERP that can fit their business 
needs. Improving integration between multiple disparate systems and business 
processes is the main reason to acquire an ERP, as confirmed by 59% of ERP buyers, 
analyzed through a survey by Software Advice (Burnson, 2015). 45% of ERP buyers 
mentioned that the second reason was to improve their CRMs software. 
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When companies face problems and frustrations as the following means that they need 
an ERP system. 
1. The company owns many different software for different processes. Since the 
information is separated into various front- and back-end systems, retrieving this 
data becomes an arduous, complex and slow task, as well as quite inaccurate. 
2. Access to this information is not easily traceable, since there are data silos, 
isolated sets of outdated business information gathered together from multiple 
software systems. Data is not reliable and its availability is not precise. 
3. Business process are irregular and lacking consistency. This results in inaccurate 
data and poor business governance practices. 
4. Slow back office processes. Manual accounting tasks and financial reporting 
across systems and through numerous spreadsheets determine very slow 
processes and unproductive employees.  
5. IT management across multiple systems becomes a very complex and time-
consuming process which is very costly and critical for the company resources. 
Update patches are expensive and require effort for customizing different IT 
software implemented. 
6. The company is not able to grow with the existing resources. Because of the lack 
of integration of all the systems, it is hard to track if an order has been shipped 
when sales, inventory and customer data are maintained in separate databases. 
This fact creates poor reputation to customers and the sales service offered 
decreases globally. 
Other factor that can promote companies to acquire an ERP system is to grow revenues 
and profits and expand operations. When companies want to put in place a new backend 
software systems and new processes, ERPs system is the solution.  
 
2.1.5 Advantages and disadvantages of ERP systems 
An ERP software allows multiple advantages for companies and their employees. ERPs 
offer a complete and robust functionality, which is secured globally. Using an ERP will 
allow companies to increase their sales and increase their profitability.  
The main benefits that using an ERP system provides are the following: 
- Long-term savings. This is the biggest benefit that an ERP can offer.  This solution 
manages our business, processes, our assets, our human resources and our 
customers, all in one that provides a more efficient management which leads to 
long-term savings. 
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- Speed and safety in decision-making. By having available data from different 
departments on a screen and a well-defined planning allows managers to take 
decisions more easily. By having the whole image of the company on an ERP 
system, it is easier to determine weak points in the structure of the company in 
order to favor the company’s growth, and improve the decision making process. 
- Better quality in the customer relationship management. An ERP allows us to 
respond to customers in a shorter time. The way the ERP links all information in 
one place gives companies a faster traceability, in case of troubles in any of the 
stages of the value chain. Using the CRM module gives a more efficient way to 
deal with customers, thus, responsiveness to customers improves and we can 
meet market demand more efficiently, adapting quickly and safely to any change 
that customers claim. 
- Standardized organization. Using an ERP forces different departments of a 
company to work in a more standard and ordered way. It helps to define best 
practices throughout the company. In this way, business processes are analyzed, 
standardized, automated and streamlined, ensuring greater efficiency in 
management. Because of that, information is very accurate and well integrated 
offering more autonomy in management. 
- Employee productivity. As all processes are optimized, the productivity of 
employees increases. Jobs are automated by deleting those processes which 
duplicate or provide redundant information. In addition, ERPs are easy to 
navigate and very intuitive, so they will facilitate the work of employees.  
- Security. The company information needs to be protected from information 
thefts or unauthorized access. ERP solutions provide different levels of access or 
authorization. Information is centralized and automatically backed up to prevent 
any failure. Cloud solutions also replicate information in different places. 
All the previous benefits that ERPs offer are advantages of acquiring ERP systems. 
Basically, they give us a complete vision of all the important processes across all 
departments following consistent and automatic workflows. This unified system makes 
reporting tasks very accurate and on real-time. For this, ERP provides a centralized 
database system on the backend which store and backup all the enterprise data. 
Because of that, ERP systems are very helpful for managing enterprise companies 
globally located. 
However, there are disadvantages that must be also highlighted: 
- Cost of ERPs are too high. Cost not only comprises the cost of the ERP Software 
itself but also the planning, customization, configuration, testing, 
implementation, maintenance… 
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- ERP deployments take a long time. Installation of ERPs take from 1 to 3 years to 
get completed and – more complex in decentralized organizations 
- User participation is necessary. It is important to provide user training. Although 
the user interface may be simple and intuitive, it takes time to learn how to use 
it for the same (and additional) tasks to what employees were used perform in 
other different software systems. 
- Migration of data to the new ERP system.  In order to integrate ERP systems in a 
unique ERP system, it is necessary to spend time, money and resources to 
achieve a consistent and complete migration of data to the new system. 
- Indirect costs. There may be additional costs related to the ERP implementation 
such as new IT infrastructure, upgrade of the WAN links… 
 
2.2 SAP: Components and Structure 
 
What is ‘SAP’? ‘SAP’ is an acronym for ‘Systeme, Anwendungen, Produkte der 
Dataenverar- beitung,’ in German, meaning ‘Systems, Applications, and Products in Data 
Processing.’ Founded in 1972, SAP – with its headquarters in Walldorf, Germany – is the 
world’s leading business software company, supporting more than 50% of the world’s 
enterprises.  
SAP ERP is an integrated system that provides enterprises with the tools to manage 
strategic planning, control objectives and analyze operations. The main SAP system 
functionalities are: integration of business processes, multifunctional (Sales, HR, 
Purchases…), modular (based on modules or packages), enterprise wide and on ‘real 
time’. 
 
2.2.1 SAP R/3 Software 
SAP R/3 is the former name of the SAP ERP. Its current successor is SAP ERP Central 
Component (ECC).  
SAP based the architecture of R/3 on a three-tier client/server structure: 
1. Presentation Layer: The newest version of R/3 GUI is based on SAP 
NetWeaver. SAP NetWeaver is the main computing platform of SAP SE, and 
it is the foundation for many SAP applications. SAP Web Application Server 
(or WebAS) is the runtime environment for SAP Applications and Business 
Suite Solutions such as SRM, CRM, SCM and ERP. SAP Netweaver is a service-
oriented application and an integration platform. It is built using ABAP 
programming language, but it also uses C, C++ and Java EE. 
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2. Application Layer: This layer is composed by one or more application servers 
and a message server. A SAP application server is a collection of executables 
which can interpret programs developed with ABAP/4 language (4th 
generation) and can manage the input and output of these programs. In the 
server side, all SAP applications are held and run. 
3. Database Layer: This layer contains all the information stored from the 
enterprise that is required by the ERP. The database layer receives requests 
from the application server when an ABAP/4 program is running and needs 
certain information stored in the database. 
SAP R/3 communications are encrypted using SAP cryptography library for Secure 
Network Communications and Secure Socket. 
 
2.2.2 SAP Modules Structure 
One of the principal reasons why SAP is so popular is that it is really flexible and almost 
any of their features are customizable. 
The way to achieve this flexibility is to break SAP system into different modules like HR, 
Finance, MM and so on, which emulate business processes of a department or business 
unit. You can integrate one module with other or even integrate it with third party 
interfaces. These types of modules are called ‘Functional Modules’ – they are solutions 
by line of business or ‘department’. 
The illustration below shows all functional SAP Modules which are offered by SAP R/3. 
One of them is a little bit different, IS – Industry Solutions. These solutions are based on 
industry-specific software and they are preconfigured for any client industry (aerospace, 
automotive, banking, construction, healthcare, life science, oil & gas, retail…). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: SAP R/3 Modules Structure. Adapted from (Lingard UK) and (The SAP Expert Base , 2000) 
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These functional modules are located in the Application Layer of SAP R/3 mentioned in 
the previous section. 
Every SAP functional module contains submodules. The submodules below belong to 
some of the most important SAP modules: FI, CO, HR, MM and SD; the list increases 
frequently due to the fact that SAP releases submodules more customizable and 
functional. 
 
Figure 2: Submodules of SAP Modules FI,  CO, HR, MM and SD. Source: Own elaboration. 
On the other hand, there are “Technical Modules”, based on innovation and 
functionality: 
 Platform and Technology Solutions. These modules offer the basis to streamline 
complexities for real time responsiveness. These modules provide actions in a 
timely, trustful and innovative manner. Some of these solutions are Analytics 
Technology, IT Management, Security, Data Management… 
 
 Solutions Spotlights.  These are used to leverage business applications with the 
latest technology advancements. Some examples are Big Data, Cloud, SAP HANA 
Platform, SAP S/4HANA and Internet of Things. 
Apart from SAP as an ERP, we can also highlight other product categories that it offers 
to help you run and optimize your software from SAP. Enterprise Management, 
Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Supplier Relationship Management (SRM) 
and Supply Chain Management (SCM) are some of these products. 
Financial Accounting 
(SAP FI)
•SAP General Ledger 
Accounting
•SAP Accounts Payable
•SAP Accounts 
Receivable
•SAP Bank Accounting
•Budgeting and 
Monitoring
•Cash Management
•SAP Asset Accounting
•SAP Funds 
Management
•SAP Treasury 
Management
•SAP Special Purpose 
Ledger
•Withholding Tax 
(TDS)
•Travel Management
Controlling (SAP CO)
•SAP Cost Element 
Accounting
•SAP Cost Center 
Accounting
•SAP CO Internal 
Orders
•SAP Profit Center 
Accounting
•SAP Profitability 
Analysis
Human Resources  
(SAP HR)
•Organizational 
Management
•Personnel 
Administration
•Recruitment
•Payroll
•Travel Management
•Personnel 
Management
•Time Management
•Compensation 
Management
•Training and Event 
Management
•Wages
•Personnel 
Development
•Workforce 
Administration
Material Management 
(SAP MM)
•Purchasing
•Inventory 
Management
•Material Planning
•Invoice Verification
•Material Requirement 
Planning
•Warehouse 
Management
•Vendor Valuation
Sales and Distribution 
(SAP SD)
•Sales
•Shipping and 
transportation
•Billing or Invoice 
generation
•Bills of Material
•Sales Information 
System
•Credit Control
•Electronic Data 
Interchange
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SAP products oriented to small and medium size companies are SAP Business One and 
mySAP All-in-one. 
 
2.2.3 SAP HANA 
Due to its popularity and innovative architecture, the issue that concern us in this section 
is SAP HANA. 
In-Memory technology is a new technology that substitutes the current Data base 
management systems technology. 
SAP was pioneer in the introduction of this new technology in 2011 with their In-
Memory platform SAP HANA. 
The MIT technical database management academic team, recognized that In-Memory 
technology will replace the current Database Management Systems technology in 
presentation on august-24-2013 at MIT in Boston MA. 
Database Vendors, like IBM, Oracle and Microsoft, are entering the market with new 
products IBM DB2-Blu, Oracle – In-Memory, in late 2013. 
SAP HANA is a one in-memory atomic copy of data for transactions and analysis. 
Compared to the traditional databased approach, it eliminates redundant data copies, 
reducing unnecessary complexity and latency. Thus, there is less hardware to manage, 
so it accelerates through innovation and simplification.  
In traditional systems, OLTP (Online Transaction Processing) provided source data to 
data warehouses, such as large number of master data transactions (INSERT, UPDATE, 
DELETE) that required an accelerated query processing, while keeping consistent data 
integrity in multi-access environments. On the other hand, OLAP (Online Transaction 
Processing) helped to analyze this information through data mining, analytics and 
decision making. This system requires lower workload of transactions, however it is 
more complex and involve aggregation structures and history data by using more 
indexes than OLTP. 
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Figure 3: OLTP vs OLAP systems (DataWarehouse4u, 2010) 
SAP HANA permits OLTP (Online Transaction Processing) and OLAP (Online Analytical 
Processing) workloads on the same platform by storing data in high-speed memory, 
organizing it in columns and partitioning and distributing it among multiple servers. 
 This process delivers faster queries, avoiding in this way costly full-table scans and single 
column indexes. Compared to the previous image, it is evident how SAP HANA reduces 
its operational overhead and it leverages one infrastructure for analytical and text 
search in both OLAP and OLTP use cases. 
 
Figure 4: Breakthrough Data & Application Processing (SAP, 2014) 
SAP HANA platform converges Database, Data Processing and Application Platform 
capabilities. It also provides libraries for predictive, planning, text, spatial and business 
analytics allowing real-time business operations. 
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Figure 5:  SAP HANA Platform - More than just a database (SAP, 2014) 
Moreover, SAP HANA offers three different deployment options which provide security, 
privacy and availability. Any of these options can be changed 
anytime: 
1. On premise – Running all SAP Solutions on SAP HANA. 
The client can build or deploy own solutions on SAP 
HANA. These solutions are maintained all within the 
client’s firewall. 
 
 
2. Hybrid – Leveraging SAP Cloud. Some solutions are 
migrated to the cloud, and you can also create or 
deploy your new SaaS apps in the cloud. In this way, 
the client can use cloud hosting and manage services 
deploying via SAP HANA Enterprise Cloud or using a 
public cloud. 
 
 
3. Cloud – Build, Run and Deploy all applications in the 
Cloud. This deployment option enables faster 
innovations and simplify the whole infrastructure. SAP 
HANA Enterprise Cloud provides the landscape to 
migrate client’s applications or build new ones. 
 
Figure 6: SAP HANA On premise 
Deployment (SAP, 2014) 
Figure 7: SAP HANA Hybrid 
Deployment (SAP, 2014) 
Figure 8: SAP HANA Cloud 
Deployment (SAP, 2014) 
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2.3 SAP Security Architecture 
 
Security in information systems involves protecting a company or organization’s data 
assets. The practice that information systems security professionals carry out is based 
on testing, implementing, maintaining and repairing software and hardware used to 
protect information. 
ISACA defines information security as measures that “ensure that within the enterprise, 
information is protected against disclosure to unauthorized users (confidentiality), 
improper modification or destruction (integrity) and non-access when required 
(availability)” (ISACA, 2012). In this way, a business or organization is secured to prevent 
crimes, espionage, sabotage or attacks. 
In terms of SAP Security, SAP specialists are involved in installing and maintaining a 
secure SAP environment. However, it is not only their job, the entire IT department also 
has to contribute to secure SAP in the enterprise so that it is aligned with organizational 
policies. 
 
2.3.1 SAP Security Settings 
The security settings configured in SAP must comply with these principles: 
1. Reducing internal fraud risks 
2. Guaranteeing integrity, accuracy, confidentiality and availability of business data 
3. Reducing unauthorized access risks to critical transactions 
4. Regulatory compliance (SOX, penal code, LOPD…) 
5. Control over the Production Environment and its transactions 
6. Strengthening internal corporate governance 
7. Compliance with the requirements directed by Internal and External Audit 
2.3.1.1 Settings parameters for passwords 
In SAP system, there must be configured different security parameters for access 
control, such as Standard SAP password controls. Such controls are security policies 
established in order to authenticate users in the system. 
These are some parameters created in SAP user profiles that are helpful in order to 
control users’ access. Some examples are: 
 LOGIN/PASSWORD_EXPIRATION_TIME: Number of days after the expiration day 
when users can change their passwords. The default value is 0. The 
recommended value is 30-45 days. 
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 LOGIN/FAILS_TO_SESSION_END: Number of times a user can enter an incorrect 
password before logon attempts in the system are finished. The default value is 
3. The range allowed is from 1 to 99. The recommended value is 3. 
 LOGIN/MIN_PASSWORD_LNG: Minimum number of characters required for 
entering as a password. The default value is 3. The range of values is from 1 to 
99. The recommended value is 3 characters. 
The previous parameters and others are defined in the transaction RSPFPAR. 
In addition to these parameters, there are other Standard SAP password controls: 
passwords cannot be PASS or SAP, the first character cannot be ‘?’ or ‘!’, password can 
only be changed at most once a day, users cannot reuse the last five passwords, and so 
on. Passwords defined by the client as illegal passwords can be entered into SAP table 
USR40. 
2.3.1.2 Access Control Settings 
Regarding to security settings related to access control, there must be configured a 
customized enterprise authorization model. 
SAP security establishes a RBAC approach, which means a role-based access control 
system. Such policy restricts users access based on mechanisms around roles, profiles 
and privileges. 
The client must define which are the business processes involved in every department 
to be able to conform roles, and thereby, generate profiles. These roles are assigned to 
users to they have access to certain functions, transactions, reports or menus in the 
system. These terms (roles, profiles, transactions…) will be explained in further detail in 
the following section. 
The main purpose of these access control settings is achieving an authorization model 
where authorization objects, transactions, users and programs are defined correctly and 
reported appropriately. In this way, consultants can determine access control policies 
and roles according to the segregation of duties controls established. 
 
2.3.2 SAP Authorization Model Architecture 
Initially, a user has no access in SAP. When we create access in the system for a user, it 
is defined its UMR (User Master Records): basic information about the user such as 
name, password, user group… and authorizations that this user has in the system. 
All this information is structured building ‘blocks’ that act as containers for other blocks 
of information. Technically, it is known as ABAP authorization model, which is built in 
SAP. 
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SAP provides authorization objects that allow users to define authorizations. These 
enable users to specify which actions they are allowed to execute in the SAP system. 
Authorizations that cover a set of tasks can be grouped together to form an 
authorization profile. Profiles are either created manually or automatically through the 
role generation. Roles describe functions that different people perform. 
The primary rules defined by this RBAC model is: 
 Role assignment: A user will be able to execute a transaction or a determined 
functionality in the system, thus, execute its permission if this subject has been 
assigned the role or profile for it. 
 Role authorization: A role must be created in order to grant access to particular 
functionalities, thereby, users that are assigned this role will be authorized for it, 
and not any other action but what the role authorizes. Roles contain intrinsically 
profiles which include all the authorizations, however, users can be assigned also 
profiles without the necessity of assigning roles. 
 Permission authorization: As mentioned in the rule above, users will be able to 
exercise a permission if that permissions is active previously in that role. 
Permissions, known as authorizations in SAP, contain the block of the 
authorizations and activities allowed by a role. If authorizations are not correctly 
set up in a role, users that are assigned that role, will not be able to execute it. 
This round structure below represents how the architecture model is formed of a 
continuous grouping of authorization packages. The smallest package is the 
authorization object which is formed by authorization fields. The highest level is the 
Master Users’ Records which keeps the authorizations for the user, such as roles and 
profiles 
 
 
 
Master Users' 
Records
Roles
Profiles
Authorizations
Auth. 
Objects
Figure 9: SAP Authorizations Structure. Source: Own elaboration. 
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2.3.3 Architecture of SAP R/3 Authorization System 
The diagram below represents the SAP R/3 authorization architecture. It is represented using an UML Class Diagram. 
 
.
Figure 10: SAP R/3 Authorization System. Source: Own elaboration. 
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2.3.3.1 Master Users’ Records 
Master Users’ Records define the accounts for which users can access to the system. 
This user information is accessed through transaction SU01. 
Some fields that are determined are: 
 User personal data, such as name, function, department, telephone, email… 
 ID User 
 Password 
 User type: system, dialogue, communication, service, reference 
 Default screen that the users sees at first when logging on the system 
 Printers assigned by default to the user 
 Users’ groups 
 Validity period 
 Profiles 
 Roles 
See appendix A for more information about the configuration page of Master Users’ 
Records. 
As mentioned above, there are different user types that can be specified: 
 Dialog (A): Individual human users (end users from the business, including 
Internet users). Users are capable to connect through SAP GUI. 
 System (B): Background processing and communication users within a SAP 
system and between multiple systems, providing, therefore, internal and 
external RFC calls. Login from GUI is not allowed. 
 Communication (C): Communication users for interfaces or external RFC calls 
among SAP systems. Login from GUI is not allowed. 
 Service (S): Anonymous system access (such as for public Web services) that 
apply to a wide group of users, generally generic users that connect via an ITS 
(Internet Transaction Service). 
 Reference (L): Impersonal users, same as type S. Login from GUI is not allowed 
and they can be used to trespass their authorizations to the user that has it as 
reference. 
 
2.3.3.2 Transaction 
Transactions in SAP are similar to programs in ordinary computer languages. A 
transaction is a sequence of dialogue steps corporately consistent and logically 
connected. Performing a transaction makes the totality of each dialogue steps and 
update them. The graphical representation on the user screen and its logic process are 
called DYNPRO (DYNamic PROgram). 
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A transaction code or T Code is a four-digits short cut key to access a transaction. 
Transactions can be accessed either by its corresponding menu or by using the 
command field and entering the transaction code. 
Custom transactions: Transactions that are created by the company for its interests 
should always start with Z or Y (the rest of letters are reserved by the system and for 
future SAP updates). 
In order to execute a transaction, the user must have at least assigned within its master 
user record the S_TCODE authorization object. This object has the auth. field TCD, whose 
values determine the T Code of the transaction allowed to execute. 
In addition to this object, there are other object validations that are required to execute 
a transaction, but S_TCODE is mandatory and essential for its operation. 
The USOBT table shows the authorization objects associated with each transaction. 
See appendix A for more information about how to enter a transaction in SAP by using 
its T-code. 
 
2.3.3.3 Roles 
Roles are a means to allow a user to access a transaction or to execute a particular 
function within a transaction. 
A role consists of groups of transactions and activities that are created with a profile 
generator (PFCG). The role structure is a recipient that contains internally profiles (that 
include at the same time authorizations). Authorizations in SAP are privileges required 
to perform a specific function in SAP. 
Thus, roles are assigned directly to users, so they are authorized to execute functions in 
SAP. 
There are three different type of roles: 
 Single role: an independent role 
 Derived role: This role has a parent and differs only in organization levels. These 
roles are usually known as Organizational roles since they manage information 
related to the organization (centers, specific operations…). Transactions, menu 
and authorizations are only managed at the parent level. 
 Composite role: It is a container that can include one or more Single or Derived 
roles. 
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See Appendix A in order to configure a single role in SAP with transactions associated 
and the process of assigning the role to a specific user (from transaction PFCG). 
The AGR_USERS table displays the roles that are assigned to users in SAP. 
Composite role consists of single roles. It eases user administration, so users can be 
assigned composite roles, and they are automatically assigned the associated single 
roles that compose the composite role. A composite role does not contain authorization 
data in itself, but the single roles which includes the authorizations needed. 
See Appendix A to learn how to create a composite roles based on single roles. 
The AGR_AGRS table displays the singles roles that are included in composite roles. 
 
2.3.3.4 Profile 
Profile is the core of the authorizations. A profile is basically a group of several 
authorizations, formed by authorization objects with certain values. 
A profile is the minimum security unit that can be assigned to a user. The only way to 
assign authorizations to a user is to include them in a profile and assign that profile to 
users. Profiles can be assigned to users through roles or directly to the master users’ 
records. 
There are two ways of creating profiles: 
o Using transaction SU03 (manually) 
o Using transaction PFCG (automatically) 
See Appendix A for configuring a manual profile by using transaction SU03. 
Creating manually profiles does not have any advantage from creating it from the PFCG 
transaction. By using PFCG instead of SU03, it is faster due to the automatic profile 
process. In this way, profiles are linked directly to roles, so they are created based on 
functions (groups of activities). For this process it is not necessary a SAP administrator 
with expertise on authorization objects. However, authorization objects must be 
correctly maintained in the SU24 transaction. This transaction will be explained at the 
end of the following section, Authorization Object. 
 
2.3.3.5 Authorization Object 
An authorization object is the minimum security unit in SAP R/3. It identifies an element 
or an object that needs to be protected. Objects that belong to the same application 
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area such as Basis – Development Environment (BC_C) or Financial Accounting (FI) are 
grouped together.  
Thus, authorization objects include organizational values such as organization, center, 
warehouse, cost centers, sales channel, etc.; and also the activities that can be 
performed on a task (create or register, change, display, delete, etc.). 
The authorization system checks several conditions before allowing users to perform 
any task in the system. A multi-conditional check on an authorization object will allow 
users to create, view or delete information from a purchasing organization. 
The authorization object F_BKPF_BUK that is represented in the image above is in charge 
of controlling any modification (activity 02), reading (act. 03), activation (act. 07) or 
display of a changed document (08) that is done to the company code when accessing 
to an accounting document. Although this is a simple authorization object, there are 
authorization objects that allow you to define more complex authorizations.  
SU24 is one of the most important SAP Security transaction codes. It is used to maintain 
authorization objects which are checked during the execution of a certain transaction. 
On one hand, SAP predefined transactions have their own authorization objects already 
registered in this transaction, however, the enterprise can change its configuration in 
order to check the SAP standard authorization objects or not. In addition, the company 
can also add new authorization objects to be checked. 
On the other hand, for each new transaction (designed by the own organization for 
business reasons), authorization objects must be documented in SU24, so these objects 
are checked by the system when you execute it. 
Auth. 
objects 
Figure 11: Identification of Authorization Objects in PFCG transaction in a Role Configuration. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
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In the transaction SU24, the objects that need to be checked to access this transaction 
are added in the following way: 
 
Figure 12: Authorization objects checked for transaction FPE3S, in transaction SU24 (SAP Security Analyst, 
2014) 
In the transaction SU24, we can display the authorization objects that are being checked 
for any transaction. In the example above, the transaction FPE3S has all these 
authorization objects, but the authorization objects that are checked by the system are 
those which are marked in the 6th column (Proposal) as ‘YS’ such as the authorization 
objects F_KKKO_BEG, F_KKKO_BUK or F_KKKO_GSB. Those which are marked as ‘NO’ 
are not checked by the system, so you do not need to have any specific role or profile 
with these objects to access to transaction FPE3S. 
 
2.3.3.6 Authorization field: 
An authorization field determines the system elements that need to be protected, by 
assigning to it an access value. Authorization fields may be referred to business 
information or security related configuration such as: 
 User groups 
 Company code 
 Purchasing organization 
 Development class 
In the same authorization object, there can be maximum 10 authorization fields. 
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There is an authorization field which is included in most authorization objects that 
determine the activity permitted over a control such as company code, an accounting 
document type, an order type…  
This activity field (ACTVT) has many possible entries. However, there have been selected 
in the table below the most used values. 
ACTVT Description 
01 Create or generate 
02 Change 
03 Display 
04 Print, edit messages 
05 Lock 
06 Delete 
07 Activate, generate 
08 Display change documents 
09 Display prices 
16 Execute 
 
Table 1: Most used values in the activity field, ACTVT .Source: Own elaboration 
The whole list of standard values of the activity field is in the TACT table. The relationship 
between activities and authorization objects is in the TACTZ table. 
Authorization fields are part of the standard ABAP authority-check function that checks 
whether a user has certain values in an authorization object or not. 
The TOBJ table contains what fields are associated with each authorization object, that 
is the way in which SAP knows which fields an authorization object contains. 
When an object is assigned values to its fields, it is transformed into an Authorization. 
 
Figure 13: Authorization field (TCD) in role ZS_DISPLAY_ALL_BASIS. Adapted from: (Consultoría SAP, 2016) 
 
2.3.3.7 Authorization value 
Each authorization field has certain number of simple values. These values allow users 
perform specific actions in the system (in the image below, specific transactions). 
Auth. 
Field 
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Figure 14: Authorization values  in role ZS_DISPLAY_ALL_BASIS. Adapted from: (Consultoría SAP, 2016) 
 
The authorization object TCD has the values SCC4, SE16 and SM59. The authorization 
object TCD defines the record of a transaction, the T Code. The first validation when 
accessing a transaction is checking the authorization object TCD of that specific 
transaction. In the image above, a user with the role ZS_DISPLAY_ALL_BASIS will have 
access to transactions SCC4 (Client Administration), SE16 (Data Browser – allows access 
to SAP Tables) and SM59 (RFC Destinations). 
 
2.3.3.8 Client 
In addition to the concepts addressed earlier such as Master Users’ Records, Roles, 
Profiles, Transactions, Authorization Object, Authorization Field… there is another key 
concept in SAP that is relevant to analyze in the Security Settings: Clients. 
A client is a subsystem or independent unit within a SAP system. The actions taken 
within each client are called transactions. These transactions are orders that call 
programs written in ABAP, which make internal transaction in the SAP system and query 
data from the database. 
The default clients in the SAP system are 000, 001 and 066. The user SAP* and its 
password PASSS exists by default in these clients. It is important that during SAP 
implementation, all default user passwords in every client are changed.  
From the perspective of security, clients should be closed and not allow modification to 
objects in the repository and to parametrization not dependent on the client. 
The transactions SE06 and SCC4 must be restricted so they are not modifiable or 
customized. By using SCC5 consultants can clear a client. 
 
2.3.3.9 Users 
Managing users such as creating, modifying or deleting users, groups and roles is 
enabled using the UME (User Management Engine). 
Auth. 
values 
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As an administrator, users and its authorizations for authentication can be controlled 
and simplified by collecting these users in groups. These groups are determined by their 
function in the company or the department they work for. 
Roles is the best way to admin and control users’ authorizations. 
There are some transactions that provide user administration such as SV01. All 
transactions authorized to be performed by users are registered in the transaction SN01. 
It is highly recommendable to establish security policies that force users to use secure 
passwords, using transaction SM30 -> USR40, through regular expressions, determining 
which are not valid passwords and through a dictionary with prohibited passwords. 
 
2.4 GRC: Governance, Risk Management and Compliance 
 
GRC, an acronym for Governance, Risk Management and Compliance, is the new term 
from Virsa systems. 
 
2.4.1 Origin of GRC  
Virsa Systems was a California-based compliance software maker. The Virsa tool was 
based upon a PwC preventative tool, known as SAFE, that controlled the grating and 
management of access within SAP. This was a tool used to check for SOX compliance in 
companies, and also very useful for finding the SODs in an enterprise.  
On April 2006, SAP SE acquired Virsa Systems. This was part of a SAP strategic decision 
in order to create a new business unit to provide customer end-to-end solutions for GRC. 
However, even before the GRC term was coined, activities and processes were 
monitored and managed attending to BAM (Business Activity Monitoring) and BPM 
(Business process management). These ideas were significantly important in the 2000s, 
so many solutions and tools gave birth to support companies BAM/BPM programs.  
Nevertheless, the implementation and maintenance of BAM/BPM projects were costly, 
and many companies abandoned them because of lack of results, integration issues, 
customization efforts… At the same time, external impositions forced companies to 
control their business and comply with the current regulations. This pressure created 
the need to implement better governance, more effective internal policies and 
accountability and consistent risk management. 
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Companies required specialized software to centralize governance, risk and compliance 
in order to establish risk and control frameworks; reporting their risks, controls and 
policies; deploying procedures to update risk exposures… These processes and systems 
came under the GRC umbrella term. 
"Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC) are three pillars that work 
together for the purpose of assuring that an organization meets its objectives. (…) 
Governance is the combination of processes established and executed by the board of 
directors (BOD) that are reflected in the organization's structure and how it is managed 
and led toward achieving goals. Risk management is predicting and managing risks that 
could hinder the organization to achieve its objectives. Compliance with the company's 
policies and procedures, laws and regulations, strong and efficient governance is 
considered key to an organization's success." (Reding, et al., 2013) 
GRC settles down different responsibilities in every business. In general, GRC means how 
governance, risk management and business’ normative compliance integrate people, 
processes and technology. 
 
2.4.2 GRC components 
 
Governance describes how an organization is managed by top managers through 
information systems and management control structures that enable them an agile 
decision-making process guaranteeing the business strategy defined. Governance 
determines the internal company guidelines. 
Figure 15: GRC Structure (Deloitte, 2014) 
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A corporate governance model is based on the enterprise characteristics. It addresses 
the differences between agent and principal. The agent problem is referred to the 
relationship between the business owners and the management thereof.  The problem 
arises when the principal or shareholders delegate the agent (administration) the 
management of the enterprise in which the interests of one another are not always the 
same, resulting in asymmetric information. 
The corporate governance model should establish the best system that encourages 
greater efficiency, safety and transparency based on the own business features and 
markets. 
Risk management consists of a set of processes that allows management to identify, 
analyze and respond to risks that can adversely affect organization objectives. Risk 
management have to respond to risks through controlling, avoiding, accepting or 
transferring them to a third party. Risks involve many areas from technological risks to 
commercial or financial risks. Risk management considers internal and external 
guidelines that affect the company.  
The enterprise must establish its risk strategies, taking into account the business impact 
of each of these risks. 
In order to analyze efficiently risks, a threat and vulnerability matrix must be 
implemented, as well as risk analysis remediation to prevent possible risks. An action 
plan is the method used to respond to existent risks in the organization. 
Governance of risk management aims the prevention of excessive risk management by 
taking into account organization’s tendency to risk.  
Compliance is the legal verification that risk management of the corporate governance 
is efficiently fulfilling external directives and regulatory guidelines, such as SOX, Basel II, 
Solvency III… Compliance means ‘according to the requirements stated, thus, ruled by 
policy enforcement that apply to the organization such as laws, regulations, contracts, 
strategies and policies. The company must assess risks and potential costs that are 
involved when complying these requirements. For that, the company will prioritize and 
implement any corrective control measures deemed necessary. 
A GRC program can be just focused on an individual area, or segregated into different 
individual areas to monitor. The most common areas are: 
 Finance and audit GRC 
 IT GRC management 
 Enterprise risk management 
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In many enterprises GRC current state is very unorganized, complex and structured in a 
fragmented way. Business processes are not correctly integrated, so there are many 
vulnerabilities in the system. 
 
Figure 16: Current State of GRC in some organizations (SAP GRC, 2007) 
After deploying an automatized GRC solution that is focused on a risk-based approach, 
which rationalizes controls and redesigns procedures and it is supported by efficient 
technology tools, an enterprise will be able to standardize and streamline its processes 
through an integrated GRC system. 
 
 
Figure 17: Future State of GRC: organized, streamlined and efficient processes (SAP GRC, 2007) 
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After all being said, you may think GRC only affects big companies, or listed companies. 
However, GRC affects all companies, since corporate governance needs to be a critical 
concern independently of the size. 
GRC is not only about documentation and reporting that must comply with government 
policies. GRC helps companies to build prerequisites for ensuring good governance and 
risk controls, beyond statutory compliance. 
 
2.4.3 GRC Methodology 
GRC approach is based on the implementation of methodologies that help Corporate 
Governance to: 
1. Identify responsibilities of governance entities 
2. Identify roles and responsibilities identified in the enterprise 
3. Define risk in a common way throughout the organization 
4. Build a common approach in the vision of the organization goals 
5. Enabling responsibility for executive managers and business units 
6. Design a consistent architecture and infrastructure in line with demand 
7. Securing and monitoring this infrastructure 
8. Ensure good management and scaling it with support groups of the organization 
 
2.4.4 SAP GRC  
The SAP GRC solution is a complete set of tools that ensure that risks throughout all 
business departments are identified, mitigated and monitored, as well as access control 
techniques that are offered for managing business roles and user provisioning. 
Furthermore, this application provides compliance with current regulation on internal 
control and audit reports on critical access tasks. 
SAP GRC changes the work paradigm in the departments involved in internal audit, risk 
management, compliance and IT security. 
SAP GRC enables an integrated solution for risk and control, it helps companies to 
manage risk events and compliance over the whole organization, business processes and 
IT applications. 
The enterprise must face barriers such as legal normative, internal policies, external 
regulations and risk events, for example, if our operations are involved in unstable 
markets. Such events could prevent an organization to meet its objectives. 
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Enterprises' objectives include sales' growth, operational efficiency, brand reputation, 
customers' satisfaction... These objectives lead to different type of processes where 
diverse teams take part and control. 
These teams could be bounded up in 3: Risks management, Internal Control and 
Compliance, and IT security management. Depending on the enterprise size or 
structure, these teams could expand to other departments or areas. 
SAP GRC creates synergies among business areas, building a collaborative workplace for 
the mentioned teams. Together with the above three teams, Internal Audit 
Management must guarantee that all these control systems are working correctly. 
GRC is similar to the ERP concept, since it also creates synergies among different 
business processes. In this case, GRC creates synergies between different business areas 
and departments. The aim of an ERP is to manage the business. In contrast, GRC’s aim 
is to control the business. 
SAP GRC is a single product that integrates all this business information that involve 
different areas. As it affects diverse departments and it is formed by different 
functionalities, it may seem that SAP GRC is composed by different modules, but it is a 
unique system and highly integrated, not only with SAP components but with other ERPs 
or applications. 
 
 
Figure 18: Integration of Business Areas involved in GRC along with SAP GRC tools for management. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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SAP Risk management, SAP Process Control, SAP Access Control and SAP Audit 
Management are some of the tools provided by SAP GRC for implementing solutions to 
prevent fraud and manage risks in each of the enterprise areas involved in GRC. 
In a quick overview of these SAP GRC tools, following the order of Figure 18: 
1. SAP GRC Risk Management: supports both manual and automated risk 
identification and monitoring. 
2. SAP GRC Process Control: ensures visibility and control by centralizing key 
controls of business processes that cross multiple systems. 
3. SAP GRC Access Control: ensures adequate control of the segregation of duties 
4. SAP GRC Audit Management: improves the way audit processes are carried out, 
through streamlining audit processes with intuitive documentation and 
increasing its efficiency with better planning and reporting methods. 
However, SAP GRC Access Control is the most requested by companies since it allows 
to identify and analyze risks, manage user access, manage critical user access and user 
access provision. All-in-one. In addition, it is the most secure method for granting 
privileges in SAP. 
 
2.4.4.1 SAP GRC Access Control 
This tool enables enterprises to build a security model based on roles and 
authorizations that is designed upon the SoD model. 
As we have described in the previous sections, segregation of duties helps to separate 
different functions that combining with each other would result in a situation where 
employees can commit fraud. In order to avoid it, SoD separate these sensitive tasks 
into different actions, that in security terms, are defined as roles. These roles can be 
configured to perform only the activities permitted in this process. 
SAP GRC Access Control enables tools to build segregation of duties on the basis of a 
security architecture. As can be seen, this application is very powerful for the value it 
provides to firms: financial value, security value, business management, risk 
management value, internal control... 
SAP GRC approach is focused on the development of business roles based on functions. 
This implementation is closely linked to the HCM module and the combination of both 
modules is greatly increasing since enterprises could automatize privileges provisioning 
when hiring or firing staff in the master entity personnel. The connection to HCM is 
made at the functional role level (based on business processes) which is related to job 
positions or HCM functions to achieve the automation model. 
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Every SAP function is related to business processes and standard functionalities within 
these, so the roles that are created for users standardize enterprise processes in a 
secure way.  The role architecture that is built in SAP GRC has no compatibility problems, 
so it is complete and ready for assigning ‘cleanly’ these roles to users. Thus, it is a more 
sustainable and maintainable model over time. 
The role model built eradicates any hybrid role or custom roles for specific users in the 
organization, so it becomes easier to manage and administer, plus risks of dependency 
functions are mitigated. 
The basic tools that SAP GRC Access Control provides are: 
1. Analyze and Manage Risk (AMR) 
2. Emergency Access Management (EAM) 
3. Business Role Management (BRM) 
4. Access Request Management (ARM) 
5. Risk terminator 
All these tools are explained in further detail in the next section, where these tools are 
used for building a SoD project by using SAP GRC Access Control. Each of these SAP GRC 
AC submodules is intended for a determined phase of the project. However, they can be 
used simultaneously in different phases of the project if the firm needs them for specific 
reasons, such as reengineering roles or making changes in a test environment. 
 
Figure 19: SAP GRC Access Control functionalities. Source: Own elaboration. 
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3 ANALYSIS OF FRAUD: CAUSES AND PREVENTION 
One of the critical challenges faced by enterprises is the need to prevent fraud 
operations and manage them through appropriate security techniques in their 
information systems. 
In a situation whereby inaccuracy of accounting entries occurs, there are two possible 
reasons for the discrepancy: error or fraud. On one hand, errors are unintentionally 
made and they often take place due to computer malfunction or human error (lack of 
knowledge, carelessness). On the other hand, fraud is intentionally committed and it is 
used to gain a dishonest advantage, which is usually financial, over another person. 
Based on a research conducted between November 2014 and October 2015 on victims 
of cyber-crime in the UK, “70% of fraud is cyber enabled” (The City of London Police, 
2016). Cyber-crime is defined as any crime that involves a computer and a network. One 
of the multiple activities that involve cyber-crime is fraud and financial crimes. 
Regarding to the study mentioned, the City of London Police is currently investigating 
an estimated £600 million in financial losses due to fraud and cyber-crime. 
In this context, financial crimes can result from different ways: 
- Altering data in an unauthorized way using unauthorized processes and data 
exploiting security holes (vulnerabilities in the enterprise’s software system). 
- Altering, destroying, suppressing or stealing output, usually to conceal 
unauthorized transactions. 
- Altering or deleting stored data. 
Other bank frauds are using computer systems including bank fraud, carding, identity 
theft, extortion and theft of classified information.  
In section 3.2, there is an analysis of the four most significant financial fraud cases in the 
world: Enron, WorldCom, Bernie Madoff, Jérôme Kerviel and Pescanova. 
Other cyber-crime activity is ‘computer as a tool’ whose target is the individual and the 
tool is the computer, and it generally exploits human weaknesses or information 
security breaches. Some of these crimes are fraud and identity theft (using malware, 
hacking, phising…), information warfare, phising scams, spams and so on. This type of 
cyber-crime uses the computer as a tool and it generally exploits human weaknesses or 
information security breaches. The most outstanding IT fraud cases related to security 
breaches will be explained in section 3.3. 
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3.1 Fraud: types and causes 
 
In the category of financial fraud, there are three different means through fraud is 
committed: 
- Misappropriation of Assets: It occurs when an employee steals company assets. 
These can be physical assets: from office supplies to expensive items in 
inventory. Assets can also be monetary including cash or cash equivalents. These 
items are highly liquid and accessible. Poor internal controls provoke scenarios 
where employees can steal checks and cash them for themselves. 
 
- Misrepresentation of Financial Statements, or also known as ‘cooking the books’.  
It occurs when financial statements are intentionally misstated in order to make 
the financial position look better than it actually is. In order to get this 
appearance, reported revenues are increased and expenses are decreased.  
Misrepresenting balance sheet accounts can involve changing ratios such as the 
current or debt to equity ratios. 
  
- Corruption: Dishonest behavior by those in positions of power, such as managers 
or government officials. Corruption cases include giving or accepting bribes, 
double dealing, under-the-table transactions, conflicts of interests, improper 
handling of relationships with custom agents, extortion, diverting funds, 
improper payments… 
In order for fraud to occur, there must be given three conditions: rationalization by the 
person committing the fraud, pressure or incentives to commit the fraud and the 
opportunity to do so.    
These three factors compose ‘The Fraud Triangle’, created in the 1950 by Dr. Donald 
Cressey, a criminologist whose research focused on fraudsters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: The Fraud Triangle (Knop, 2016) 
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In 2004, Wolfe & Hermanson introduced the ‘The Fraud Diamond’ model, which added 
the fourth element: Capability.  
This factor is related to 
personal traits, how a person 
plays a certain role in 
committing that fraud such as 
being confident, stress-
dealing, authoritative and 
knowledgeable of the 
accounting systems and 
internal control weaknesses.  
 
 
In 2010, M. Kranacher proposed a model that mainly focused on one of these sides of 
the triangle: incentive or pressure, which she redefined as “Motivation of Fraud 
Perpetrators” (Dorminey, 2011). This factor was defined with the acronym MICE which 
stands for: Money, Ideology, Coercion and Ego. These type of motivators create that 
social pressure to commit fraudulent activities. However, as Dorminey argued, this 
model cannot solve the fraud problem since there are two sides that cannot be easily 
observed: pressure (or incentives or motivation), and rationalization, redefined as 
Personal Integrity in the Fraud Scale Model (Albrecht, 1984). 
The combination of above models is reinterpreted as the New Fraud Triangle Model 
(Kassem & Highson, 2012) to better understand why fraud is committed as an extension 
to Cressey’s fraud triangle model, including motivation, opportunity, integrity and 
fraudster’s capabilities as shown in figure 11 below. 
 
 
Figure 22: Combination of The Fraud Triangle and The Fraud Diamond: The New Fraud Triangle Model. 
Adapted from (Wells, Fraud Triangle, 2005) and (Lormel, 2012). 
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Figure 21: The Fraud Diamond (BDO Consulting (BDOC), 2010) 
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3.1.1 Individual vs Enterprise perspective 
This previous analysis of how fraud is committed and its motivators helps us to conclude 
that there are three sides of this triangle: motivation, fraudster’s capabilities and 
rationalization, that depend largely on the individual. Individual reasons to commit fraud 
can be affected by others, but this fact is problematic to be controlled by the enterprise.  
Fraudster’s capabilities are applicable to the individual’s skills such as the ability to deal 
with stress and pressure and confidence of not being detected. Capability is also 
affected by an authoritative position within the organization.  
There are many pressure sources that can ‘force’ the individual to commit fraud. When 
speaking about pressure sources, we are referring to different motivation inflows: 
 Personal pressure (gambling addiction; lack of personal discipline) 
 Corporate or employment pressure (continuous compensation structure; 
frustration with work) 
 External pressure (market expectations; social pressure). 
This pressure can come from either financial or non-financial pressure. The enterprise 
measures may create pressure on the individual, consciously or not, in order to commit 
fraud.  
Personal Integrity, as defined by the Fraud Scale, is “the personal code of ethical 
behavior each person adopts” (Albrecht, 1984). Rationalization is particularly applicable 
to financial reporting fraud, where sources of pressure are more observable such as 
analysts’ forecasts, managements’ earnings guidance and history of sales and earnings 
growth.  
These pressures encourage individuals to adopt a fraudulent behavior that allows them, 
for example, to avoid loss of customers or a decline in sales which can hurt dramatically 
their image, ego or their sales incentives. This fraudulent financial behavior is present to 
some degree in all enterprises.  
Nevertheless, opportunity is significantly different from the other triangle sides. This 
variable relies heavily on the enterprise opposition to fraud and the security measures 
it provides to prevent it. Enterprises must take a stand against fraud and endorse a 
healthy and safe work environment. 
Fraudsters can commit fraud when they have a position of trust in the company and 
have knowledge about certain shortcomings in the internal control structure so they can 
compromise security access controls without being noticed. 
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3.2 Accounting fraud & financial crimes 
In the last decade, many large cases of cybercrime have been noticeable due to 
accounting fraud. Some of these cases were carried out by a single individual, such as 
Bernard Madoff, Jérôme Kerviel and Manuel Fernández de Sousa. Usually, in these 
cases, justice is more severe and more comprehensive the market. However, when it 
comes to a company that leads the scam, reputation drops dramatically, along with its 
shares. The loss of trust in the company is immediate, severely damaging the firm, as 
happened with Enron and WorldCom, two of the largest US companies that staged the 
biggest financial scandals of the so-called globalization of capital markets. Simple 
operations marked by the ambition and greed, and not influenced by the financial crisis 
of 2008, which did affect Kerviel operations. 
Before analyzing every case in further detail, in the following table, there is an overview 
of the cases being reported and some relevant features about them, such as: 
1. Name of the company affected by fraud 
2. Weaknesses of the company affected by fraud, which are company’s failures that 
facilitated fraud to occur 
3. Name of the originator of fraud specifying if it was committed by an individual 
or a collective (the company to itself or a third party group) 
4. Intrinsic or extrinsic causes to individuals that incited them to commit fraud 
5. Fraud strategy: Action plan to carry out fraudulent operations 
6. Economic losses that resulted from fraud 
7. Year of occurrence of the case described 
Company 
affected 
Company’s 
weaknesses & 
failures 
Originator of 
fraud: 
Individual or 
Collective 
Cause for 
committing fraud 
Fraud strategy 
Economic 
losses1 
Year 
Enron Individualism, 
undefined code 
of conduct, lack 
of access control, 
poor financial 
reporting 
Arthur 
Andersen 
Consulting 
(Collective) 
Huge incentives 
and bonuses if 
increased profits 
- Destroying 
compromising 
documents in which 
billions in debt were 
hidden 
- Took advantage of 
accounting loopholes 
and special purpose 
entities 
$ 63.4 
billion 
losses 
2001 
                                                     
1 Figures of economic losses are represented in American billion dollars. American billion dollars are 
expressed as a thousand of million dollars. However, Spanish billion dollars are expressed as a million of 
million dollars. It is important not to confuse them since they are not equivalent. 
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WorldCom Weak internal 
control for Top 
Management and 
Accounting 
Department 
WorldCom 
Accounting 
Department, 
CEO & CFO 
(Collective) 
$10 million in 
bonuses to CEO 
& CFO when not 
making profits 
 
- Incorrect posting of 
operating costs as 
expenditure cost on 
the Balance Sheet 
- Loans & transfers 
granted not allowed 
by GAAP 
$ 3.8 
billion 
losses 
2002 
Madoff 
Investment 
Securities 
(BMIS) 
Lack of internal 
control 
procedures 
BMIS’s CEO: 
Bernie Madoff 
(Individual) 
High reputation 
in Wall Street, 
along with an 
authoritative 
position in BMIS 
- Ponzi scheme: 
pyramidal fraud of 
investments 
- Gaining potential 
clients in exclusive 
clubs in the U.S. 
$50 
billion 
losses to 
customers 
2008 
Société 
Générale 
Lack of internal 
control and poor 
supervision by 
Société officials 
Unhealthy 
corporate culture 
Jérôme Kerviel 
(Individual) 
Lonely, very 
ambitious and 
authorized trader 
Eagerness to 
progress and 
advance 
Make profits for 
the bank 
- Abuse of forgery and 
trust in Société IS 
- Observation of 
financial rules for 
trespassing them 
- Taking speculative 
positions on stock 
market 
€ 4.9 
billion 
losses 
2008 
Pescanova Lack of internal 
control over 
associations and 
poor supervision 
of Chairman 
activities 
Manuel 
Fernández de 
Sousa, 
Pescanova 
Chairman 
(Individual) 
Recognized 
businessman 
with many 
contacts 
worldwide 
High interest in 
hiding its losses. 
- Creation of offshore 
entities, related to 
‘Panama Papers’ 
- Taking his own 
decisions without 
board approval 
- Making stock market 
manipulation in 
relation to its own 
shares 
$ 3.28 
billion 
losses 
2012 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Cases about Accounting Fraud & Financial Cybercrime: Companies’ Weaknesses, 
Originators of Fraud, Causes for committing it, Fraud Strategy, Economic Losses and Year of Occurrence. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
It is noticeable that all cases presented in the table above show internal fraud, i.e. 
carried out by employees of the organization; while Enron and Pescanova are not only 
internal fraud cases since they were also supported by external auditors from Arthur 
Andersen, and BDO respectively. 
 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
50 | Analysis of Fraud 
 
 Enron  
Enron Corporation, the largest power distribution company, led to bankruptcy in 
October 2001 when the Arthur Andersen failure audit was uncovered through an 
exhaustive investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Arthur Andersen was one of the five largest audit and accounting firms in the world 
until this scandal came to light. So far, Arthur Andersen was auditing Enron 
accounting for 16 years. 
Enron developed a team of executives who were able to hide billions in debt from 
failed deals and projects. In order to hide them, managers took advantage of 
accounting loopholes, special purpose entities and poor financial reporting.  
Andersen auditing was suspected of having destroyed compromising documents, in 
which Enron had camouflaged its precarious financial situation, specifically losses 
that reached $ 63.4 billion. Its liabilities amounted to more than $30 billion. Apart 
from that, the Enron scandal was the largest bankruptcy reorganization in US history. 
Enron employees and shareholders received limited returns in lawsuits, despite 
losing billions in savings, pensions and stock prices. 
In October 2002, Arthur Andersen was fined $500,000 and sentenced to five years 
of probation for obstruction of justice in connection with its handling of Enron 
documents. (The New York Times, 2002) Arthur Andersen’s relationship with its 
customers was seriously injured, losing 650 of its 2,300 public sector customers in 
the US and others abroad. (La Nación | El Mundo, 2002) 
The causes of this scandal were incentives to managers. They earned huge bonuses 
if they increased profits at all costs. (Silverstein, 2013) 
Some of the lessons we can learn from Enron scandal is that there must be a clear 
mission and a code of ethics that is inculcated to its employees. Teamwork is very 
important, so employees do not focus on their own interests and profits but the 
enterprise’s success.  However, employees have to cooperate without violating the 
corporate codes of conduct established. Rationalization of individuals can be 
affected wrongly in a teamwork environment if employees have in mind that ‘the 
whole team is participating’ in the fraud, and therefore, are subject to some peer 
pressure that leads them to commit fraud.  
Besides what discussed above, it is evident that managers and auditors had access 
controls to hide information or alter records in their financial reports. In the next 
section, it will be explained the legislation that emerged in the wake of the Enron 
scandal: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  
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 WorldCom  
The telecommunications corporation WorldCom, now known as MCI, Inc.  was the 
United States’ second largest long distance telephone company, after AT&T. 
WorldCom experienced rapid growth in the 1990s by acquiring other telcom 
companies, such as Williams Telecommunications Group Inc for $2.5 billion and MCI 
Communications Inc. for $40 billion. After 65 acquisitions, the company was very 
competitive and WorldCom’s stock was trading above $64 per share.  
This company’s growth came to a halt when fraudulent accounting methods were 
uncovered. In 2002, WorldCom incurred in operating costs (mostly costs associated 
with using outsourced network services, called “line costs”) that were posted 
wrongly as capital expenditures on the balance sheet instead of expenses. (Universia 
Knowledge@Wharton, 2003) Moreover, Worldcom granted large personal loans to 
the CEO Bernie Ebbers totaling around $400 million. All these transfers were not in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The SEC filed 
fraud charges against WorldCom. At that time, stocks were trading around $15 per 
share. Auditors’ investigations revealed $3.8 billion worth of fraud, being thus the 
second largest accounting fraud in American history. 
Regarding to the causes of fraud assessed earlier, WorldCom CEO received $7.5 
million in bonuses in 1999 and CFO, Scott Sullivan, $2.76 million, when the company 
was not making profits. Incentives were not measured by performance goals and 
this was a very strong motivation for CEO and CFO to commit fraud. Top 
management and accounting employees who committed fraud could override 
internal controls to commit fraud, so opportunity evidently existed. 
 Bernie Madoff scandal 
The Madoff investment scandal is the major case of stock and 
securities fraud discovered in United States. Bernard L. Madoff, 
founder and CEO of Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS) and one of 
the most active investors in the last 50 years, was the sole author of 
one of the biggest financial scams. In late 2008, Bernard Madoff was arrested by FBI 
after admitting that his business was a large ‘Ponzi scheme’ that had caused $50 
billion losses to customers. In June of 2009, Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in 
prison. (Calvo, 2013) 
A Ponzi scheme is a pyramidal fraud investment operation: the promised return to 
investors is paid from new capital paid by the entry of new customers. The scheme 
was named after Charles Ponzi notorious technique in 1920, which was closely 
followed by Bernie Madoff. 
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In order to operate with so many investors, Madoff convinced them “using” a split 
strike strategy2, so it was possible to make money in both rising and failing markets. 
(Análisis Global, 2009) This attractive and exclusive product along with Madoff 
reputation for being co-founder and ex-president of the board of the US Nasdaq 
index (one of the most important stock indexes in the world) was spread by word of 
mouth among the wealthiest millionaires and investment banking. 
In this case, this financial scam is caused by low risk benefits which are really secure 
and a prestigious investor. His image and authoritative position is a source of 
capability of fraud, and his Ponzi scheme evidences the lack of internal control 
procedures in BMIS, so opportunity exists. 
 Jérôme Kerviel  
Jérôme Kerviel is the personification of financial scandal 
in France. Kerviel is an ambitious young trader of modest 
origin who was working in the French bank Societé 
Générale for 8 years. Société Générale is one of the main financial services’ 
companies in Europe. 
In January of 2008, he was sentenced to five years in prison and to repay 4,900 
million euros to Société Générale for taking speculative positions on the stock 
market that caused a large hole in the accounts of the entity. In addition, in 2012, 
Kerviel was convicted of abuse of trust, forgery and fraudulent introduction of data 
into the computer system of Société Générale. (Benito, 2012) 
In march of 2014 after several trials, the French Supreme Court changed the 
sentence of three years in prison for Jérôme Kerviel and decided to cancel the huge 
compensation of 4,900 million euros that the bank requested to Kerviel. (Mora, 
2014) 
Kerviel started his financial tricks buying amounts of shares of a company in Tokyo 
or Hong Kong and then sold them immediately in Paris or New York taking advantage 
of very small price differences. Later on, he tried to hide bad investments in risky 
products. He bought large blocks of shares, withheld them and sold them when 
rising markets. Kerviel concealed the risks taking inverse operations with fake 
counterparts. Because of the financial crisis and falling markets, he was not able to 
sell them so he embarked in the futures market, betting he was going to sell huge 
                                                     
2 Split strikes conversions involves buying stocks of large companies, and also buying and selling options 
of those same securities. This strategy was not actually followed by Madoff, but the strategy he told all 
his investors he was carrying out. 
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number of shares in a determined period, until he was discovered committing 
50,000 million euros in the unstable futures market. 
However, Kerviel maintained his innocence during the trial and confessed that his 
managers knew these operations at all times, stating that he was the patsy so he 
claimed responsibility to Société officials for bank losses. 
This is a case where opportunity definitely existed. Gauls securities regulators fined 
€4 million to Société for serious shortcomings in the system of internal control. 
Additionally, his capabilities as an authorized trader in the Société system helped 
him to conduct this fraud. He observed during years the controls to break the 
financial rules and hide shares. When he broke the rules, his rationalization changed. 
He thought of the bank day and night and changed his life, left his girlfriend... Fraud 
changed his behavior. Kerviel eagerness to progress and advance to the first line of 
the bank, along with the lack of review and control of his managers made the fraud 
occur. 
 Pescanova 
The last enterprise affected by fraudulent financial 
operations is Pescanova. Pescanova is one of the 
world’s largest fishing groups, founded in Spain in 
1960 by José Fernández López. The Pescanova 
group currently operates in 24 countries over the 5 continents. Pescanova was an 
example of successful vertical integration, controlling all stages in the supply chain. 
The main character of this case is Manuel Fernández de Sousa, Chairman of 
Pescanova when the scandal broke. He inherited the company that his father (Jose 
Fernandez Lopez), a successful and influential businessman and entrepreneur in 
Madrid and Galicia, built up. Sousa stood out for a superior education level (studied 
abroad a senior management course) and a high ability for social relations. His 
capabilities as a recognized manager and Chairman were unquestionable. 
However, he also had conflicts with many people since he was so important that he 
only spoke with exclusive managers or presidents. This was the main reason he took 
his own decisions without taking into consideration the executive team, the board 
of Pescanova and even his family, who were also placed in management positions in 
the group’s subsidiaries. This was one of the main failures in the company, the 
capability of its Chairman to take decisions without approval of the board of 
directors. Undoubtedly, the Chairman user had higher privileges in the system and 
it was not well controlled and regulated. 
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The risky decisions that Sousa carried out were uncovered in 2012, in the annual 
report that the BDO, Pescanova’s auditing firm, published. One of Pescanova 
shareholders filed a lawsuit against BDO, which was charged for an alleged crime of 
falsification of economic and financial information. Specifically, BDO reported losses 
amounting 1,483 million euros, when the actual amount reached 2,700 million 
euros.  
Then, the company suspended its auditors BDO and hired KPMG to carry out a 
forensic analysis of its accounts. (Reuters, 2013). Pescanova revised its balance sheet 
of 2012 and recognized that kept double accounting. Pescanova stated that the 
accumulated 1,850 million euros of debt was distributed among Spanish 
subsidiaries, foreign subsidiaries and in the core company in Galicia. Adding up 
commitments and debts to suppliers, the real figure of debt amounted about 4,000 
million euros (approximately 4,469 million dollars), almost 4 times what was initially 
recognized. 
In addition, Sousa revealed that before the firm scandal when Pescanova shares 
were trading highly (between 13.45 to 17.99), he sold his 7.2 percent stake in the 
firm. Approximately, he could have raised at least 27 million euros. (Reuters, 2013) 
Due to this fact, the National Securities Market Commission (often abbreviated as 
CNMV) imposed fines to Pescanova for a total amount of 450,000 euros and to its 
executive president Manuel Fernandez de Sousa 225.000 euros for violations of the 
Law on Securities Market. (La Voz de Galicia, 2015) 
KPMG certified that Pescanova operated with a large group of offshore companies 
spread over all kind of tax havens (El Confidencial, 2016). Recently, the information 
collected from the “Panama papers” detected that Sousa actually created offshore 
entities through a Panamanian law firm (Mossack Fonseca) in British Virgin Islands. 
These entities were registered in this tax haven to hide the identity of its owner 
(Sousa) and for avoiding taxes, paying a very low rate or not paying at all.  
After Pescanova bankruptcy in 2013, Sousa requested urgently to Mossack Fonseca 
a certificate proving that his companies were disabled and all its assets belonged 
only to himself, so he could exculpate the other members of the board of Pescanova  
(infoLibre, 2016) 
Despite Sousa amendments, he was obviously fired from the company. The company 
changed its top management and was restructured under a new company brand, 
"Nueva Pescanova".  
 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
55 | Analysis of Fraud 
 
3.3 Cybercrime: Fraud & Security Breaches 
Fraud in cybercrime is not only related to accounting problems as the cases we have 
reviewed above. The computers, information systems or access controls of an enterprise 
can be compromised to exploit security holes. This is the scenario of cybercrime that 
takes the ‘computer as a tool’ to commit fraud. 
Cyberattacks and security 
Nowadays computer security suffers threats that result in many cases in huge economic 
losses. Thefts of corporate information cannot only undermine confidence in the 
enterprise, but jeopardize its economic survival. 
Based on a recent research (CISCO & BT, 2016), these are some shocking figures about 
security attacks: 
 169 million of entities were theft only in 2015.  
 300 million of malware files are created yearly. 
 97% of Fortune 500 enterprises have been hacked. 
 Every 2 seconds there is an identity theft in the US. 
 Cyberattacks increase on an annual 48% basis. 
Cybersecurity is not anymore a one-time strategy performed to avoid possible attacks. 
Companies cannot underestimate the possibility that a major attack happen to them, 
because attacks are getting more intense and sophisticated, and online information 
theft is currently very strong. For this reason, companies must be fully involved in the 
security standards deployed, since cybersecurity is a “permanent process which seeks 
to eliminate weaknesses, and to be more intelligent than the attacker”, as described by 
a Rand Corporation study published in 2015. Cybersecurity is a continuous process 
where departments such as risks, security, internal control… have to work and 
collaborate together to develop security at all levels. 
3.3.1 Security Breaches Cases 
Over the last 10 years, some relevant cases have stood out due to the vast amounts of 
information hacked. All these data breaches recorded are reported in 2004 or beyond, 
mainly since the rapid growth of data. This fact gives cyber criminals more opportunities 
to expose massive volumes of data in a single breach. 
Before analyzing every case in further detail, in the following table there is an overview 
of the cases being reported and some relevant features about them, such as: 
1. Name of the company affected by fraud 
2. Weaknesses of the company affected by fraud, which are company’s failures that 
facilitated fraud to occur 
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3. Name of the originator of fraud specifying if it was committed by an individual 
or a collective (the company to itself or a third party group) 
4. Leak method developed regarding to cyberattacks (Cases have been 
documented and sorted by this factor) 
5. Fraud strategy: Action plan to carry out fraudulent operations 
6. Economic or data losses that resulted from fraud 
7. Year of occurrence of the case described 
Company 
affected 
Company’s 
weaknesses 
Originator 
of fraud 
Leak 
method 
Fraud strategy 
Economic or data 
losses 
Year 
AOL Lack of access 
control tools, 
poor security of 
critical customer 
data 
Jason 
Smathers: 
Individual 
Inside 
job 
- Access to critical data 
using other employee 
credentials 
- Selling millions of 
customers’ email 
addresses to spammers 
92 million screen 
names and email 
addresses stolen 
2004 
Court 
Ventures 
Lack of access 
control tools, 
poor security of 
critical customer 
data 
Court 
Ventures: 
Collective 
Inside 
job 
- Access to critical data 
stored in a third-party 
database (US Info Search) 
- Reselling consumer data 
to a Vietnamese ID thief  
200 million 
consumer records 
sold (SSN, credit 
card data, bank 
account data) 
2012 
T.J.Maxx Weak WEP 
encryption of 
data in the stores 
system 
A hackers’ 
band: 
Collective 
 
Hacking - Packet sniffer installed on 
the network which 
collected real-time data & 
payment info 
- Stolen data sold to ID 
thieves 
94 million of Visa 
and MasterCard 
accounts exposed 
2007 
Heartland 
Payment 
Systems 
(HPY) 
Poor protection 
of sensitive data 
against SQL 
injection attacks 
Unknown 
intruders: 
Collective 
 
Hacking - Sniffer malware installed 
in the HPY application 
- SQL injection attacks that 
read customer data 
134 million credit 
card holder data, 
SSN stolen;  
$110 million paid 
for claims 
2008 
EBay Employees’ 
unconsciousness 
of security and 
the risk that pose 
ID credentials 
A group of 
hackers: 
Collective 
Hacking 
 
- Obtained login credentials 
from a group of 
employees 
- Accessed a consumer 
records’ database and 
changed their credentials 
145 million users’ 
passwords had to 
be changed since 
they were 
modified 
2014 
SWIFT Insufficient 
banks’ internal 
security measures 
‘Lazarus’, 
a hackers’ 
band: 
Collective  
Hacking - Stole credentials to order 
illegal transfers from 
Bangladesh Bank reserves 
to accounts in Philippines. 
- Malware on Alliance 
Access network 
$81 million stolen 
to the Bangladesh 
Central bank 
reserves 
 
2016 
Table 3: Analysis of Cases about Cybercrime & Security breaches: Companies’ Weaknesses, Originators of 
Fraud, Leak method, Fraud Strategy, Losses and Year of Occurrence. Source: Own elaboration. 
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 AOL 
In 2004, Jason Smathers, a software engineer in America Online Inc., stole 92 million3 
screen names and email addresses using another employee’s access code. The 
stolen list included multiple email addresses of AOL customers in 2003 in Virginia. 
He then sold this information to spammers who sent out unwanted gambling 
advertisements to AOL subscribers, specifically up to 7 billion unwanted emails. This 
case could have been prevented using appropriate techniques for access control. 
 Court Ventures 
In March 2012, Experian (the US leading global information services company that 
provides data and analytic tools) acquired Court Ventures (Lord, 2015). Court 
Ventures is a company that focuses on collecting court records which contain 
personally identifiable information (PII). One of Court Ventures’ subcontractors was 
US Info Search, with whom Court Ventures customers could find people addresses 
to determine which court records to review. The US Secret Service notified that 
Court Ventures was reselling data from a US Info Search database to a third party: 
ID thieves like a 25-year-old Vietnamese man, Hieu Minh Ngo, among others. (Krebs 
on Security, 2015) 200 million4 consumer records including Social Security numbers, 
credit card data and bank account information were compromised. 
In the previous cases, the leak method used was performed inside the company, either 
by a former employee who committed identity theft to access to consumer data in order 
to sell it, or by a company that permits the sale of third party’s data to an identity thief. 
These cases are examples of ‘inside job’ as a leak method. These scenarios show how 
some employees compromised information by inappropriate access to critical data. 
 T.J.Maxx  
TJ Maxx breach is the largest retail breach to date: 94 million5 of Visa and MasterCard 
accounts were exposed to potential fraud. T.J.Maxx is an American department store 
chain with more than 1,000 stores. T.J.Maxx infringement occurred because of a 
weak WEP encryption in use in two of its Marshalls stores in Miami. Once intruders 
had access, they installed a packet sniffer on the T.J.Maxx network, which collected 
data from real-time operations, including data stored on payment cards. Thus, 
                                                     
3 92 million screen names and email addresses stolen, figure contrasted among different sources: (NBC 
News, 2005) (The Washington Post, 2004) (WIRED, 2004) 
4 200 million consumer records compromised, figure contrasted among different sources: (Experian, 2014) 
(Krebs on Security, 2015) 
5 94 million of credit card accounts exposed, figure contrasted among different sources: (ABC News, 2007) 
(NBC News, 2007) (The New York Times, 2007) 
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hackers were able to appropriate data of millions of customers.  The hackers band 
used some of the account numbers stolen for personal use while others were sold 
to other international data thieves.  
The fraud committed by T.J.Maxx highlighted the increased vulnerability to theft of 
personal information. T.J.Maxx case which occurred in 2007 was one of the largest 
scandals before the cases mentioned above, such as Heartland, eBay, Court 
Ventures… 
 Heartland  
Heartland Payment Systems (HPY), a leading payment processing company, is 
recognized as the largest credit card scam in history. This attack happened in 2008 
when Heartland systems were compromised by a sniffer malware. 134 million6 credit 
card holder names and numbers as well as Social Security numbers were exposed 
through SQL injection attacks.  
Heartland paid more than $110 million to Visa, MasterCard, American Express and 
other card associations to settle claims related to the breach. (Pepitone & 
Remizowski, 2012) Then, HPY informed about this breach to cardholders and advises 
them to analyze their monthly statements to prevent any suspicious activity.  
Unknown intruders used SQL injection attack, which consists of insertion of a SQL 
query via data input or transmitted from the client to the web application. This 
attack enables to read sensitive data from a database, modify data, execute admin 
operations, and so on. 
 eBay  
A group of hackers attacked the company between late February and early March in 
2014. They obtained the login credentials to access from a small number of 
employees. Then, they accessed an enterprise database which contained all users’ 
records and copied some of these credentials. Exactly 145 million7 users were 
affected and were forced to change their passwords. After this scandal came to light, 
eBay shares fell to their lowest value of the last 2 years. 
This cyberattack led by a hacker group took advantage of an enterprise weakness: 
employees of the company. In other cases, hackers exploit hardware or software 
weaknesses, however, employees are a major cause of attacks. Enterprises usually 
                                                     
6 134 million credit card holder names and numbers and SSN exposed, figure contrasted among different 
sources: (COMODO, 2013) (Bloomberg, 2009) (PCADvisor, 2012) 
7 145 million users affected, figure contrasted among different sources: (Reuters, 2014) (Business Insider, 
2014) (The Washington Post, 2014) 
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do not make employees conscious of the importance of their credentials, passwords 
or the data they manage, which is critical for hackers or any identity thief. 
 Bangladesh Bank & SWIFT  
In the last case presented regarding to cybersecurity, the main 
character is Lazarus, the most sophisticated hackers’ band in the world. Since 2009, 
Lazarus is linked to a series of cyberattacks targeting US and South Korean 
organizations (Global Cybersec, 2016). This North Korean band is specialized in 
executing fraudulent transactions over the SWIFT network. This is why Lazarus is the 
major suspect of the largest cyber heist in history, occurred in Bangladesh Central 
Bank.  
Hackers planned an ingenious strategy to attack the global financial messaging 
system that secure interbank operations: SWIFT. Approximately 11,000 financial 
institutions use the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide InterBank Financial 
Telecommunications) financial platform. Additionally, many of these banks have 
installed the Alliance Access software, which banks and other clients use to interface 
with SWIFT. (Finkle, 2016) 
Last January, this group of hackers took advantage of some weaknesses of Alliance 
Access software and intrude into the Bangladesh Central Bank’s systems. Once they 
accessed, they stole its credentials to execute payment transfers. They sent 35 
SWIFT requests to the Federal Reserve at New York in order to transfer Bangladesh 
Central Bank funds to accounts in Philippines and Sri Lanka. The initial robbery 
involved an amount of $951 million. $101 million were actually transferred, but the 
remaining amount was blocked by the Fed because of a misspelling in one of the 
transactions. An order to ‘Fandation Shalika’ instead of ‘Foundation Shalika’ ruined 
the fraud, since the Federal Reserve could not find a bank with the exact recipient. 
US $20 million were recovered in Sri Lanka bank, however $81 million8 were hidden 
beneath the lax legislation existing in the Philippine casinos. These fraudulent 
transfers were covered up through the malware implemented and distributed. 
EBay, Heartland, T.J.Maxx and Bangladesh Central Bank were cases where the method 
of leak was hacking. Hacking methods like installing packet sniffers or SQL injection are 
more sophisticated examples than just using employee’s credentials like in eBay. These 
cases deployed phishing techniques since they ‘harvest’ personal information such as ID 
credentials, credit account numbers and passwords... to commit fraudulent operations. 
                                                     
8 81 million of credit card accounts exposed, figure contrasted among different sources:  
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However, all these cases show weaknesses of the companies affected that hackers 
exploited to compromise data and jeopardize the enterprise survival causing poor brand 
image, distrust, huge economic losses… 
As consequence of these significant cases where fraud and cybercrime have been 
notable, there is an important effort of governments to regulate these scandals, so 
companies can prevent them whether they occur because of an inside job or external 
factors such as cyberattacks through hacking, phising, sniffing and so on. 
 
3.3.2 Cost of Implementation of Security Measures to prevent breaches and 
fraud 
 
Regarding to the security cases analyzed above, there have been collected some 
solutions that could help companies to prevent fraud and security breaches. 
In the table below, there have been captured the failures of these companies, fraud 
strategy and their losses, represented in 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns (also previously 
exposed in Figure 13). In the 5th column, there are have been considered some security 
measures that could be acquired by a company in order to avoid any future failure 
regarding to its security holes. These could be used as examples for other enterprises 
that face similar weaknesses. In the 6th column, there have been listed the costs that 
should be incurred. 
Costs of these measures not only depend on the enterprise size, but the security system 
already installed in the company, the applications involved for its business processes, 
the web tools installed for controlling access and users’ privileges and the number of 
users that access the system, among others. 
The tool that is being analyzed in this thesis for access control and regulate internal 
policies and risks is SAP GRC Access Control. This tool enables to reduce intrinsic risks in 
business processes, create automatically alerts when risks are detected, implements 
remediation controls for risk violations, checks mandatory compliance over risk 
mitigation, automates user access, role authorizations, and so on. 
However, in the following table, there has been noted another system for protecting our 
data and securing information, IBM Security Guardium. This product guarantees 
security, privacy and data integrity in the enterprise data center. It enables data 
encryption and other tools for classification of sensitive data and alerts when there have 
been data changes or intruders in the system. 
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9 SoD is referred to Segregation of Duties. This concept will be explained in further detail in the next 
section, specifically in section 4.2. Segregation of Duties. 
 FAILURES AND LOSSES ASSOCIATED SECURITY SOLUTIONS AND THEIR 
COSTS 
Company 
affected 
Company’s 
weaknesses 
Fraud Strategy Economic or 
data losses 
Security measures Implementation 
cost of these 
measures 
AOL Lack of access 
control tools, 
poor security of 
critical customer 
data 
Access to critical 
data using other 
employee 
credentials 
Selling millions of 
customers’ email 
addresses to 
spammers 
92 million 
screen 
names and 
email 
addresses 
stolen 
Web Access Control 
Authorization 
architecture in the 
enterprise security 
system (SoD9 model) 
Data privacy system 
 
Cost of a similar 
tool to SAP GRC 
Access Control and 
its implementation 
Cost of a similar 
tool to IBM 
Security Guardium 
 
Court 
Ventures 
Lack of access 
control tools, 
poor security of 
critical customer 
data 
Access to critical 
data stored in a 
third-party 
database (US 
Info Search) 
Reselling 
consumer data to 
a Vietnamese ID 
thief  
200 million 
consumer 
records sold 
(SSN, credit 
card data, 
bank account 
data) 
Web Access Control 
Data privacy system 
Authorization 
architecture in the 
enterprise security 
system (SoD model) 
 
Cost of a similar 
tool to SAP GRC 
Access Control and 
its implementation 
 
eBay Employees’ 
unconsciousness 
of security and 
the risk that 
pose ID 
credentials 
Obtained login 
credentials from 
a group of 
employees 
Accessed a 
consumer 
records’ 
database and 
changed their 
credentials 
145 million 
users’ 
passwords 
had to be 
changed 
since they 
were 
modified 
Web Access Control 
Data privacy system 
Authorization 
architecture in the 
enterprise security 
system (SoD model) 
Security Awareness 
and Training Policy 
 
Cost of a similar 
tool to SAP GRC 
Access Control and 
its implementation 
Cost of a similar 
tool to IBM 
Security Guardium 
Cost of Security 
Awareness Training 
Courses 
Heartland 
Payment 
Systems 
(HPY) 
Poor protection 
of sensitive data 
against SQL 
injection attacks 
Sniffer malware 
installed in the 
HPY application 
SQL injection 
attacks that read 
customer data 
134 million 
credit card 
holder data, 
SSN stolen;  
$110 million 
paid for 
claims 
IDS implementation 
to detect any sniffer 
malware 
Data privacy system 
Database protection 
procedures to 
prevent SQL attacks 
Cost of an IDS 
deployments 
Cost of a similar 
tool to IBM 
Security Guardium 
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Table 4: Analysis of failures committed and security solutions that could have prevented them from 
occurring. Source: Own Elaboration. 
The cost of implementation and Segregation of Duties (SoD) configuration of a tool as 
SAP GRC Access Control depends on several factors: 
- Number of business processes under the enterprise management (this is 
referred in this case to SAP modules). The cost will vary depending on the 
number of SAP modules implemented in the enterprise, since more modules 
signify more SoD conflicts to analyze. 
- Number of users that access the system (SAP or other applications). 
- Type of system where the security architecture is implemented: SAP or non-SAP 
system. If the access control structure is configured on a non-SAP application will 
require more time and effort to make it work properly and streamlined with SAP 
GRC AC. 
- Number of transactions executed per year in SAP, or in other applications 
These various factors can be interpreted as variables for our cost analysis: 
Variable X: Number of business processes. X is unknown, it cannot be known which 
business processes are carried out under the enterprise management or which 
processes are outsourced. 
Variable Y: Number of users that access the system. Y could be estimated as the number 
of employees in the firm. 
T.J.Maxx Weak WEP 
encryption of 
data in the 
stores system 
Packet sniffer 
installed on the 
network which 
collected real-
time data & 
payment info 
Stolen data sold 
to ID thieves 
94 million of 
Visa and 
MasterCard 
accounts 
exposed 
IDS implementation 
to detect any sniffer 
malware 
Data privacy system 
Establish WPA2 
wireless network 
encryption 
Cost of securing 
WiFi 
Cost of 
implementing 
WPA2 Enterprise 
Encryption on their 
WLAN 
SWIFT & 
Bangladesh 
Bank 
Insufficient 
banks’ internal 
security 
measures 
Stole credentials 
to order illegal 
transfers from 
Bangladesh Bank 
reserves to 
accounts in 
Philippines. 
Malware on 
Alliance Access 
network 
$81 million 
stolen to the 
Bangladesh 
Central bank 
reserves 
 
IDS implementation 
to detect any sniffer 
malware 
Web Access Control 
Data privacy system 
Authorization 
architecture in the 
enterprise security 
system (SoD model) 
Cost of a similar 
tool to SAP GRC 
Access Control and 
its implementation 
Cost of a similar 
tool to IBM 
Security Guardium 
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Variable Z: Type of security system used. Z is also unknown, since it cannot be analyzed 
particular systems that the enterprises reviewed actually use. 
Variable K: Number of transactions executed. K is also an unknown variable, since it 
cannot be analyzed particular systems that the enterprises reviewed actually use. 
 
3.3.2.1 Security Software & Compliance Requirements 
Considering the size of the enterprises mentioned, taking as reference the number of 
employees and estimating the number of transactions that can be executed in SAP, the 
result will be the cost of compliance with Segregation of Duties and security regulations. 
If a user executes in SAP approximately 10 transactions daily and work for 260 days 
yearly (subtracting weekends), the number of transactions executed yearly can be 
calculated from the product of the latter factors. In addition, only 60% of users have 
been indicated as potential users of SAP GRC and other security tools. 
 
Enterprise 
Affected 
Number of 
employees 
Number of employees 
that use ERPs and 
security tools (60%) 
Number of 
transactions 
executed 
yearly 
HPY 3,734 2,240.4 5,825,040 
Bangladesh 
Bank 
5,071 3,042.6 7,910,760 
Aol 5,600 3,360 8,736,000 
Ebay 11,600 6,960 18,096,000 
Court Ventures 17,000 10,200 26,520,000 
T.J.Maxx 198,000 118,800 308,880,000 
 
Table 5: Number of transactions executed yearly by users from the enterprises affected. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
When enterprises overcome 6 million transactions executed yearly, the cost of offering 
security compliance such as PCI for credit cards (as it could apply in the SWIFT case) 
amounts $50,000 and above. 
The cost of regulation measures is related to the number of transactions executed yearly 
by an enterprise, as seen above. 
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Enterprise 
Affected 
Number of 
employees 
Number of 
employees that 
may  use SAP 
GRC AC (1%) 
SAP GRC 
Access 
Control 
License 
IBM 
Security 
Guardium 
License 
TOTAL COST 
of both 
solutions 
HPY 3,734 37.34 7,430.66 3,696.66 $ 11,127.32 
Bangladesh Bank 5,071 50.71 10,091.29 5,020.29 $ 15,111.58 
Aol 5,600 56 11,144.00 5,544.00 $ 16,688.00 
Ebay 11,600 116 23,084.00 11,484.00 $ 34,568.00 
Court Ventures 17,000 170 33,830.00 16,830.00 $ 50,660.00 
T.J.Maxx 198,000 1,980 394,020.00 196,020.00 $ 590,040.00 
 
Table 6: Security Software Solutions for the enterprises affected by security breaches. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
Estimating a SAP GRC Access Control license for 1 user yearly for the amount of $199, it 
can be then calculated the cost of these licenses for all users that require access to this 
tool in every company reviewed. IBM Security Guardium license for 1 user amounts $99 
yearly, based on cost estimations in comparison with other IBM Security products. 
In the table above, it has been estimated that only 1% of users in the company will 
require access to this tool, since it is mainly used by a reduced group of Security 
Administrators and some employees from the Internal Control & Fraud, and Risks 
departments. 
3.3.2.2 Personnel Costs 
In order to provide a complete SoD architecture based on risks and adjust in a tool as 
SAP GRC Access Control, it is required a group of security consultants, analysts and 
support members (among others) working on this project. The total cost of this team 
amounts a total of $529,464.00 for a period of time of 3,120 hours (40 hrs/week): 78 
weeks, approximately lasting 1 year and a half. This is the average duration of these 
projects.  
Job position 
Number of 
Members 
Cost/hour ($) 
Number of 
hours 
Total Cost ($) 
Analyst of Business Processes 2 56.00  936              52,416.00  
Fraud Risks Consultant 1            51.00  624              31,824.00  
IT Security Technical Consultant 2             62-00  1,560 96,720.00  
SAP Functional Consultant 1             51.00  936              47,736.00  
IT Security Support members 3               39.00  1,872              73,008.00  
Project Manager 1              73.00  3,120           227,760.00  
  10   3,120           $  529,464.00  
 
Table 7: Personnel costs for a SoD project. Source: Own elaboration. 
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3.3.2.3 Total Costs 
 
The total costs of the software solutions cost and the personnel cost contracted for this 
project would determine the total cost shown in the last column, which ranges from 
$590,591.32 in the case of a ‘smaller’ company as HPY to $1,159,504 in the T.J.Maxx 
case, which represents a very large company. 
Enterprise 
Affected 
Regulations 
Compliance 
 Software Cost Personnel Cost TOTAL COST 
HPY $           50,000  $           11,127.32  $       529,464.00   $           590,591.32  
Bangladesh 
Bank 
$           50,000  $           15,111.58   $       529,464.00   $           594,575.58  
Aol $           50,000  $           16,688.00   $       529,464.00   $           596,152.00  
Ebay $           50,000  $           34,568.00   $       529,464.00   $           614,032.00  
Court 
Ventures 
$           50,000  $           50,660.00   $       529,464.00   $           630,124.00  
T.J.Maxx $           50,000  $         590,040.00   $       529,464.00   $       1,159,504.00  
 
Table 8: Total Costs of Security Measures proposed. Source: Own elaboration. 
Additionally, companies should always implement systems for protecting data so in case 
of a disaster, failures, data thieves, or compromise of data by fraudsters, data can still 
be recovered. In the event of these critical situations, data could be available by using 
backup systems. Data availability is a key issue nowadays, so it is important that 
companies take into account systems that ensure accessibility and availability whenever 
it is needed. 
In the same way that information systems are usually contracted through software 
licenses, backup systems use this contract method too. 
In order to estimate the cost of the implementation of a backup system in an enterprise, 
there are some factors to be considered: 
- Size of the enterprise 
- Network sockets 
- Number of clients running on the front-end server 
- Number of applications to be protected 
In the total costs proposed above, there has not been included the amount of budget 
for backup systems. This is an additional service, but not required for a Segregation of 
Duties project. 
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3.3.2.4 Cost of Security Solutions as percentage of the Losses in Security 
breaches 
In order to calculate total losses, there have been considered two factors: number of 
records stolen and sold and its cost in the market. 
Based on results from the 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, the average 
cost of a data breach hits $154 per stolen record. (IBM, 2015)  
The product of the number of data records compromised and the average cost of it, 
$154 (plus additional losses, if applied) results in total losses, represented in the 5th 
column of the table below. 
 
Enterprise 
Affected 
Total Cost of 
Security Measures 
in dollars (1) 
No. Data 
records 
compromised 
Additional 
Losses, in 
dollars 
Total 
Losses, in 
dollars (2) 
PROPORTION 
(1/2) 
HPY  $           590.591,32  134000000 110000000 20746000000 0,00285% 
Bangladesh 
Bank 
 $           594.575,58   81000000 81000000 0,73404% 
Aol  $           596.152,00  92000000  14168000000 0,00421% 
Ebay  $           614.032,00  145000000  22330000000 0,00275% 
Court 
Ventures 
 $           630.124,00  200000000  30800000000 0,00205% 
T.J.Maxx  $       1.159.504,00  94000000  14476000000 0,00801% 
 
Table 9: Proportion of the cost of security measures against losses caused by security breaches. Source: 
Own elaboration. 
In the case of Bangladesh Bank and Swift, the cost of implementing security measures 
as SAP GRC Access Control (acquiring software licenses and the personnel to implement 
this project) and IBM Security Guardium represents only 0.73404% of the losses that 
this scandal provoked. 
Furthermore, in the losses represented above, there have not been included other costs 
resulting from the breach such as brand image losses or lawsuits costs. 
As can be seen in the table above, the magnitude of costs incurred when carrying out 
security projects based on segregation of duties is negligible and has an extremely small 
value in relation to the costs involved in security data breaches where large numbers of 
customer records are involved.
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4 FRAUD-PREVENTION STRATEGIES 
In light of the existence of numerous cases in which financial fraud through cyberattacks 
and malware is in vogue, strategy solutions have been developed to prevent fraud.  
On one hand, in the governmental framework, there are many regulations that have 
arisen in order to define rules and standards for internal control governance in 
corporations all over the world, such as SOX in the US, or SCIIF (ICFR) in Spain. 
On the other hand, from a more technical point of view, there must be established some 
security solutions to prevent fraud. Firstly, recognizing which risks are more relevant in 
our company, and which risks result from different tasks carried out by the same person 
or department. Then, a key point is to analyze its impact and probability, thus, mitigate 
them and set up prevention measures, and a contingency plan. 
The solution proposed to prevent fraud in this thesis is based on the concept of 
segregation of duties in the company followed by a proper analysis and risk assessment. 
Regardless of the technical strategy used by our company to prevent fraud and other 
critical risks, this solution must comply with the rules in force in every country with 
respect to internal control and corporate governance. 
4.1 Applicable Regulations 
In order to establish certain rules on how companies have to regulate their processes 
and the activities performed in the organization, some regulations provide accurate 
information about Internal Control and Corporate Governance. The most innovative 
regulations regarding to Internal Control were Sarbanes-Oxley Act and COSO regulation. 
4.1.1 COSO: Internal Control Objectives, Components and Levels  
COSO, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, is an 
initiative to improve internal control within organizations. 
Despite COSO is not as popular as SoX, COSO provided a very solid integrated conceptual 
structure, which has become the main standard in the world.  
A concept that is being used throughout any corporate control regulation is Internal 
Control.  According to COSO (McNally & CPA, 2013), “Internal control is a process 
effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed 
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives (…)”. 
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The three different categories of objectives are:  
 Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
 Adequacy and reliability of financial operations 
 Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
Thus, Internal Control is an objective-oriented process that is conceived and executed 
by people at all levels of an organization. 
Furthermore, internal control consists of repetitive and permanent processes that are 
integrated together into a dynamic system that is affected by changing business 
conditions. These multidirectional processes that compose Internal Control are: 
1. Control Environment 
2. Risk Assessment 
3. Control Activities 
4. Information and Communication 
5. Supervision and Monitoring 
 
4.1.2 Fraud Scandals’ Legacy: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
A number of corporate accounting scandals created a need for regulations, such as the 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 commonly called Sarbanes-Oxley, or SOX, is a United 
States federal law enacted on July 30, 2002 in response to a number of major corporate 
and accounting scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Xerox and the other 
scandals mentioned above. This legislation emerged mainly in the wake of Enron, exactly 
15 months later from the uncovering of Enron Scandal on October 2001.  
SOX was developed by the famous auditors: Paul Sarbanes, a democrat US Senator in 
Maryland, and Michael Oxley, a republican US Senator in Ohio. 
SOX aimed to re-establish investor confidence regarding financial information issued by 
companies, which should have been audited professionally following these security 
standards. 
The introduction to SOX states that this act was an act intended ‘to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws, and for other purposes’. (Sarbanes, 2002) 
SOX Compliance is applicable to all companies listed on New York Stock Exchange, 
whether it is listed the entire company, or a subsidiary. 
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Compared to COSO concept, SOX adds two new elements: audit of internal control and 
COSO organizational perspective. 
Internal control structure, as defined by SOX, is segregated into three different levels of 
control and their respective officers: 
1. Structures and Internal Control Procedures:  This is the broadest internal control 
level, for which the administration is responsible for: establishment and 
maintenance; and assessment of internal control effectiveness.  
2. Internal Accounting Controls:  This a technical level referred to the process of 
financial reporting. Auditors are responsible of the auditing reports. 
3. Internal Controls: This is a more practical level associated to the effectiveness of 
solving problems that are faced on a daily basis in organizations. 
Some of the sections reviewed below are Section 302, which is listed under Title III of 
the act, and pertains to ‘Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports’; and Section 404, 
which is listed under the Title IV of the act and pertains to ‘Management Assessment of 
Internal Controls’. 
 
4.1.2.1 Section 302: 
The CEO/CFO Must Certify Quarterly and Annually that: 
- The Securities & Exchange Commission report has been reviewed by the 
CEO/CFO 
- The report does not contain any misleading and/or untrue statements 
- Significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in internal control have been 
disclosed to the Audit Committee and auditors, as well as any fraud (material or 
not) involving anyone with a significant role in internal control 
- Material weaknesses must be disclosed in the annual report to shareholders 
Section 302 is very important since it forces top officials of public companies to be 
aware, knowledgeable and responsible of fraud or any error in their internal control 
systems. Top executives are legally accountable for the financial information disclosed. 
 
4.1.2.2 Section 404: 
Defines the rules for internal control and financial reporting 
- Companies that must comply with SOX must assess effectiveness of internal 
control structure and procedures for financial reporting 
- The responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control 
over financial reporting lies in the management 
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- Material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting must be 
identified by management 
- External auditors shall attest to and report on management’s assessment of 
internal control for financial reporting. 
Through effective Internal Controls over Financial Reporting (ICFR), the right rules 
are established to provide reliable financial statements. (Sarbanes, 2002) 
Section 404 and section 302 are closely related, because Section 404 explains how to 
implement internal controls so we can prove what management has been required to 
review and certify, based on section 302. 
On the other hand, Section 401 addresses fraudulent actions in companies, and aims to 
discourage the use of fraudulent tactics that involve off-balance sheet items. In case of 
substantial changes in their financial situation, companies have to communicate 
immediately these variations publicly, according to Section 409. 
To sum up, SOX changed corporate governance in different ways: 
1. It made corporate board of directors aware and responsible of any fraud or error 
in the internal control systems 
2. It imposed audit requirements over how companies regulate internal control 
3. It reinforced and promoted the creation of codes of ethics 
4. It created new responsibilities, that entailed additional costs on public 
companies and accounting firms 
5. It led to a greater internal control of financial reporting and made financial 
reporting to be certified and audited 
6. It originated a new regulator: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) to establish and reorganize auditing standards based on risks 
7. It made companies respect and comply with corporate governance 
4.1.3 Regulation for Internal Control and Corporate Governance Systems 
The regulation that is applied in Spain regarding to internal control in regulated entities 
are the following: 
- Internal Control over Financial Reporting in listed companies (ICFR) system 
issued by COSO, or SCIIF in Spanish: Sistemas de Control Interno de la 
Información Financiera. This regulation was implemented by CNMV (Comisión 
Nacional de Mercado de Valores). 
- Internal Control of management companies of Undertakings for the Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS). This relates to investment funds 
regulated at European Union level.  
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In Spanish, UCITS is defined as SGIIC: Sociedades Gestoras de Instituciones de 
Inversión Colectiva y sociedades de inversión. 
- Internal Control Audit for Service Providers: International Standard on Assurance 
Engagements (ISAE 3402, Assurance Reports on Controls at a Service 
Organization), which substitutes the Statement on Auditing Standards 70, 
Service Organizations (SAS 70). The US standard applied is SSAE 16: Statement 
on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16, Reporting on Controls 
at a Service Organization. 
- Sectoral regulation for internal control, such as: 
o Solvency II is a European directive aimed at regulating the activities of 
insurance and reinsurance, homogenizing the European legislative 
landscape. 
o Basilea III is a global regulatory framework to strengthen the governance, 
supervision and risk management of the banking sector, drawn up by the 
Committee on Banking Supervision. 
- Advice on the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID). It regulates organizational requirements including internal control such 
as compliance, internal audit and risk control. 
- Advice when taking control of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). 
Organizations should focus on designing governance, compliance and controls 
framework concurrent with the core FATCA implementation effort. 
- Compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), specifically EuroSOX, the scaled 
version for Europe. SOX also has other versions such as CSOX (in Canada) and 
JSOX (in Japan). 
On the other hand, to establish security controls in corporative governance, the 
following regulations must be followed: 
- Advice and review of the Annual Report of Corporate Governance (EPCM). 
- Compliance with the Code of Good Governance and information systems to third 
parties 
- Compliance with Corporate Social Responsibility, defined in the ISO 26000 
- Implementation of good governance practices of Information Systems COBIT, 
ITIL, ISO 27000, etc. 
- Ethics and integrity programs and development of codes of conduct 
- Implementation of the Center for Internet Security (CIS) controls 
- Particularly in Spain, compliance with ENS (Esquema Nacional de Seguridad) 
 
 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
72 | Fraud-Prevention Strategies 
 
4.2 Segregation of Duties 
 
After the appearance of fraud financial cases like Enron and WorldCom and its 
consequent implantation of regulations applied to control as SOX, Basel III, Solvency II… 
it arises a wide range of fields to exploit such as new risks to address, new audit 
procedures to develop, new audit reports, new training for these auditors, new 
regulations to review, and new and changing audit standards. (Tarantino & Cernauskas, 
2009) 
One of the implications of these various internal controls audit standards is a greater 
control over application security and segregation of duties (SOD). 
In this section, SOD is our main focus, since it reinterprets new standards for firms to 
implement in order to the prevention of fraud and errors. 
Segregation of duties is a primary internal control used when undertaking financial 
operations, which is intended to prevent or reduce the risk of errors or irregularities, 
identify problems and ensure corrective action is taken (SAP Corporation). This is 
achieved by preventing a single individual takes control over all stages of financial 
transactions. 
Or put more simply: 
One person cannot have access to the whole process.  
The task needs to be segregated so that there is check and balance. 
The objective of implementing SoD in a business is to ensure that different people are 
involved in the different stages of a transaction so they perform different functions. 
These four general categories of duties consist of: Initiation, authorization/approval, 
recording and settlement processes. No person should be able to record, authorize and 
settle a transaction. 
SOD controls have to be designed and implemented taking a risk-based approach. Such 
controls are implemented using applications that handle accounting information or any 
critical information that needs to be reported. This information is usually managed in 
ERPs, as we explained in section 2. One of the largest ERPs in the world is SAP (See more 
about SAP in section 3), that’s why in following sections, it will be discussed a model of 
segregation of duties structured in SAP. 
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4.2.1 Segregation of Duties Model 
There are some concepts of a Segregation of Duties model that are relevant to fully 
understand it, such as: 
- Principle of least privilege: users should have the minimum access to resources 
that are absolutely required to perform their job duties. 
- Sensitive transactions: business transactions that potentially impact the 
financial statements of a company, these are usually risky operations that can 
affect financial statements, operating activities, or damage the corporate image. 
- SOD conflict: the pairing of two sensitive transactions result in business risks. A 
SOD conflict arises from the intersection of two critical tasks, that occur or affect 
the company simultaneously. 
The philosophy of SOD and the regulations resulted from it rely on the concept that 
nobody can have too many privileges to access a system and be able to execute 
transactions in every business process without control. This situation can pose critical 
risks for a business, since employees can be tempted to commit fraud or other internal 
control failures.  
SOD can reduce the likelihood of such crimes through disseminating sensitive tasks and 
their respective privileges into separate roles assigned to different people or 
departments. In this way, users become less ‘powerful’ in the system. 
A SOD model should accomplish two primary objectives. Firstly, SOD conflicts should be 
reduced to prevent the occurrence of conflicts of interest, fraud, abuse of functions… 
Secondly, this model should detect control failures including security breaches, 
information thefts, and any tactic of avoidance of security controls. 
SOD conflicts result in corporate risks. An example could be a user who has privileges 
for two different functions, of which one comes into conflict with the other. 
 Function 1: Vendor master file maintenance 
 Function 2: Orders / purchases approval 
These two functions will pose a risk if a user can create fictitious vendor or create an 
unauthorized vendor (Function 1) and make an improper purchase (Function 2).  
Another example could be a user with access to these two functions: 
 Function 2: Orders / purchases approval 
 Function 3: Payments 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
74 | Fraud-Prevention Strategies 
 
These two functions will also pose a risk if a user can approve an unauthorized purchase 
(Function 2) and make its payment without further approval from senior management 
(Function 3). 
A user with Functions 1, 2 and 3 could create the whole process from creating a fictitious 
vendor, making an illegal purchase to this fake vendor to paying it without any other 
approval. 
For solving such conflicts, these functions should be segregated into different user 
responsibilities (roles). Then, each role should be assigned to only a user or a 
department in charge of this task. Security consultants or IT team that build an 
appropriate SOD structure will ensure that these separate roles are assigned to different 
people, and not to the same individual to avoid this risk. 
For this reason, IT department and heads of different business areas should collaborate 
together to elaborate a complete security model that complies with SOD. 
The process determined to capture, analyze, mitigate and control risks is being explained 
in the subsequent section. 
Building a SOD model is one of the steps of a compliance lifecycle. In order to achieve 
SOD, IT management should establish security settings and an authorization model. 
Once SOD is implemented, the next step would be compliance reporting, attending to 
the regulations and normative related to SOD and security. This reporting would be then 
audited and controlled to verify that complies with the current standards. Those 
controls that were not be approved by the audit team should be analyzed in the next 
lifecycle. 
Some benefits that an effective SOD model brings are saving time and money for 
reporting, reducing auditing costs, achieving SOX compliance, reducing risks and 
opportunities for fraud, and enabling a model that detects violations before being 
performed.  
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5 SOD PROCESS FROM A RISK-BASED APPROACH 
Enterprises that recognize that do not know how the risk of fraud is inherent to its 
business processes cannot be able to develop antifraud controls to prevent it. In order 
to make enterprises conscious about fraud risk, an enterprise must learn to identify 
potential threats and the weaknesses of its controls. In this way, the enterprise will 
develop continuous and frequent fraud risk assessments. 
 
Risk evolves and changes over time. For this reason, a company must keep pace with 
risk and have the agility to always assess it regardless of the circumstances of the 
company. The most agile way to assess risk is through a systematic assessment based 
on predefined rules and automatic controls throughout the different project phases. 
 
The analysis of risks through a SoD analysis is being captured in the document by the 
risk management lifecycle illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 23:  Risk Management Lifecycle. Source: Own elaboration. 
SoD conflicts identified among two functions build up risk elements in our enterprise. 
The combination of all enterprise functions creates a matrix where we can quickly 
identify the crossing of these functions, thus, the risks created among them. 
Nevertheless, there are other combination of functions that will not pose any risk for 
the system.  
 
Through this risk identification process, the enterprise will determine that some of 
these risks are not relevant for its business processes, so the response to these risks will 
be acceptance. However, risks that are critical and impact business processes will be 
analyzed, and the enterprise must respond to these risks. 
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The action plan executed to prevent these risks will depend on the materiality of risk 
such as the probability and its impact. In order to implement this response, it is essential 
that the enterprise implements controls that mitigate such risks. 
 
Once mitigating controls are stablished, it comes into play the phase of reporting and 
evaluating the risks that have been eliminated, and on the other hand, monitoring and 
controlling risks that still exist and threaten our system. In this point, in order to reduce 
the unmitigated risks, another risk lifecycle would start. 
 
5.1.1.1 Risk-based approach 
As mentioned earlier, it is crucial to implement tasks and processes that do not create 
conflicts between them, since conflicts in SoD lead to risks. 
According to PMI, risk is “an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive 
or negative effect on a project objective". 
Unlike a problem, a risk is identified in advance and can occur or not; however, a 
problem has already occurred or is occurring, so we could not analyze it previously to 
have treated and evaluated this event. 
Risk management (RM) “is a method of ensuring that, for a specific project, all risk 
events are identified, qualified and handled.” (Project Management Institute (PMI), 
2013) RM aims increasing probability of positive events (opportunities) and diminishing 
the probability of negative events (threats). This will determine the success of our 
projects, or simply, the prevention of attacks, failures, disorders… in our business 
processes. 
In order to provide the right resources and time to perform risk management, it is 
necessary to plan it, from the methodology, to budget, timing, risk categories identified, 
responsibilities, reporting…  
Risk management follows a lifecycle that can determine the methodology of our SoD 
projects. As lifecycles, risk management tasks are continuous and repetitive, since risks 
evolve and are shown in different shapes along the way. It is impossible to build the 
perfect model of risk that eliminates every potential risk because there are always 
unknown risks that we cannot identify or control. For these unknown risks, it is 
recommendable to dedicate a contingency reserve, i.e. an amount of money from our 
retained earnings that covers unforeseen losses in our business. 
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5.2 Risk Identification 
 
The first step from this lifecycle is to recognize potential 
risks of fraud that can affect our enterprise and are 
inherent to our business processes. 
 
There are risks which are known by the enterprise and 
others that are unknown. 
 
In the first category, there are direct risks if they are under our control (e.g. SoD 
conflicts); or indirect risks, if they are not under the enterprise control (e.g. 
cyberattacks). 
 
The second category, unknown risks are those mentioned above, for which the 
enterprise will dedicate a contingency reserve. 
 
Firstly, by identifying sensitive transactions, we can comprehend those business 
processes that are more critical in our company, thus, should be closely watched. In 
addition, there must be determined the SoD conflicts existent in the company. These 
will be determined through the definition of the functional and technical matrixes 
(section 5.1.1. and 5.1.2). 
 
 
Figure 24: Risk Identification Process. Source: Own elaboration. 
In addition to these critical system elements, the company must identify the employees 
and departments that due to its operability are more prone to commit each of the 
identified risks of fraud, and discover the methods that can be used more likely by 
fraudsters. 
 
Sensitive Transactions
•Analyze business 
processes
•Determine business 
functions which are 
carried out in every 
business process
•Identify critical 
transactions in the 
system
Functional and 
Technical Matrixes
•Define the 
Functional Matrix 
based on business 
functions 
(transactions)
•Define the Technical 
Matrix based on all 
the possible ways of 
executing a business 
function (mapping of 
transactions)
Segregation of Duties 
conflicts
•Create combinations 
among business 
functions
•Determine risks 
through 'critical' 
combination of 
functions
•Analyze risks' impact 
and probability
Risk 
Management
Identify 
risks
Risk assess 
& analyze
Action PlanImplement
Measure, 
control and 
monitor
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
78 | SoD Process from a risk-based approach 
 
5.2.1 Functional Matrix Definition 
In order to define a functional matrix that fulfill correctly segregation of duties, these 
are the steps to follow: 
1. Definition of the functions that correspond to different business processes that 
have been identified in the enterprise, such as fixed assets, treasury, 
procurement…  
 
The list of these functions will depend significantly on the company and the 
business processes that are run internally. Some examples of business processes 
are Fixed Assets, Accounting, Financing, Taxes, Payments, Treasury, Material 
Management…. These business processes usually correspond to ERP Modules 
such as Controlling (CO), Plant Maintenance (PM), Financial Accounting (FI), Sales 
Distribution (SD)… 
See Section 2.2.2 for more information about SAP Modules. 
 
2. Thorough study of the functions performed by each group of people in a 
department with access to the system (SAP or any other system). Through this 
research, the enterprise must define a clear and up-to-date matrix of all 
functions. 
See Appendix B for more information about the main functions in the Controlling 
module, which are obtained from analyzing the business workflow related to it. 
This functional matrix is not industry standard, since job positions are different in every 
company, so it depends on its size and the industry; in addition, functions and names 
may vary. 
By way of example, a functional matrix has been designed with three different functions 
related to diverse business processes: Fixed Assets, Treasury and Purchases. 
 Function 1 (Fixed Assets): Divestment of Fixed Assets 
 Function 2 (Treasury): Collection Management 
 Function 3 (Purchases): Release purchase order 
 Function 1.  Function 2.  Function 3.  
Function 1.     
Function 2.    
Function 3.    
 
Table 10: Example of a functional matrix. Source: Own elaboration.  
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 No SoD conflicts 
 SoD conflict detected 
 No conflicts among the same function 
 Fields not evaluated 
 
Table 11: Legend of colors of a functional matrix. Source: Own elaboration. 
  
Below the gray marks, there are the same crossings of functions than above these 
marks, so the bottom area is not evaluated, but the upper area. 
The SoD conflict found by the crossing of Function 1 and Function 2 is referred to the 
risk of fraud that can be carried out if a user with access to both functions can process 
invoices by divestment of assets to customers for a lower value and then record its 
collection (in collusion with the customer in exchange for favors / commissions). 
 
5.2.2 Technical Matrix Definition 
A technical matrix is the deployment of the functional matrix from the perspective of 
authorizations. In order to build a technical matrix, the enterprise should do a previous 
analysis of definition of roles or profiles in the security system of the company. In case 
of inexistence, the enterprise must define the relationship between roles/profiles and 
functions performed in the system. 
The technical matrix is totally dependent on the security system implemented in an ERP 
or any other management enterprise security tool. 
In order to define a technical matrix that fulfill correctly segregation of duties, these are 
the steps to follow: 
1. Identification of the transactions that represent accurately the operations of 
each of the functions included in the functional matrix for SoD. 
Every department or business area should provide a list of the transactions codes 
used for each of the operations that they execute. Once this list has been 
provided, we would need to analyze a description of the transaction. In a SAP 
scenario, the table TSTC lists all transactions implemented in the system along 
with their descriptions.  
2. Identification of the authorization objects, fields and values required to be set 
up in order to execute a transaction. 
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In order to obtain the parameters needed to execute a transaction, there are 
some transactions in a SAP scenario that can help us.  
The transaction SU24 provides the authorization objects, fields and values that 
are reported and documented in SAP which are being checked by the system, 
through AUTHORITY-CHECKs when being executed its transaction source code.  
In case this transaction was not well documented in SU24, another solution 
would be tracing the transaction, so analyze every authorization object with its 
corresponding values that are actually checked by the system. In the transaction 
ST01 enabled for traces, there will be a list of authorization objects identified and 
required to execute completely this transaction with the necessary privileges. 
3. Mapping of transactions. A SoD process based on risks should ensure that a 
company figure out every possible method of executing a transaction. Mapping 
all ways in which a user can execute a transaction is essential for describing a 
technical matrix adequately. 
It is very common that for a particular business function, users can access to 
various transactions to carry out this activity. In that case, the security team 
should verify that the same objects are checked for all these transactions, and 
users cannot access other transactions or other functionalities not allowed for 
this user. To do this, these different transactions will have to be configured the 
same way in the transaction SU24 so that the system checks the same objects. 
By contrast, sometimes transactions have been programmed differently among 
them and check some objects not permitted because of security reasons, such 
as jump queries to unauthorized transactions, enabling functionalities that can 
encourage fraud, capability to perform other different business functions to the 
transaction involved… In this scenario, the security team should ask developers 
to change the program of this transaction in the system so that it meets the 
security rules that have been considered. 
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Figure 26: Trace ST01 of transaction FB01 in SAP. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
The transaction ST01 lists authorization 
objects that are checked by the system. 
Then, the complete list of the authorization 
objects checked are included in a list of 
transactions documented. In this list, there 
are the transaction code, the environment, 
authorization object, authorization field and 
range of values. 
Once the list of transactions in which a 
function can be executed, we can build the 
technical matrix. 
The technical matrix is formed by all the possible ways that from different applications 
we can execute the same transaction, i.e. there may be 20 ways in an application of 
making a payment to a supplier. Usually the company only know and use 5 of them, but 
the security department finds other 15 ways of accomplishing this task. In the system, 
only 5 of these ways are restricted and controlled, but the others are not under the 
company control. These have to be analyzed and taken into consideration for the 
technical matrix design.  
A frequent enterprise failure is to map only those transactions that are executed. This 
would be a scenario as the mentioned earlier. There may be transactions in menus that 
are assigned through roles, that users do not execute but have access to them. These 
transactions need to be controlled and taken into account for its analysis 
 Application 1 Application 2 Application 3 
Function 1 2 4 0 
Function 2 0 2 3 
Function 3 0 0 0 
 
Table 12: Example of a Technical Matrix. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 25: Transaction FB01 documented (System, 
Authorization Object, values). Source: Own 
elaboration. 
No. of privileges (access 
methods) mapped 
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In the example above, there are three functions represented, however, a real technical 
matrix should include all functions executed by the enterprise. 
 Function 1 (Fixed Assets): Divestment of Fixed Assets 
 Function 2 (Treasury): Collection Management 
 Function 3 (Purchases): Release purchase order 
Additionally, there are three applications represented, however, a real technical matrix 
should include all applications that an enterprise use. 
 Application 1: IQMS Financial Management: Fixed Assets Module 
 Application 2: SAP ERP: FI & FSCM Modules 
 Application 3: Microsoft Dymanics NAV 
Application 1, IQMS where the company has the Fixed Assets Module, is specialized in 
how to manage assets' financial and tax reporting. Collection management will be 
carried out from this application. 
In the application 2, SAP ERP, there are two modules running: FI and FSCM. From this 
application, we can accomplish different functions: function 1 (FI) and function 2 (FSCM), 
but there is not available any software to manage purchasing processes. 
In the example shown, Application 3, Microsoft Dymanics NAV and its ERP management 
program for Central purchasing. In this application, there are three ways of releasing 
purchase order. 
 
5.3 Risks Analysis & Assessment 
 
In this phase, risks have already been identified and we have 
under control every transaction (executed or not in the 
system) that users can access. SoD conflicts have been 
identified, so risks of fraud have been recognized. 
Risks have to be assessed through measuring its probability 
and impact in the company. 
By using a quantitative analysis of risks, the company must assign an economic value to 
each risk. Risks are assessed depending on its materiality. Materiality is a SoD term 
referred to how to measure the impact of a risk. 
Materiality (EY, 2010) “is the financial threshold or impact a potential SoD conflict can 
have over a company’s financial statements.” 
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Based on the materiality of risk, the enterprise has to assess which is the financial 
threshold in order to compare risks with each other. 
Those risks with higher economic values are those that can result in fraud or failures in 
the company, and therefore those to which the enterprise should respond. 
The enterprise should also consider the probability of the identified risks. For example, 
risks with a very high economic value but a very low probability will be controversial. 
Companies should consider if it is effective or not to implement a plan to avoid them. 
This decision will depend on the company preferences and its resources (time, money...) 
On one hand, the enterprise will accept and document those risks with low probability 
and a low materiality. On the other hand, the company will dedicate a contingency 
reserve for risks with high impact but quite improbable to occur. 
Risks to which the company will prepare an action plan are those with high probability 
and high impact, thus, a high economic value (high materiality). 
 
5.4 Action Plan 
 
In the action plan phase, it is when the company has to find 
a strategy to respond those risks with high impact and high 
probability. Those risks, as result of SoD conflicts, are being 
analyzed and controlled. 
In this phase, the company has to define measures and 
response to risks. The objective is to develop and analyze 
different responses to risks, take decisions about what actions to implement in the next 
phase and assign responsibilities when risk management. It is also significant planning 
the action to carry out such as setting deadlines, budgets… 
From a risk management approach, when we face a fraud risk in a business process, the 
enterprise can perform different types or responses: 
- Accept: this is the typical response that companies used to carry out, not 
implementing any plan to prevent it, simply, accept its occurrence. 
- Avoid: when a company finds risks in particular countries or markets, and the 
way to solve it is not entering in that market or not expanding to a specific 
country because of the risks it involves. 
- Transfer: when a company hires an outsourcing firm and transfer that risk to it, 
since they know better how to manage risks and control them. 
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- Control: fraud risks have to be controlled, offering solutions where risks are 
monitored and managed under the company’s boundaries 
- Mitigate: risks can be reduced to its minimum level till being totally eliminated 
when controls are well performed, thus, risks become minimal and barely exist. 
The solution to prevent fraud risks is to search and establish preventive controls. Such 
anti-fraud controls will reduce and mitigate the risks identified. 
5.4.1 Stakeholders in decision-making 
In the action plan, IT and finance areas are both interested in risk management in order 
to provide a complete SoD process.  
The finance area knows the materiality of risk for measuring the impact of every 
business process and the mitigating controls to provide in every area.  
The IT area builds on the risks captured by internal control and measured by the finance 
area and enters it into the computer system as authorization data to result in access 
control remediation.  
All this process has to be go hand in hand with top management as they have a general 
overview of the operations of the company and recognize more precisely the 
importance of each of the risks based on available resources and weaknesses of the 
company. 
5.4.2 Mitigating Matrix Definition 
The solution to mitigate risks is by building controls that reduce the impact of such SoD 
conflicts, almost to its complete reduction. 
In order to define a mitigating matrix, there are some steps that should be followed: 
1. Thorough study of the combination of functions and analysis of risks intra-
process (within each process), inter-process (with other processes) and critical 
action. 
 
2. Once defined corporate risk matrix (Functional Matrix) from internal control 
matrixes, the mitigating controls that can be applied to these risks defined for 
each particular case are identified. 
Continuing the above example, the SoD conflict identified by the combination of 
Function 1 and Function 2 was related to the risk of fraud that can be carried out if a 
user with access to both functions can process invoices by divestment of assets to clients 
for a lower value and then record its collection (in collusion with the client in exchange 
for favors / commissions). 
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As a mitigating controls, the enterprise could establish that: 
 All invoices entered either from the Logistics module or from the FI module 
remain locked until they are released for payment according to the authorization 
matrix. 
 Thorough review of clients and support related to invoices 
 Review of the counterpart to the disposal of assets for a lower value 
 Review of unbilled receipts of good or commissions 
 Check SoD rules related to Access Control in order to monitor access to these 
specific functions 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Example of a mitigating matrix. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Legend of colors of a mitigating matrix. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
After this analysis, there must be an evaluation of the current SoD conflicts in order to 
be reduced to its minimum level. The mitigated SoD conflicts will be highlighted with 
yellow marks and will deploy its mitigating controls. In this process, the company can 
start enforcing least privileges for users and restricting them access only to their job 
responsibilities. 
 
When establishing mitigating controls, it can be assigned a mitigation monitor that is 
the individual that will check if the mitigation has been performed correctly.  In the 
mitigation control tab, alerts can be set through an alert generator when risks are 
committed or when attempting to carry out a SoD violation. 
 
A mitigation approver is assigned to controls and is responsible for approving any 
change to the controls defined. 
 Function 1.  Function 2.  Function 3.  
Function 1.     
Function 2.    
Function 3.     
 No SoD conflict 
 SoD conflict mitigated 
 No conflicts among the same function 
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5.5 Implementing Solutions 
 
In this phase, the enterprise has to implement all the 
measures mentioned in the previous phase.  
Mitigating controls take place following the solutions 
planned when changing SoD conflicts to a mitigated SoD 
conflict in the matrixes seen previously. 
In the implementation phase, not only mitigation controls are considered, but also the 
implementation of rules that will let us provide measures to prevent SoD violations. In 
order to achieve this automatic set of rules, a company has to implement a rule set of 
every information captured in the preceding phases. 
A SoD rule set has to be customized for a specific firm, since every company has different 
business processes, thus, it can be affected by different types of risks. 
In order to automatize these controls and violation checks, the company will ensure that 
in its ERP or any other tool used to manage its business process there is a functionality 
to enable these rules. 
In scenarios such as SAP, there are default rule sets configured with the standard SAP 
transactions and most used business processes. However, if used this default rule set, 
the company will need to add custom transactions, or authorization checks which are 
not SAP standard. In addition, in the default rule set, there may be risks that are not 
applicable to our company, so such risks will be disabled. After this revision, the 
company should add to these risks those that have been detected from SoD conflicts 
and fit our business processes.  
The format or structure of this rule set will highly depend on the application used. In a 
SAP scenario, a rule set is a spreadsheet file that is imported to SAP GRC to analyze the 
SoD implemented and make it life in the SAP system. 
In this spreadsheet, there are several tabs: 
1. bp – list of codes of all the business processes and their description (e.g. FFAA 
Fixed Assets) 
2. funct – list of codes of all functions and their description (e.g. AF01UX0 AF01 – 
Registration of immobilized suppliers’ invoices) 
3. functact – combination of a function with the transaction codes where this 
function can be developed – all the methods where this function can be executed 
– (e.g. AF01UX0: transactions AB01, AB02, AB08, ABGF, ABGL…) Every 
transaction is in a separate row related to its function. 
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4. functbp – combination of functions and business processes codes (e.g. AF01UX0 
FFAA) 
5. risk – risks resulted from SoD conflicts: combination of functions, 1st value is the 
risk code, then the two functions that conflict and a risk category code (e.g. 
FI088UX0: AF01UX0 CA01UA0 FINZ) Based on the Functional Matrix Definition. 
6. riskdescr – list of risks and their description (e.g. FI088UX0 AF01- Registration of 
immobilized suppliers’ invoices & CA01A – Management of FI accounting 
periods) 
7. rrsr – lists of risks codes associated to the client where they run (e.g. FI088UX0 
SANDRA&CO) 
8. ruleset – list of client rule set name and its description (e.g. SANDRA&CO Rule 
set designed for Sandra Morillejo Thesis) 
9. funcperm – list of functions related to the transactions where this function can 
be executed and the authorization objects that are being checked in order to 
have access to them. It is based on the Technical Matrix definition. The table 
below shows a brief summary of the information in this tab. 
 
Function 
Code 
Transaction 
Code 
Auth. 
Object 
Auth. 
Field 
Auth. 
Value 
(Range 
start) 
Auth. 
Value 
(Range 
end) 
Logic 
operation 
for auth. 
values 
AF01UX0 AB01 A_B_ANLKL ACTVT 01 01 AND 
AF01UX0 AB01 A_B_ANLKL ANLKL ZXXX ZXXX AND 
 
Table 15: Example of Rule set funcperm tab (based on the Technical Matrix Definition). Source: Own 
elaboration.  
 
Besides all technical implementations such as mitigating controls and the definition of a 
rule set, the mission of a corporate governance is to define an anti-fraud culture to 
prevent any risk (a zero tolerance culture). This type of prevention policy should involve 
from top management to the last employee incorporated thereto. 
The antifraud culture should follow the recommendations featured in section 3.1.2. 
Some of these anti-fraud measures could be to review and improve internal controls 
and anti-fraud programs in key departments, reformulating variable compensation 
programs, providing training for staff on the regulatory framework applicable to 
anticorruption international standards and business ethics, implementing a complaints 
channel or ethical line and complaints procedures, and so on. 
Another anti-fraud control could be monitoring suspicious transactions. Critical 
transactions could be traced and reported so managers or the IT team can check if these 
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operations meet the standards reliably. In order to monitor these transactions, the 
company has to define rules where these critical transactions or functions are monitored 
in the configuration parameters related to Access Control. 
 
5.6 Measure, control and monitor 
risks 
 
The last step consists of the evaluation of controls and 
processes that ensure that identified risks have been 
analyzed, mitigated and implemented in an efficient 
way. 
The objective is to perform control and monitoring tasks of the resulting risks following 
the implementation of mitigation measures. 
Some of the steps to be followed are: 
1. Identification and assessment of residual fraud risks arising from the 
absence of controls or ineffective controls. 
2. Response to residual fraud risk 
All these steps determine and close the risk management lifecycle, but as mentioned, 
this is a continuous process, not a project that ends once a response to risks is 
implemented.  Segregation of Duties has to be understood as a process, since the 
company evolves, as well as risks that can impact our company.
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6 METHODOLOGY OF A SOD PROJECT USING SAP 
GRC ACCESS CONTROL 
An enterprise that needs to implement segregation of duties bearing in mind risks, 
corporate governance and compliance can use the powerful tool SAP GRC Access 
Control to achieve it. 
SAP methodology for projects is based on delivering value and adapt to changes from 
an agile approach. Companies need to respond quickly to risks and changes in both the 
internal and external environments to create solutions in an efficient and flexible way. 
This the reason why companies have changed from traditional waterfall methodologies 
to agile methodologies. SAP developed its own methodology: ASAP, which lifecycle is 
based on Scrum and Lean, which are based in: 
1. Agile risk identification and management 
2. Implementation of operative functionalities structured in short development 
cycles (sprints), starting with those with higher priority, thus, those that bring 
more value to the client 
3. Fast information retrievals and value earning 
4. Continuous participation in the project 
5. Increased flexibility in implementation 
6. Improved control and monitoring of the project 
ASAP methodology is designed for implementing a SAP project from scratch. In this case, 
ASAP is not applicable since our approach is building a SoD model by using the tools 
provided by SAP GRC Access Control in a SAP environment already implemented or 
other non-SAP application. However, this type of projects is agile too.  When SAP GRC 
AC is implemented in a company, it increases largely the speed of fulfilling access 
requests, provides control in every critical situation, access controls are reviewed, 
consistent and automatized, resources are shared easily and accessed when needed… 
The phases followed in this project were the following: 
1.  An exhaustive analysis of SoD to identify SoD risks, recognize business processes 
and tasks, identify every critical element in the system to control it, group users 
by function or job position, and so on. 
2. A design phase where the role security model is developed taking into account 
the business functions identified to comply with SoD 
3. The implementation step is where the role model is analyzed to ensure there 
are not SoD conflicts in the roles designed, then rules take shape and, if any, 
corrective actions are performed and reported. 
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4. In the testing phase, roles assignations are tested in the Quality environment, so 
users can check if they have privileges only for the tasks they are supposed to 
perform according to their job positions. 
5. The last phase is maintenance. This phase is endless, since as we mentioned, SoD 
is not a project by itself but a process. Company’s departments will change, new 
business areas will be created, new transactions in the system will be developed, 
new users and job positions will be created… This phase is where the model is 
already implemented, but it must be subject to change at any time to meet the 
business needs. 
 
Figure 27: SoD Project Phases where different actors are involved using SAP GRC Access Control tools.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
There are the main functionalities that SAP GRC Access Control tools offer in each of the 
project phases: 
- AMR (Access and Manage Risks) or ARA (Access Risk Analysis) will be used after 
Functional Technical Matrix Definition in order to analyze the risks identified and 
monitor them, as well as creating alerts to prevent risks in all business processes. 
- BRM (Business Role Management) enables to create roles, implement 
authorizations and maintain roles over time. It enables role provisions to users  
- ARM (Access Request Management) is used in the maintenance phase. It is a tool 
to support user incidences related to SAP access, such as requesting new 
transactions or roles. This tool includes an approval workflow. 
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- EAM (Emergency Access Management) or SPM (Super-user Privilege 
Management) will be used by users to access critical tasks in emergency 
situations. All the actions performed by this super-user access will be controlled. 
6.1.1 Overview of the most critical transactions and tables in SAP 
There are some transaction codes that are going to be useful when implementing SAP 
GRC Access Control as well as a streamlined SAP security configuration. 
See more about transaction codes or T-codes in the Background and Preliminary 
Concepts section. 
In the table below, there are represented some T-codes and its description, along with 
their main functionalities. 
T-code Description Functionality 
SU24 Maintain Authorization 
Defaults 
- Display and update the values in tables 
USOBT_C and USOBX_C 
- Restrict access to transactions based on the 
authorization objects checked 
- Add or subtract the checks performed in the 
transaction by changing the appropriate 
flag 
ST01 System Trace - Execute transaction trace 
- Display all checked authorization objects, 
the values assigned over the check and 
objects which may lead to a missing 
authorization behavior 
SU53 Evaluate Authorization Check - Display the missing authorization object 
that a user is not assigned in its 
roles/profiles to access a particular 
transaction or function within a transaction. 
SE16  Data Browser - Display information from SAP tables 
SE11 ABAP Dictionary Maintenance - Display information from SAP tables, and 
also their structure 
- Create, change and display table entries 
SM30 Call View Maintenance - Access to tables with a maintenance dialog 
defined 
- Critical transaction for all the functions that 
can be enabled in every table 
SE30 ABAP Runtime Analysis - Execute performance or flow analysis of an 
ABAP program. 
- Measure performance and find bottlenecks 
SA38 ABAP Reporting - HIGHLY critical (access not given to any user 
in the Production Environment) 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
92 | Methodology of a SoD Project using SAP GRC Access Control 
 
- Run directly programs or reports in SAP 
SM49 Execute external OS commands 
 
- Execute external operating system 
commands in SAP GUI 
SM59 RFC Destinations 
(Display/Maintain) 
- Configure and display RFC Destination 
SP01 Output Controller - Maintain the spools: delete, print, save local 
files... 
- Spool administration 
SP02 Display Spool Requests - Display and monitor spool requests 
SE01 Transport Organizer 
(Extended) 
- Change and transport organizer 
- Create, change, view logs, display 
transports (all tasks related to transport 
requests) 
SE09 Transport Organizer - Workbench transport requests 
- Release transport orders 
- Track changes to ABAP workbench objects 
(dictionary, reports, pools…) 
STMS Transport Management 
System 
- Import transport order from the source 
environment to the destination system 
SM01 Lock Transactions - Lock or unlock instantly transaction codes in 
the system, so any user can access it 
 
Table 16: List of T-codes (SAP transaction codes) which are critical in SAP security configuration in a SoD 
project. Source: Own elaboration. 
In the table below, there are represented some tables and its description, along with 
their main functionalities, that are useful to determine certain information when 
managing roles and transactions in SAP. 
Table Description Functionality 
TSTC SAP Transaction Codes - Display all transactions implemented 
in the system along with their 
descriptions, programs associated… 
AGR_TCODES Assignment of roles to Tcodes - Display the roles where a particular 
transaction has been assigned 
(included in its intrinsic profile) 
AGR_USERS Assignment of roles to users - Display all the roles that are assigned 
to a specific user 
USOBT_C, 
USOBX_C 
Maintain Check Indicators - Display the relationship between a 
transaction and its authorization 
objects 
- Store check indicators maintained in 
SU24 
 
Table 17: List of tables which are critical in SAP security configuration in a SoD project. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
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6.2 Analysis of SoD 
 
The analysis of Segregation of Duties in a SAP system is a complex task since there are 
many factors and settings to take into account before building a complete and secure 
SoD model. 
As was mentioned in the section 5, it is important to look at SoD from a risk perspective. 
Firstly, we should identify risks resulted from SoD conflicts when defining the Functional 
Matrix. Then, analyze all the possible ways of performing a specific function in the 
system, i.e. from all the applications that the company uses for business processes. 
When identifying all the critical functions in conflict, the enterprise should identify the 
elements that are most critical to segregate correctly these tasks. Such elements are 
transactions and authorization objects which are quite critical in the system, not only 
because of combination with other critical functions, but because the intrinsic risk 
containing in themselves. 
 
6.2.1 Identification of Critical Processes and Sensitive Transactions 
Firstly, it is important to identify critical processes as well as SAP standard transactions 
that execute those business processes. 
Consultants have to take into consideration the most critical transactions when building 
roles. In SoD terms, these are known as sensitive transactions. 
Sensitive transactions are those labelled as highly risky when implementing the 
functional matrix which supports the foundation of a proper segregation of duties. 
In addition to these critical functions, there are critical transactions in SAP whose access 
should be limited due to the security risks that imply. Some examples are SE11, SE16, 
SE30, SA38, SM30, SE16M, SM49 (creation of system orders) and SM59 (execution of 
system orders). The use of these transaction with inadequate access may pose a risk to 
the company data since a lot of tables can be altered (SE16/SE16M), external OS 
commands can be executed, any SAP program can be run (SA38), and so on. 
Depending on the company security decisions, some of these transactions will be limited 
to only few users for specific reasons, and other transactions will be directly prohibited 
for all users in the system. 
1. Analysis 2. Design
3. 
Implementation
4. Testing 5. Maintenance
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6.2.1.1 Transactions Z* or Y* 
There are also some transactions that are developed exclusively for the company, 
customized for its business needs. These transactions usually start with Z or Y. These 
type of transactions must be checked by security consultants since they have not been 
programmed or validated by a technical SAP support team, but by an external software 
developing team.  
 
6.2.2 Identification of critical authorization objects 
Secondly, SAP consultants need to determine the authorizations objects required for 
these transactions. In addition, the authorizations that are critical in SAP over these 
objects should be customized into SoD rules in order to avoid the generation of false 
positives, and negative false. 
Before building roles, we should consider which are the most critical authorization 
objects that users need to access to perform their duties. This is a list of the 
authorization objects that deal with System Administration (thus, start with S) whose 
access should be restricted or forbidden: 
7. Security for tables: S_TABU_DIS (authorization group for a table), S_TABU_NAM 
(name of the table) and S_TABU_CLI (for client independent tables). 
8. Reports or executable programs: These are protected by S_PROGRAM, which 
checks it the user executing a program is included in the group authorized for it. 
9. Files from programs: S_DATASET provides access to the specified filename in the 
OS of the program that is being run. Using this object, it can be determined the 
activity permitted: read, write, deletion… 
10. Spools: A spool is a recipient of print requests which provides a number of 
utilities for controlling the output of information storage. Many objects give 
access to spools: S_ADMI_FCD, S_SPO_ACT, S_SPO_DEV and S_SPO_PAGE. 
11. Users / Roles: Using objects that control user administration, different roles can 
be created to segregate these functions. S_USER_AGR, S_USER_GRP, 
S_USER_PRO and S_USER_AUT are some examples. 
12. BDC (Batch Data Communication) sessions: S_BTCH_ADM, S_BTCH_JOB, 
S_BTCH_NAM are the objects that determine the activities authorized when 
loading data into SAP (batch sessions). The automatic background process that 
enters data into a transaction is defined as batch input. Every batch input 
executed in SAP is recorded in the SM35 transaction.  
13. ABAP Workbench: S_DEVELOP is the authorization object that controls ABAP 
development objects. These controls include object type, object name, activity… 
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All these security controls must be set up in order to achieve a safe and complete 
architecture that controls all critical elements such as activities, transactions and 
authorization objects. 
 
6.2.3 Identification of Enterprise Structural Elements 
Some elements related to the structure of the organization should be defined prior the 
construction of a SoD model.  
1. Consultants should map the organizational values of the company: 
organizational codes, cost centers, purchasing groups… 
2. Business processes and application controls associated to them. If the company 
processes are not aligned with a common and integrated model, changes to 
business processes will be required.  
3. Users should be grouped by similar tasks or activities carried out along business 
processes. Simultaneously, users could be also gathered together by 
geographical location. These user groups need to be approved by the 
corresponding business area leader. 
 
 
6.2.4 Identification of Transactions for the Functional Matrix Definition 
After having identified critical transactions, critical authorization objects and enterprise 
elements, such as all the business processes, SoD analysts have to recognize the inter-
process and intra-process risks affecting the company. Therefore, the tools used will be 
those that extract risks from SoD conflicts: functional matrix, technical matrix and other 
mapping techniques transactions. See more about this whole process in sections 5.1.1 
and 5.1.2. 
Firstly, SoD analysts have to consider which are the transactions that are been used by 
users in the systems. A technique could be monitoring the transactions used for a period 
of time. Another technique (and quite used) is to obtain the statistics from the system 
of the transactions that users have been using for a certain period of time. This 
information can be queried through SAP transaction SE16 and with help of the tables 
AGR_TCODES and AGR_USERS to be able to identify who uses what. 
In this redesign model, SoD analysts have to make a list of the transactions executed and 
not executed by users and transactions that have been executed by a functional business 
area and not executed by a business area. 
Based on this list, we can build the functional matrix and seek for crossings of risks (SoD 
conflicts). 
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Human Resources will provide SoD analysts a list of current users in the system and an 
updated organigram of business areas in the organization. Every department manager 
will provide SoD analysts what tasks should be performed in the system (not what they 
are currently performing, because these operations may vary with a correct SoD 
analysis). It is important to exactly know: 
- A clear and streamlined list of tasks and processes that should be carried out by each 
department in the organization 
- A list of users that correspond to every business area, or department and they perform 
the same tasks, so they will have the same business roles 
Once this information is complete, the design phase could start. 
 
6.2.5 Risk monitoring and remediation using SAP AMR 
The SAP GRC tool that can help us to automatize this risk identification process is AMR 
(Analyze & Manage Risks), previously ARA (Access Risk Analysis). 
AMR basically consists of a repository of definition of SoD rules and critical transactions. 
One of its benefits it that it will check the rules established for user activities and for role 
management tasks and will ensure these do not introduce new risks to our company.  In 
addition, AMR reports a list of the risks existing within the current SAP security 
configuration and according to the Security role model defined.  
AMR inflows: 
1. The security model defined of risks created from the combination of functions. 
2. Data collected by AMR such as users, profiles, roles, transactions, 
authorizations… 
AMR outflow: 
1. AMR processes all incompatible functions in the system to provide a report of 
the number of risks in the system in categories of highly critic risks, high risks, 
medium risks and low risks. 
2. Provides solutions to prevent these risks through deleting authorizations with 
conflicts or by implementing mitigating controls to the identified risks. 
This risk analysis and remediation tool generates and maintains automatically this 
process of identifying risks, mitigating conflicts for users and roles, and providing a 
continuous monitoring of access risks and user roles assignments across the enterprise. 
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The figure above represents how different GRC teams are involved in the SoD project and Access Control architecture. This diagram shows from 
the business process identification to the different rules and controls that are applied automatically by using SAP GRC AC ARA. This is how SoD is 
structured from a risk-based approach in an enterprise system. IT Security Management, Internal Control and Compliance and Risk Management 
have to collaborate together to make this process live, in an integrated and cohesive way. 
 
Figure 28: Corporate Governance: Risk and Compliance Integration. Source: Own elaboration. 
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6.3 Design 
 
Once the functional and technical matrixes have been designed and risks have been 
identified, it is important to design and build a security model that ensures segregation 
of duties. 
The definition of this new model of authorizations has to be based in the functions 
performed within the business. This model has to offer flexibility and modularity, so it is 
possible to make future changes and maintain it in a clean and agile way. New roles can 
only provide privileges to the required functions determined by job position. 
 
6.3.1 Critical Activities: Read-only access vs Read-write access privileges for 
the Authorization System Model 
When constructing the authorization architecture based on roles and profiles, there will 
be roles that contain certain functionalities which are more simple such as access to 
print accounting documents, or access to read/view sales reports. These roles will be 
less critical in the system since these access permissions do not create or change any 
document in the system. Clients can set if display access is critical for them, but it is not 
usually the case. 
However, security consultants must pay attention when creating roles for more critical 
activities such as creating, changing accounting documents, releasing, deleting or 
removing them. These type of activities is critical in the system so it is important that 
the role that contains them is only assigned to users in charge of these activities, such 
as the accounting department, but not to any user. 
 
6.3.2 RBAC – Building a Role Based Access Control Architecture 
As has been disclosed throughout this document, the security architecture that 
implements more easily SoD is a RBAC (Role-based Access Control) approach. 
For building roles in the system, we have to distinguish among single roles, composite 
roles and business roles.  
See more about what a role is, single roles and composite roles in section 6.2.1 Roles. 
See more about how to create single and composite roles in SAP in the Appendix A. 
1. Analysis 2. Design 3. Implementation 4. Testing 5. Maintenance
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In a SoD model, there can be built different roles. It depends on the organization 
preference or the SoD consultant design. In the design explained below there are five 
different type of roles designed: Environmental Roles, Functional Roles, Composite or 
Job Position Roles, Organizational Roles and Business Roles. 
In the category of single roles, there are defined different subcategories: Functional 
roles and Organizational roles. 
1. Environmental Roles are single roles that are assigned to all users in the system. 
It is a basis role that include all transactions or common tools to all users as 
managing spool (SP01, SP02), managing user preferences, error handling, etc.  
 
2. Functional Roles are single roles that include transactions that allow to execute 
a certain function, as well as authorization objects necessary for its 
implementation However, there cannot be authorized any authorization object 
related to organizational values. These roles must be absolutely independent of 
any organizational values so they can be used transversely for any of the firm 
subsidiaries, cost centers, etc.  
Functional roles need to be differentiated into two types for visualization tasks 
and for change or update tasks. In this way, there are: 
o Read-only access privileges: Users are authorized only for visualization. 
This access scope is associated to activities 03, 08, 09, etc. 
o Read-write access privileges: Users are authorized also for changes, 
updates or releasing tasks. This access scope is associated to activities 01, 
02, 05, 06, etc. 
 
3. Composite roles or Job position roles are those roles compounded with the 
grouping of functional roles that make up a job position within the company. 
Composite roles do not include Organizational Scoped Roles since these scoped 
roles are associated with users and not with job positions. For example, in the 
CO module, Cost Center Management, Primary Cost Elements Management. See 
examples of Composite Roles for the CO module in the Appendix B. 
 
 
4. Organizational Scoped Roles are single roles that define the organizational work 
environment of a user, but does not include privileges to perform any 
functionality (i.e., they do not include transactions). In this role, all the 
authorization objects related to organization values are included. These 
organizational objects are necessary for the execution of a function or different 
functions included in a job position (defined in a composite role).  
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Accordingly, there must be distinguished two different type of organizational 
scoped roles: 
o Function-Scope Roles: These organizational roles are defined to 
complement a function with organizational values. That is, these roles are 
associated with a single functional role. 
o Position-Scope Roles: These organizational roles are defined to 
complement a position organizationally. That is, these roles are 
associated with a position role, or composite role. 
Depending on the module, some area-function roles, area-position roles or both 
have been defined. In case of CO module defined in the Appendix B, the 
definition of access at the organizational level has been implemented using 
position-scope roles. 
As in functional roles, it is necessary to maintain distinct roles for the display 
scope and updating scope. 
5. Business Roles: These roles consist of a set of composite roles and 
organizational-scoped roles that make up a profile or position within the 
organization. This business role is assigned to users who perform the same 
activity within the organization. 
These roles have to be named according to the nomenclature defined by the company.  
The nomenclature proposed in this document is: 
Z + Role Type + Module + Organization + ‘_’ + Description + ‘_’ + Suffix 
Z: According to SAP note 20643, every new implementation has to start with ‘Z’, and in 
default, starting with ‘Y’. 
Role type: Single role (‘<’), Composite role (‘<<’) 
Module: 1 or 2 digits for the module name to which this role functionality is associated 
Organization: 2 digits for the organization code, if applicable. XX is the solution when 
organization is not applicable, in case of functional or composite roles. 
Description: Short role description. It will start with U if the role allows Updates or 
modifications, and V if the role is configured for Visualization. Its length depends on the 
other values length, but it is not unlimited, since the maximum role length is 30 
characters. For word separation, blanks cannot be used, ‘_’ will be the separator. 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
101 | Methodology of a SoD Project using SAP GRC Access Control 
 
Suffix: Role ending with 2, 3 or 4 digits that sum up a role description. This suffix will be 
the same for composite, functional and organizational scoped roles. 
1. Environmental Role:  It is a unique role, it could be named as Z<BXX_USER_GRAL, 
since it belongs to the Basis Module and is the general user access role that every 
user has assigned. 
2. Functional Roles. Ex. Z<COXX_UCOST_CENTER_UCOC 
3. Composite roles or Job position roles. Ex. Z<<COXX_UCOST_CENTER_UCOC 
4. Organizational Scoped Roles Ex. Z<CO01_CO0A1H_USCOPE_UCOC 
The description is split up in 2 parts: the description (ex. cost center code: 
CO0A1H) + ‘_’ + ‘U/V’ if the update or visualization task is performed + ‘SCOPE’. 
 
6.3.3 Compliant Business Roles & SoD through SAP BRM 
Business Roles are managed in SAP GRC BRM (Business Roles Management), previously 
known as Enterprise Role Management. BRM apply enterprise role nomenclatures to 
role creation, diminishing management and the risk of SoD violations. 
Business roles form a SAP security design based on job positions, not specifically in tasks. 
A task-based role design increases the number of roles per user, since a user has a role 
for every task executed. In a job based role approach, security is designed based on 
positions for a group of users. This decrease the number of roles per user, which is more 
maintainable and secure. 
There are not roles for specific employees, every job position is assigned certain business 
roles. Every time there is a new user in the system, it is assigned determined business 
roles according to its position. In addition, there are many processes that can be 
managed by using SAP GRC BRM: 
- Change of job position. A user is changed to a different job position, so a new 
set of business roles will be assigned to this user. However, this user is assigned 
for a short period of time (ex. 2 months) a temporary user with the previous 
privileges. If the new job position has not been defined in the system, we will 
contact the SoD analyst.  
- Temporary replacement. When a user is laid off for a temporary period, the user 
that replace this user will be assigned its privileges in a temporary user during 
this time. 
- Role incidence. A role can be misconfigured and lack of information. In order to 
make these changes, the role can be modified. This functional role will have to 
be then approved by the SoD analyst. 
 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
102 | Methodology of a SoD Project using SAP GRC Access Control 
 
- New function in a job position. Business role is modified including this new 
function. These changes will have to be then approved by the SoD analyst. 
- New transaction in the system. When a new transaction is created in the system, 
it can be assigned to a functional role, but a new approval workflow will start. It 
is important that before this transaction is in the system, it has been documented 
correctly in transaction SU24. 
- Merger or new firm subsidiary. Single and composite roles are created in the 
backend and then imported to SAP GRC where the business role will be built. 
Despite business roles implement a more effective security structure, single and 
composite roles can be also created and maintained through SAP BRM. 
BRM has to be configured with an Approval Workflow, so any change in the Role 
Architecture is approved or rejected by the Role Owner, or in its absence, by the Security 
Leader. Role Owners are usually SoD analysts, and the Security Lead actor could be 
represented by Internal Control. 
BRM Workflow Steps: 
1. SoD analysts define the role. 
2. System administrators maintain authorizations, synchronizing them with 
backend systems.  
3. System administrators have the possibility to derive the role to others where it 
can be contained or related. 
4. Before approving the changes in the role, there is a risk assessment report when 
SoD conflicts are found within the role or with the combination of other roles. 
There can be stablished rules, controls or other solutions to mitigate them. 
5. Process Owner or Role Owner has to approve the role or reject it. 
a. If approved: 
i. System administrators have to generate the role in all the 
environments in backend. 
ii. SoD analyst or Role Designer has to maintain test cases  
b. If rejected: 
i. System Administrators will be notified in SAP Netweaver and they 
will be in charge of notifying it to users if required. 
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6.4 Implementation 
 
Once the security model is designed, it is the time to build it in SAP following the 
methodology explained above and the directions for a secure environment. 
The workflow standardized in BRM processes the results of ARM and its Analysis of Risk 
and Remediation Rules. After this analysis, BRM verifies if there are SoD conflicts at an 
intra-role level (within a role among transactions or authorization objects) and at an 
inter-role level (among different roles).  
After this analysis, SoD analysts will have to consider any role conflict or user conflict 
and report them to elaborate corrective actions. 
Roles are built following the BRM workflow steps. The next stage is to assign roles to 
users according to the design stablished. This stage is described as Role provisioning. 
Roles have to be assigned from a start date to an end date, which can be marked as 
31.12.9999 if the position is permanent. In case of temporary roles, the end date will be 
marked with the specified date when users cannot be authorized to it. 
 
 
6.5 Testing 
 
Firstly, it is required to have separation of duties not only in the employees of the 
organization, but the diverse teams responsible for the design, implementation and 
testing of this security model in the company. 
In order to achieve these different functions, there are three different environments 
where they work. 
6.5.1 SAP Deployment Environment 
In any software deployment there is a landscape (environment or tier) where software 
and computer programs run and are deployed. An environment is composed of servers 
resulting on a layout of servers, or architecture of servers. 
1. Analysis 2. Design
3. 
Implementation
4. Testing 5. Maintenance
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In the SAP scenario, there are three different environments: 
- Development environment (DEV) is where programmers and consultants carry out 
the customization of the ERP functionalities based on the company’s requirements.   
 
Regarding to security terms, this area is where new transactions such as transactions 
Z* or Y* are developed, new programs are edited using the ABAP10 Development 
WorkBench, user interfaces are designed, roles are created, profiles and 
authorizations are conformed. Basically it is where changes are originally made. In 
this environment, there are no users registered in the system, but only the 
authorizations, transactions, menus, programs, user interfaces… 
 
Once developers and consultants have programmed and configured all changes in 
the Development server, they transport this information to the test server (Quality). 
 
- Quality environment (QAS) is where the core team members and other staff test 
the customization of the software designed and programmed. 
In this testing server, testers check the programs before transporting them to the 
Production server: it is an acceptance or rejection decision. 
 
In order to check whether a user can access or not to a specific program 
(transaction), consultants assign this new program (transaction) to users through 
new or existing profiles, included in roles. That user can check in its Quality SAP logon 
if he/she has the right credentials for accessing every option or function in a 
transaction. Users can also request for changes if a transaction has not been 
developed correctly. 
 
Apart from user tests, there are also different tests for checking the new program’s 
performance and also its integration with various modules. 
 
- Production Environment (PRD): is where the real-time data of the company is 
recorded and stored. Every transaction and business process that is performed by 
end users (client) will be run and go live. Client data such as transactions, programs, 
interfaces… are in the production environment once it has overcome the previous 
stages (DEV and QAS), so all changes recorded in the Quality Environment were 
transported to the Production Environment. 
                                                     
10 ABAP is the SAP 4th generation programming language which is used to program most of the R/3 
products, SAP Business One, etc. This programming language is totally integrated with SAP system, and it 
is oriented to a sequence of events depending on the compliance of one condition or event. 
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In order to have real data without misconfigurations in the Production Environment, 
it is important that every transaction is transported after being tested appropriately 
in the Quality Environment so we can guarantee the integrity and consistency of the 
transactions running in PRD. 
 
 
Figure 29: Flow of data across different environments. Source: Own elaboration. 
The flow of data is in the direction represented above, but not backwards. The data 
is transported from one environment to another using transport orders. 
 
Transport orders have to be created including all the new information, changes, new 
transactions… (Tr. SE01) Once it is created and completed, it is released along with 
all the tasks included on it (Tr. SE09). After being released, the order has to be 
imported to the destination system using STMS (Transport Management System). 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Security Analysis in the Quality Environment 
SAP Security consultants must check that transactions are documented correctly with 
the right authorizations. 
 
6.5.2.1 Adequate Documentation for Transactions 
The steps for analyzing access control for transactions start with the initial execution of 
the transaction. A transaction must exist, thus, have an entry in the TSTC table. Then, 
the system checks if this transaction has been locked using tr. SM01. In case it has been 
locked, the execution will be stopped and will not be used by any client. 
If the transaction has not been locked and started its execution, as mentioned 
previously, S_TCODE is the first authorization object that is checked when accessing a 
transaction. Then, depending on the transaction, a transaction may also require to check 
other authorization objects. 
In the SU24 transaction, there is a list of all authorization objects required to access a 
specific transaction. If the authorization objects for that transaction are checked by the 
system, users will need to be assigned those authorization objects to access. These 
objects with the values entered in the tr. SU24 conform the authorizations. These will 
Development 
Environment
Quality 
Environment
Production 
Environment
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be included in a profile, assigned manually to the user or through a role. In this way, 
users with that role or profile will be able to perform any function in that transaction. 
6.5.2.2 User Access denial 
If users are not able to access some functionalities in a transaction that is tested on the 
Quality environment, this transaction will be required to be traced. This process starts 
when IT Consultants receive a ticket because of the missing authorization. 
In the scenario of access denial, there can be some reasons for the lack of access: 
- The role did not include the appropriate authorization objects, however, these 
were checked by the system since they were reported in the SU24 transaction. 
- The system checks authorization objects when selecting certain functions in the 
transaction, nevertheless they are not reported correctly in the SU24 
transaction, thus, they are not included in the corresponding role. 
When the Authorization check fails because of access denial, we can use the following 
tools for determining the solution to this access: 
- Using Last Failed Authorization check – transaction SU53 
- Using Assignment of Authorization Objects to Transactions – transaction SU24 
- Tracing the Authorizations for a function – transaction ST01 
See more about the transactions SU53 and ST01 in the Appendix C. 
 
6.5.3 User Access Management: ARM 
Users need to verify that they have the right privileges to access the system. If users do 
not have access to transactions or operations they should, they will request it to the 
Security team involved in SoD & GRC.  
These users’ requests are usually handled through PaaS ticketing platforms specialized 
in IT Service Management, such as Service Now. These type of tools manage user 
requests and enable incidents reporting.  These tools manage processes that are 
auditable and verifiable. In addition, they ensure a clear approval process, that checks 
for SoD violations, and if there is none, it provides and assign the appropriate role. 
SAP offered under the GRC umbrella its own product, ARM (Access Request 
Management). ARM mainly consists in roles provisioning to users. Users need 
transactions that are not included in their existing roles or in roles that could lead to SoD 
conflicts. 
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ARM also has a workflow. Requests first need to be approved by the user line manager. 
Then, it is approved by the SAP Process Owner, who are in charge of assigning the user 
request to the Security team. The Security team is responsible for granting access to 
users. However, the role to assign will be first approved by the Process Owner and the 
Role Owner, as well as by Internal Control. 
 
 
6.6 Maintenance 
 
The maintenance phase starts when the SoD project has already been built in the 
Production environment. Real-time data is now being operated in the system. The 
testing phase has been approved, so there is no need to rollback. 
However, over time, there will be changes in the system. Risks evolve and our company 
has to be able to adapt agilely in order to prevent any fraudulent activity in the system. 
Risks are continuously being recognized and assessed through SAP GRC ARM. This tool 
will provide us remediation to SoD critical conflicts. 
BRM will be also involved in the maintenance of roles, since there will be many changes 
in the system: new roles, transactions, mergers, and changes in job positions, inter alia. 
User requests, tickets and incidences are tasks that require more time in the 
maintenance phase. ARM or a similar tool will help Security consultants to make this 
activity easier and faster to handle. 
 
6.6.1 Privileged access for critical tasks: SAP EAM 
The last SAP GRC Access Control functionality explained in this document is SAP EAM. 
SAP EAM stands for Emergency Access Management, previously known as SPM 
Superuser Privilege Management or Firefighter (FF). 
Users may require urgent access for exceptional circumstances. In these situations, the 
Firefighter user is a secure and auditable solution. 
1. Analysis 2. Design
3. 
Implementation
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The Firefighter ID is a user ID that grants access in an exceptional basis. The FF ID is 
created by the Security team, and assigned to users or group of users (even 
departments) who require to carry out tasks in extraordinary occasions.  
In these emergency situations, users log in to the FF ID and a prompt message will 
appear. Users are required to specify the reasons of use and the activities that are being 
performed from the FF that cannot be executed by their normal users because of lack 
of access, or access denial. 
Once the information for the FF logon has been completed, users (logged in the system 
as FF) can execute these transactions. When users have finished these emergency tasks, 
they log off from FF ID and can continue with other activities from their normal users. 
Additionally, every transaction executed by FF ID is reported to the FF Administrator, 
which will receive a complete report of the FF operations. 
The Security team has to configure and create specific roles for the FF ID that will contain 
additional roles that are not authorized in a regular basis. However, there will not be 
authorized activities/functions which are not related to the position or department. 
SAP EAM stands out for its versatility for users, besides being an easy and fast 
application to deploy in the system. The disadvantage of this tool is that users have to 
be trained on using the Firefighter only in emergency situations, and not as frequent 
use. 
On the other hand, it is relevant that FF Administrators and FF Owners are formed to be 
capable to understand the transactions and operations which are reported by SAP GRC 
Access Control EAM. 
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7 PLANNING AND COSTS 
In this section, it is presented a detailed vision of the project planning based on 
monitoring reports along the progress of the project.  In addition, the total budget of 
the thesis is also broken down specifying each category of costs that apply.  
7.1 Project Planning 
 
The elaboration of this thesis extends from 1st January 2016 until 18th June 2016. 
The following table shows the breakdown of planning followed for all the activities 
during the development of the thesis, indicating the time spent on each. 
Task / Activity Start Date Duration End Date 
Study on the preliminary concepts  01/01/2016 13 weeks 31/03/2016 
Analysis of Fraud and causes 01/04/2016 2 weeks 15/04/2016 
Solutions: Regulation and Security Principles (SoD) 15/04/2016 1 week 22/04/2016 
Design of a risk based-approach to SoD 22/04/2016 2 weeks 06/05/2016 
Methodology of a project based on the design proposed 06/05/2016 3 weeks 27/05/2016 
Documentation 01/04/2016 11 weeks 18/06/2016 
Review and corrections 27/05/2016 2 weeks 10/06/2016 
 
Table 18: Project Planning. Source: Own elaboration. 
Following up the schedule planned on the table above, during the first three months, 
there was a previous analysis of the SAP security architecture and how SoD was 
structured and implemented, and a thorough research on GRC and SAP GRC tools. 
During this period, the emphasis was not dedicated on documentation, but in the 
previous research and analysis of these tools, so the average work for this period was 
around 2 hours per day. 
The estimated hours in the first 3 months (90 days ~ 13 weeks) are calculated as: 
13 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 × 5
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘
 × 2
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 130 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 
After this period, an average work of 6 hours per day have been dedicated to this project 
without taking into account holidays and occasional free days. The documentation was 
performed while detailed tasks were performed (analysis, solutions, design, 
methodology…) 
 
 
                                                                                        
Sandra Morillejo González 
110 | Planning and costs 
 
The estimated hours in the last 3 months (77 days ~ 11 weeks) are calculated as: 
77 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 × 6
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 462 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 
The project duration has an estimated amount of 592 hours (130 hours from the first 
phase and 462 hours from the second phase of the project). 
7.1.1 Monitoring Reports 
In order to evaluate the progress of the project, the development of the last 3 months 
have been measured along three different monitoring reports. The objective of these 
reports is to evaluate the progress of the thesis and focus on the tasks that were 
estimated to be completed in a certain date. In addition, it brings a complete vision of 
the project. It was a helpful tool for reviewing the thesis with its tutors along the project. 
The result of all the monitoring reports is the burndown chart, which is a graph that 
compares that planned progress over the months with the actual progress of the 
project. This comparison is made in terms of percentage of the completed project, 
considering that each task has a specific weight based on the estimated days.  
The blue bar (or line) shows the evolution planned early in the project based on the 
different tasks and estimated time it would take each. 
The red bar (or line) shows the completed work until the day of the monitoring report. 
These monitoring reports were distributed over time: on April 15th, on May 15th and on 
June 15th. 
The first monitoring report was performed on April 15th, when the documentation had 
started, and the preliminary concepts had already been analyzed and documented. 
In this first report, the project was under schedule, so tutors expected this work rhythm 
to continue along the project. 
However, some tasks such as the analysis of fraud and its causes took a lot of time 
because of the thorough research on accounting cases and cybersecurity cases where 
fraud was involved.  
Identifying the causes of fraud in each case and analyzing weaknesses of the firms 
affected and, then, finding solutions for preventing fraud took a long time, more than 
estimated firstly. 
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Figure 30: Monitoring Report on 15/04/2016. Source: Own elaboration. 
The second monitoring report was performed on May 15th. The first tasks such as 
preliminary concepts, analysis and solutions were already carried out, however the 
design of the approach to SoD was about to be completed.  
 
Figure 31: Monitoring Report on 15/05/2016. Source: Own elaboration. 
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However, the methodology was not advanced as it was estimated, since the design of 
the solution based on SoD from a risk-based approach required time and effort for 
streamlining tasks in relation to risk mitigation. In this phase, the project suffered high 
delays on the Design and the Methodology implemented. These tasks were completed 
at the end of May, contrasted and reviewed with tutors on several meetings. 
The last monitoring report was carried out on June 15th. In this report, the project was 
almost completed. The thesis was adapted taking into consideration some tutors’ 
recommendations. 
 
Figure 32: Monitoring Report on 15/06/2016. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Globally, most of the project progress was performed during April and May. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the preliminary concepts of the thesis were documented 
in the first period of the thesis (Jan.-March). Last changes of structure, content and last 
sections such as conclusions and summary were documented on June.  
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Figure 33: Burndown chart: Progress on Monitoring Reports 
7.2 Project Costs 
 
This section presents the estimated budget required for the development of the present 
project divided into categories. 
7.2.1 Personnel cost 
Taking into account average salaries of IT Security and Risk consultants in companies as 
PwC, EY or Deloitte with less than 3 years of experience, the average salary is around 
22,000€/year. These salaries correspond to job positions in Madrid.  
The duration of this thesis has been estimated in the project planning section to be 
approximately 500 hours. Based on a working day of 8 hours and 40 hours per week: 
592ℎ𝑟𝑠
8ℎ𝑟𝑠
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 74 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠;  
74 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
5
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘
 = 14.8 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 
The duration of this project would be 62.5 days or 12.5 weeks working in a full time job.   
Considering that the average number of weeks worked are 52 per year, the total 
personnel cost results in: 
22,000 €
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
×
14.8 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠
52 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 = €𝟔, 𝟐𝟔𝟏 
7.2.2 Hardware cost 
The hardware devices used for this project consisted in two laptops: an enterprise laptop 
used to research on SAP security configuration and testing on SAP GRC Access Control, 
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and a personal computer to document the whole thesis and research on fraud and its 
analysis. 
The enterprise laptop was a Dell Latitude E6230 Intel Core i5 2.60Ghz, 8GB of RAM and 
120GB SSD, whereas the personal laptop used was a Sony VAIO Vpccb Intel Core i5 
2.40Ghz, 6GB of RAM and 640GB SSD. 
The cost computation for these elements has been calculated taking into account the 
depreciation period. The expected life of the enterprise laptop has been estimated to 3 
years, while the expected life of the personal laptop has been estimated to 6 years. 
The costs for these devices can be calculated by using the following formula: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 × 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
 Enterprise laptop:  
o Cost without taxes = €400 
o Depreciation period = 3 years ~ 156 weeks 
o Utilization time = 1st January 2016-31st March 2016 ~ 13 weeks (90 days) 
o 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = €400
156 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠
 × 13 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 = € 33.33 
 
 Personal laptop:  
o Cost without taxes = €700 
o Depreciation period = 6 years ~ 312 weeks 
o Utilization time = 1st April 2016-18th June 2016 ~ 11 weeks (78 days) 
o 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = €700
312 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠
 × 11 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 = € 24.68 
The total cost incurred in hardware devices are €58.01. 
7.2.3 Software cost 
The software used in the enterprise laptop for the thesis research were mainly the SAP 
GUI license and access to the enterprise SAP GRC Sandbox (which is a SAP testing 
environment separated from a real time production environment).  
SAP GRC Sandbox and SAP GUI licenses are costs known by the enterprise IT team, but 
not public for the rest of the enterprise. The cost of a SAP license for an end user is 
around €990. Since SAP GRC Sandbox is not a productive environment and there is not 
real-time data connected, it has been estimated a 10% of its cost, €99 yearly. Bearing in 
mind that the firm software was used for 3 months, its cost has been approximated to 
€25. 
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In the personal laptop, the main tools used have been: 
 Microsoft Office 365: Free of cost for UC3M students 
 Gliffy (Online Diagram and Flowchart Software): Free of cost 
 Windows 10 Professional License: Free of cost 
7.2.4 Other costs 
Indirect costs are included in this category, since they are costs not directly accountable 
to the cost object, such as electricity for the devices used and other office supplies. In 
order to provide electricity or fulfill other office supplies, there has been estimated a 
percentage of the direct cost budget for such costs.  
 It has been determined a 20% of the direct costs. In addition, there have been added 
two more cost elements in its calculation: 
- Benefits, because of the advance and thorough research on SoD in SAP projects 
and its implementation. It has been considered a 15% over the costs. 
- Risk Margin, 15% of direct costs has been assigned to risks that affected the 
project scope. 
7.2.5 Total costs 
The table below represents the costs involved in the thesis elaboration. In the bottom 
row, it has been estimated the total project cost. 21% of taxes have been added to the 
total cost. 
Description Cost 
Direct Cost 6,344.01 
Personnel cost 6,261 
Hardware cost 58.01 
Software cost 25 
Indirect Cost 634.401 
Electricity and office supplies 634.401 
Total before Taxes and other Costs 6,978.41 
Benefits 1,049.76 
Risk Margin 951.60 
Total before Taxes 8976.77 
Taxes 1,885.12 
TOTAL 10,861.89 
 
Table 19: Total Costs in Project Planning. Source: Own elaboration. 
As a result of the above calculations, the final cost of this thesis amounts to a total of 
€10,861.89, taxes included. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
In the digital era, it is not surprising that risks arise from this technological world and 
fraud emerges when access control policies are trespassed. However, many companies 
are still unaware of the importance and the impact of these risks, and do not know the 
right measures to prevent them. The techniques to achieve an approximated 
assessment of risks is not so obvious for many companies and lies on a simple statement: 
Segregation of Duties. 
Segregation of Duties (SoD) offers a solution to fraud by separating tasks that when 
combined together come into conflict. This methodology provides job positions 
categorized as roles with minimum privileges throughout the entire business concept. 
Business processes are the core of this methodology. That’s why companies which do 
not pay attention to how their business processes are integrated and how its 
departments communicate with each other will not be able to create a consistent work 
environment for tasks, applications, and most importantly, people. 
Access control policies play an important role while building a SoD model. The SoD 
process proposed follows a Roles Based Access Control architecture.  This security 
approach consists of two main principles: minimum least privilege and prevention of 
SoD conflicts. 
This thesis started with the focus point on ERPs, such as SAP. ERP systems offer an 
integrated vision of all the business processes across the organization. They allow to 
identify and manage the main tasks of the company. Business processes have to be 
streamlined and coordinated to provide consistent and automatic workflows. Such 
workflows are the most important tool to enable a correct segregation of duties.  
ERP avoids different business applications and gathers all the information in a single 
software where information is real-time, accurate and integrated. This results in a higher 
employee efficiency and better quality in our results. One of the ERP advantages is being 
able to easily trace and report information. In this way, these systems can trace and 
monitor critical tasks favoring fraud detecting. 
In addition, ERP solutions provide a complete security configuration based on different 
levels of access. SAP, as one of the most popular ERP examples, has been an adequate 
example thanks to the authorizations structure that offers.  
Our research question has been to analyze fraud in real cases where enterprises have 
faced financial and fraud crimes, as well as cybersecurity attacks. Fraud has been studied 
from its origin to identify conditions that cause the occurrence of fraud.  
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The result was a combination of the Fraud Triangle by Wells, J.T. 2005, and the Fraud 
Diamond, by Lormel, D. 2012. These philosophies of fraud present different causes of 
fraud that together structure all its components: motivation, opportunity, capabilities 
and personal integrity. 
From these fraudsters’ reasons to commit fraud, this study extended that this causes 
must be analyzed from an individual and enterprise structure. There are many pressures 
and motivational causes that can lead employees to commit fraud, as well as its 
capabilities in the company or its rationalization. However, there is another element 
that depends to a large degree on companies, that is opportunity. Opportunity relies 
heavily on the enterprise opposition to fraud and the security measures it provides to 
prevent it. Companies should not leave the door open to opportunity, because that is 
what will make fraudsters to endanger your business. At the end of the document, there 
have been listed some recommendations for enterprises to prevent fraud based on the 
4 dimensions that fraud can arise from. 
Through a review of different notable cases where accounting fraud was involved, there 
have been analyzed for each particular case its causes for committing fraud, the fraud 
strategies carried out and some weaknesses that companies had. The results evidenced 
the main failures of companies. Firstly, weak supervision and control over capable 
positions such as top management and the accounting department. Secondly, lack of 
internal control procedures. Thirdly, it was identified an unhealthy corporate culture 
that incentivized bonuses unrelated with employees’ performance, besides an unclear 
definition of goals and no established thresholds for compensation. In addition, there 
was not defined any code of ethics and conduct in the company. This denoted an 
individualist environment that did not encourage cooperation and teamwork. Last but 
not least, lack of access control was a common factor in all companies examined. 
The latter point was the common factor in the companies analyzed that were heavily 
damaged by computer cyberattacks. Hackers and fraudulent employees took advantage 
of lack of access control tools that companies had. The most popular strategies were to 
access to critical data using some employees’ credentials and then installing sniffer 
malware on the network of the application. Employees’ unconsciousness of the risk that 
ID credentials pose is a key factor that companies need to prevent. Many fraudster and 
hackers sold then the data stolen to ID thieves. Internal security measures were 
insufficient in all the cases in order to protecting critical users’ data. 
As hackers access with users’ credentials, it is crucial that from these user accounts, 
hackers are not capable of performing any critical task in the system, and even less to 
manage all phases in a transaction such as recording, authorize and settle a transaction. 
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Due to the large amount of cases regarding financial fraud through cyberattacks and 
malware, the value that this research brings to companies is remarkably high. Moreover, 
the economic figures of these attacks have been taken in consideration since the losses 
assumed by the companies concerned exceeded billion dollars. 
As a consequence of these cases, numerous regulations have emerged to prevent fraud. 
The regulations that deal with internal control and corporate governance as well as the 
security policies related have been included in this document. Regulations such as COSO 
and SoX strengthen internal control rules and implement higher control over CEOs and 
CFOs operations. 
SoD from a risk based approach 
The solution for companies to prevent fraud is implementing a model based on 
Segregation of Duties from a risk approach. Through this study, it has been analyzed the 
SoD process in accordance to the risk lifecycle, due to the fact that SoD is built from 
conflicts between tasks, which pose a risk to enterprises. These conflicting tasks are 
separated into different roles to ensure separate responsibilities and privileges. 
The SoD process embodied in this research starts with the risks identification, then an 
analysis of risks and its prioritization, which will lead to assess and evaluate the impact 
of the risks that affect our firm. Defining functional and technical matrixes will help us 
to identify SoD conflicts in the system. The next step is to create some rules that mitigate 
such risks. Fraud risks will be controlled and automatized in the rules defined, that will 
be collected and processed in tools such as SAP GRC Access Control. Then, these risks 
will be continuously monitored to prevent future fraudulent operations and create 
alerts when attempted. 
GRC: Collaborative workplace 
Another concept that enhances SoD from a risk perspective is the GRC term: 
Governance, Risk Management and Compliance. The lesson learned from its benefits is 
the importance of a collaborative work environment where different departments have 
to cooperate together to ensure a correct SoD. Security analysts do not know what 
business processes are relevant in the business or where there can be SoD conflicts and 
possibilities of fraud, but Internal Control do. Risks can only be assessed and identified 
by a Risk Management team, as well as the Security department will be involved in the 
configuration of the SoD process attending to the security implemented in the 
organization. All these tasks have to be audited simultaneously by Audit Management 
that will ensure that these activities have been correctly reported attending to 
accounting standards and application controls over IT security. 
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SAP GRC Access Control as a powerful tool to control risks and enhance SoD 
SAP GRC Access Control has been the tool used to design an architecture project based 
on the key concepts mentioned: SoD, risks and GRC. In this research, it has been 
reflected how a project implementing SoD would evolve by using SAP GRC AC.  An 
analysis of the tasks executed allows to define different roles: functional roles, 
organizational scoped roles and business roles. The described project is implemented 
through the following phases: a previous analysis of SoD, design of roles with the 
corresponding authorizations, implementation of these roles and rules of control, 
testing and a continuous monitoring. For each of these stages, there is a tool that can 
be used in SAP GRC Access Control, such as ARM for risk identification, BRM for business 
role management, EAM for critical tasks auditing and monitoring, and ARM for user 
requests of access incidences in the system. 
To sum up, fraud and cybersecurity attacks have been assessed by developing a role 
based access control architecture that develops as a security control segregation of 
duties in the business processes. In order to achieve this model, there has been 
proposed a SAP project which employs the module GRC Access Control to build security 
privileges from a risk-based approach. 
 
 
8.1 Recommendations and future development 
 
Lastly, there have been developed different measures to help enterprises to prevent 
fraud. These recommendations are based on each area of the New Fraud Triangle 
Model (Kassem & Highson, 2012) described in Section 3.1, which are: motivation, 
opportunity, integrity and fraudster’s capabilities. 
Capability: People with top positions in organizations or authoritative functions can be 
influenced to commit fraud because they are more capable to do it. These positions 
should be more controlled than others in terms of their security access. These highest 
levels of the organization should lead by example and respect the ethical standards of 
the company. 
Motivation: The company should push for employees to not commit fraud through 
measures such as the following: 
 Compensation structure based on objectives and milestones 
 Non-financial incentive plans such as additional paid vacations or increased 
professional development 
 Establishment of sales incentives based on profits, not revenues 
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 Salary commensurate to the market and to the job position played 
 Managing work place frustration by analyzing and treating these cases 
 
Due to the fact that nowadays firms must be profitable, there is no room for failure and 
if managers or some employees do not meet their objectives, they will be dismissed 
from office. To prevent unfaithful employees and high staff turnover, it is very valuable 
to invest time and resources on increasing the sense of belonging to the company. 
Integrity: In order to provide a positive and respectful work environment, where fraud 
is prevented, these could be some solutions: 
 Staff training and continuous assessment on fraud issues 
 Establishment of anti-fraud programs: code of ethics, policies, procedures… 
 Determination of lines of complaints 
Opportunity: Business processes must be diagnosed, analyzed and evaluated for the 
purpose of covering any possible security breaches for fraud. These evaluations could 
be the following: 
 Specialized audits that meet the current regulations  
 Third parties continuous monitoring and management of payments 
 Evaluation and constant updating of risks and controls 
 
The formula to protect businesses from fraud is not unique, it depends on many critical 
factors, as we have listed. However, there is a key point for both small and large 
companies: identify and assess each of the risks and mitigate them. Combating fraud is 
how we help building a better business workplace for all. 
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9 Executive Summary 
Large scandals where fraud is involved has become the main reason for enterprises to 
get protected from risks within the enterprise. Internal risk controlling is an area that is 
being exploded over the last years due to its importance for analyzing risks and 
mitigating them through security controls. 
On one hand, governments are forcing enterprises to comply with certain regulations 
for internal control and a responsible corporate governance. On the other hand, fraud 
must not only be understood as compliance with applicable regulations, but as a whole 
process to identify risks affecting our company and design and develop an action plan 
to control these risks and mitigate them. It is important that enterprises focus on this 
challenge as an evolutionary and adaptive process over time but not as a straight 
temporary project. Firms have to be totally aware of the importance of preventing risks, 
so they can invest a significant amount of their budget in control and protection. 
Fraud has to be studied from its origin, so it can be explained why fraudsters commit 
it.  In this way, enterprises can determine which areas to be reinforced due to security 
holes or weak motivation measures. 
In search of the causes of fraud, there have been analyzed different theories. Firstly, a 
theory that describes three sides of a fraud triangle, which are opportunity, 
rationalization and pressure. Then, this philosophy was studied and reviewed by 
researchers as Wolfe and Hermanson who added up another factor in this study: 
Capability. Fraudster’s capabilities can be encouraged based on motivators such as 
Money, Ideology, Coercion and Ego (MICE theory). From all these perspectives, it was 
concluded that fraud can be occasioned from the combination of these 4 variables: 
motivation, opportunity, fraudster’s capabilities and personal integrity 
(rationalization). 
Taking into consideration all these factors, there is one side of the triangle that is highly 
relevant for companies, which is opportunity. Compared to the other factors, this 
variable is highly dependent on the fraud occurrence, since it relies heavily on the 
enterprise opposition to fraud and the security measures it provides to prevent it.  
Through a thorough research on accounting scandals and data breaches were fraud is 
involved, there were some main reasons of fraudsters to commit fraud: the lack of 
internal control policies and the capability of fraudsters (hackers or employees) to 
commit fraud. These capabilities increased due to a weak and fast access to critical data 
using other employee credentials. 
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Once fraud is recognized, enterprises will need to analyze their weaknesses when 
protecting themselves from fraud. In addition, companies must bear in mind the 
applicable regulations regarding to internal control and corporate governance. Such 
regulations have arisen to prevent fraud and strengthen internal control policies in 
companies. 
The solution to enterprises in the pursuit to prevent fraud is described in this thesis. This 
proposal is based on a security architecture solution that is focused in Access Control. 
It has been followed a Role Based Access Control model, which is focused on a security 
principle: Segregation of Duties (SoD). Such user roles are formed with the necessary 
privileges for its job position tasks, so a user cannot have access to the whole process.  
Segregation of Duties has been directed in this thesis as a process. This security principle 
consists on separating those tasks that may lead to a conflict, thus, to fraud. Such risks 
can be mitigated, however the business processes and their tasks evolve continuously 
and the firm has to be adaptive and monitor constantly risks. In order to understand this 
risk process, it has been analyzed SoD from the risk management lifecycle. All tasks 
involved in the SoD processes have been adapted to the different phases of risk 
management cycle: identification, analysis, assessment, action plan, implementation 
and monitoring.  
As a result of the risk analysis over SoD performed, this process has been applied to the 
methodology of a whole project. Enterprises which are interested in implementing a 
SoD solution in their business core should follow this methodology for a correct 
segregation of duties evaluation and implementation. It is relevant that companies 
provide a streamlined set of business processes throughout the entire company. 
Companies using ERPs will be more ready for starting building SoD than unorganized 
enterprises that control many applications for different purposes.  
From this point, the definition of functional and technical matrixes will provide 
information about the conflicts to evaluate and assess. Those SoD conflicts that pose 
higher risks for the company will be mitigated through mitigation controls. These can 
be automatically set up for building risks rule sets and alerts when the detection of any 
fraud risks. 
The methodology of SoD has been conducted using the tools offered by SAP GRC Access 
Control. This software application is an integrated set of tools that helps enterprises to 
implement SoD through risk monitoring, auditing reports on critical tasks in the system, 
a role based access control model deployed and managed with business roles, and so 
on. It is relevant to note that this tool is structured from a GRC framework.  
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GRC (Governance, Risk Management and Compliance) can be described as a 
collaborative work approach that looks at the enterprise as a whole, integrating tasks 
from different departments and streamlining them in a unique solid system. GRC 
changes the work paradigm in the departments involved in Internal Audit, Risk 
Management, Compliance and IT security. All these areas work together from different 
perspectives but within the same integrated SoD process.  
Compliance with internal control policies and applicable regulations is also crucial and 
these verifications are included in tools such as SAP GRC Access Control. Enterprises that 
install and maintain correctly a SoD methodology will be able to successfully comply with 
regulations regarding to corporate governance and internal control. 
All the measures proposed do not imply a large investment for companies. As been 
analyzed in this thesis, all these regulations, security software and the personnel 
involved in a complete Segregation of Duties project represent only a 0.7% of the total 
losses resulted from a data breach. (Percentage shown in the worst case scenario 
presented: T.J.Maxx). 
Companies should stablish a well-defined strategy to build security measures as 
proposed. In addition, it is recommendable to build a healthy corporate culture, a 
compensation structure based on objectives and milestones, control thoroughly the 
highest levels of the organization and perform staff training on fraud issues and security 
awareness, among others. 
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10  Appendix A: Additional SAP Security 
Configuration 
1. Master Users’ Records configuration from transaction SU01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Example of access to a transaction by using its T-code 
 
For example, the transaction FD01, which allows us to create customer master 
records, can be accessed through the SAP Path: SAP Menu > Accounting > Financial 
Accounting > Accounts Receivable > Master Records > FD01 – Create (See image at 
the left below). However, the fastest way to access is by entering the T Code in SAP. 
(See image at the right below). 
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3. Configuration procedure of a single role with transactions associated and its 
assignation to a user. 
 
In the image below, we show how to create a single role, which name is Z_ROLE_USER, 
from the transaction code PFCG.  
 
 
 
Then, the role created is completed with a description about the role and a long text of 
the role. 
After these changes we save these details clicking on the save button. 
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The next step is to assign transaction codes to the role. In this way, users who are 
assigned this role can have access only to the specified transactions on the role menu.  
Selecting the Menu Tab (1), we can create folders and insert transactions (2).  
In these folders, we can assign the transaction codes that are related to the role 
functionality. In the image at the right, there are transactions associated to a Buyer 
Position Role. 
 
 
 
Then, in the Authorizations Tab, we click on Change Authorization Data in order to check 
authorizations contained in the profile of this role. 
 
When selecting the round red cycle button on the settings, we will generate 
automatically the profile of the role.  
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The last step is to select the User tab, that allows us to assign this role to user IDs with a 
specified validity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Configuration procedure of a composite role  
In order to create a composite role, first we need to create single roles so we can add 
them in the composite role in the Roles tab (transaction PFCG in SAP).  
Composite roles as well as single roles have to be define with a unique name. Role 
names, either single or composite, cannot be changed since its creation. 
The composite role (1) will 
contain those roles (2) that are 
related and that can be 
associated forming a unique 
role.  
 
 
 
 
5. Manual profile generation 
In the example used previously in the single role creation with the example role 
Z_ROLE_USER, we created its profile automatically using transaction PFCG. 
By using transaction SU03, profiles can be created through a manual process. This 
process is time-consuming and requires expertise on the authorization concepts. 
1 
2 
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As we see in the image at the right, a profile 
consists of authorizations: authorization objects 
that include determined authorizations defined 
in the system. 
The profile A_ALL consists of authorizations: 
authorization objects such as S_PROGRAM, 
S_ARCHIVE, A_PERI_BUK… 
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11  Appendix B: Analysis of authorization objects 
for SAP CO module 
11.1 SAP Controlling (CO) 
Controlling (CO) is the term used by SAP referred to ‘Managerial Accounting’. This is 
concerned with the provisions and use of accounting information to managers within 
organizations. This module provides managers the basis needed to make informed 
business decisions in order to achieve a better controlling management. 
Managerial accounting, in contrast with financial accounting (FI), provides data for 
internal use of the enterprise. It emphasizes relevance and flexibility of data, and it has 
a long-term emphasis, easing managers to take well-versed decisions for the future. It is 
a means to an end. 
Managerial accounting looks at the business as a whole, but it also focuses on different 
parts of it. This type of accounting draws significantly from other disciplines such as 
finance, economics, and operations research, that’s why it is highly recommended to 
use the CO module in conjunction with other modules, such as FI, MM, SD, PP or HR. 
Actually, the whole Accounting Module (FI-CO) plays the role of a ‘Feeder System’ since 
they are the core modules of SAP. Even if an enterprise is interested in implementing 
only the SD module and the CRM product, the FICO module will be basic since it is highly 
correlated to others, therefore, the complete FICO module should be the first module 
to deploy.  
SAP recommends Controlling implementation to be carried out in three different 
phases: Foundation, Stabilization and then Enhancement and Optimization. 
Controlling is divided into the following areas: 
1. Cost Element Accounting (CO-OM-CEL): Component that controls in real time all 
financial transactions relevant to profit and loss accounts.  
2. Cost Center Accounting (CO-OM-CCA): Sub module used for internal control of 
each cost center in the organization. The standard hierarchy of cost centers 
enables to visualize and control organization performance, based on the 
comparison of planned and actual costs for each of them. The client can set up a 
monthly budget for every cost center. 
3. Internal Order Accounting (CO-OM-OPA). Internal Orders are normally used for 
managing small projects (internal jobs and tasks) that need to be budgeted and 
managed independently. They enable the client to plan, collect and settle costs 
of the project. It is helpful for top management on the decision-making process. 
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4. Activity-Based Costing (CO-ABC). This sub module allows to define more 
precisely of the origin of the costs associated with a particular process. 
5. Profit Center Accounting (EC-PCA): Sub module used for management-related 
internal reporting. A profit center is a unit managed independently by a person 
who is responsible for the profit. 
6. Product Costing (CO-PC): This sub module measures the material cost of a 
product, that is the value added by each process and organizational unit. It 
determines inventories and helps to take make or buy decisions. 
7. Profitability Analysis (CO-PA): This tool allows the client to review information 
related to the benefit of the company, as well as the added value that provides 
a specific business segment. 
 
Figure 34: Controlling Structure (Garmendia, 2012) 
11.1.1 Standard flow of the Controlling Business Processes 
The main controlling activities that are being represented in the following flows are 
related to the Cost Center Accounting (CO-OM-CCA) and Internal Orders (CO-OM-OPA). 
SAP Menu > Accounting -> Controlling -> Cost Element Accounting -> Master Data 
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 Cost Center Accounting flow 
 
 Internal Orders Accounting flow 
 
11.1.2 Authorization Objects Required 
In this section, there are being listed the authorization objects required to have the 
proper access to the main transactions for the Controlling Module. The authorization 
objects needed have been detected after a previous analysis of the main transactions 
for the CO Module, that are the following: 
SAP Transaction Code Transaction Description 
KA01/KA06 Create primary/secondary cost element 
KAH1 Create cost element group 
KAH2 Change cost element group 
KS01 Create cost center 
KS02 Change cost center 
KS03 Display cost center 
KSH1 Create cost center group 
KO01 Create internal order 
KOH1 Create internal order group 
KP26 Change activity type/price planning on cost center 
KK01 Create statistical figure 
KBH1 Create statistical key figure group 
KSCF Carry forward cost center commitment 
KL01 Create activity type 
KLH1 Create activity type group 
KB11N Enter manual reposting of costs 
KO88 Actual settlement: Order 
S_ALR_87005757 Create distribution assessment cycle 
KSU1 Create actual assessment 
Controlling Master 
Data
• Cost Element
• Cost Element Group
• Cost Center
• Cost Center Group
• Hierarchies
• Activity Type
• Activity Type Group
• Statistical Figure
• Statistical Key Figure Group
• Profit Center
Planning
• Cost Centers
• Activities
• Statistical Figures
Accounting / 
Repostings
• Enter Activity Allocation
• Accounting Statistical Figures
• Enter Manual Allocations
• Enter Reposting of CO Line 
Items
• Enter Manual Reposting of 
Costs
Closing of Posting 
Periods
• Execute Actual Distribution
• Assessment Cost Element
Closing of Accounting 
Periods
• Carry Forward Cost Center 
Commitment
Internal 
Orders 
Master Data
• Internal Order
• Internal Order 
Group
Order Release Planning Budgeting
Accounting / 
Allocations
Settlement Closing
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1. KA01/KA06 - Create primary/secondary cost element 
The authorization object for primary or secondary cost elements is K_CSKB. This 
authorization object protects the cost elements in master data maintenance. 
 
 
 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKB 
CO-CCA: 
Cost 
Element 
Master 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating the 
cost element 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
CO_KAINT: Cost 
Element 
Classification 
(Primary/Secondary) 
1 – Primary 
Cost 
2 – Secondary 
Cost CSKS 
KOKRS: Controlling 
Area (that belongs 
to a cost center) 
Depends on 
the enterprise 
 
Other activity values are 02 - Change; 03 - Display; 06 - Delete; and 08 – Display 
change documents. 
2. KAH1 - Create cost element group 
The authorization object for creating cost element groups is K_CSKA_SET. This 
authorization object protects maintenance of cost element groups. 
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Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKA_SET 
CO-CCA: 
Cost 
Element 
Groups 
ACTVT: Activity 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role KTOPL: Chart 
of Accounts 
01 – Role for 
creating cost 
element groups 
CSKA 
 
Other activity values are 02 – Change and 03 – Display. 
3. KAH2 - Change cost element group 
The authorization object for changing cost element groups is K_CSKA_SET. This 
authorization object protects maintenance of cost element groups. 
 
 
 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKA_SET 
CO-CCA: 
Cost 
ACTVT: Activity 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
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Element 
Groups KTOPL: Chart 
of Accounts 
02 – Role for 
changing cost 
element groups 
CSKA 
 
4. KS01 - Create cost center 
The authorization object for creating cost centers is K_CSKS. This authorization 
object protects the cost centers in master data maintenance for Cost Center 
Accounting.  
 
 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKS 
CO-CCA: 
Cost Center 
Master 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating the cost 
center 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
KOSTL: Cost Center 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS KOKRS: Controlling 
Area (that belongs 
to the Cost Center) 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
 
Other activity values are 02 – Change; 03 – Display; 06 – Delete; 08 – Display; 63 
– Activate inactive cost centers. 
5. KS02 - Change cost center 
The authorization object for creating cost centers is K_CSKS. This authorization 
object protects the cost centers in master data maintenance for Cost Center 
Accounting.  
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Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKS 
CO-CCA: 
Cost Center 
Master 
ACTVT: Activity 
02 – Role for changing 
the cost center 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
KOSTL: Cost 
Center 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
KOKRS: 
Controlling Area 
(that belongs to 
the Cost Center) 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
 
6. KS03 - Display cost center 
The authorization object for displaying cost centers is K_CSKS. This authorization 
object protects the cost centers in master data maintenance for Cost Center 
Accounting.  
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKS 
CO-CCA: 
Cost Center 
Master 
ACTVT: Activity 
03 – Role for 
displaying the 
cost center 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
KOSTL: Cost Center 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS KOKRS: Controlling 
Area (that belongs 
to the Cost Center) 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
 
 
7. KSH1 - Create cost center group 
The authorization object for creating cost center groups is K_CSKS_SET. This 
authorization object protects the maintenance of cost centers groups in Cost 
Center Accounting.  
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Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKS_SET 
CO-CCA: 
Cost Center 
Groups 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating the cost 
center group 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role KOKRS: Controlling 
Area (that belongs 
to the Cost Center) 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
Other activity values are 02 – Change and 03 – Display. 
 
8. KO01 - Create internal order 
The authorization object for creating internal orders is K_ORDER. This 
authorization object issues access for the following actions: maintenance of 
order master data, manual order planning, budgeting of orders, actions in the 
information systems, and also for an area of responsibility in Overhead Cost 
Controlling (CO-OM area of responsibility).  
 If there is a cost center responsible for the order, the CO-OM area can 
include the order, the responsible cost center or a node in the standard 
hierarchy of the Cost Center Accounting.  
 If there is no responsible cost center, the CO-OM area of responsibility 
applies only to the order. 
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Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_ORDER 
CO-CCA: 
Cost 
Element 
Master 
AUFART: Order Type 
Depends on 
the enterprise 
T0030 
Organizational 
Role 
AUTHPHASE: 
Internal Order 
Authorization – 
Authorization Phase 
Depends on 
the enterprise 
N/A 
CO_ACTION: Actions 
for CO-OM 
Authorization Check 
Depends on 
the enterprise 
 
KSTAR: Cost Element 
Depends on 
the enterprise 
CSKB 
RESPAREA: CO-OM 
Responsibility Area 
Depends on 
the enterprise 
 
 
9. KOH1 - Create internal order group 
The authorization object for creating internal orders is K_AUFK_SET. This 
authorization object protects the maintenance of the order groups for internal 
orders. 
 
 
 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Role Type 
K_AUFK_SET CO-OPA: 
Order 
Groups 
ACTVT: Activity 01 – Role for 
creating the 
internal order 
group 
Functional 
Role 
HNAME: Group 
Name 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
 
10. KP26 - Change activity type/price planning on cost center 
The authorization object for changing activity planning is K_CSKS_PLA. This 
authorization object protects cost centers in planning for Cost Center 
Accounting. 
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Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSKS_PLA 
CO-CCA: 
Cost Center 
Planning 
ACTVT: Activity 
02 – Role for 
changing activity 
type/price planning 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
KOSTL: Cost 
Center 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
 
 Other activity value is 03 – Display. 
11. KK01 - Create statistical figure 
The authorization object for changing activity planning is K_KA03. This 
authorization object protects cost centers in planning for Cost Center 
Accounting. 
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Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_KA03 
CO-CCA: 
Statistical 
Key Figures 
ACTVT: Activity 
02 – Role for 
creating or changing 
statistical figures 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
KOKRS: 
Controlling Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
12. KBH1 - Create statistical key figure group 
The authorization object for changing activity planning is K_KA03_SET. This 
authorization object protects the maintenance of statistical key figure groups. 
 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_KA03_SET 
CO-CCA: 
Statistical 
Key Figure 
Groups 
ACTVT: Activity 
02 – Role for 
creating or changing 
statistical key figure 
groups 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
KOKRS: 
Controlling Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
13. KSCF - Carry forward cost center commitment 
The authorization object for carrying forward cost center commitment is 
K_VRGNG. This authorization object protects manual actual cost postings, and 
allocations of planned and actual costs, which change the data of a whole 
controlling area (or larger areas). 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_VRGNG 
CO: Bus. 
Trans., 
Actual 
Postings and 
Plan/Act. 
Allocations 
ACTVT: Activity 
48 – Role for 
carrying forward 
cost center 
commitment 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
CO_VRGNG: CO 
Business 
Transaction 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
Other activity values are 03 – Display, 06 – Cancel and 16 – Create. 
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14. KL01 - Create activity type 
The authorization object for creating activity types is K_CSLA. This authorization 
object protects activity types in the processing of master data maintenance. 
 
 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSLA 
CO-CCA: 
Activity 
Types 
Master 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating activity 
types 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
 
15. KLH1 - Create activity type group 
16. The authorization object for creating activity types is K_CSLA_SET. This 
authorization object protects the maintenance of the activity type groups. 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_CSLA_SET 
CO-CCA: 
Activity Type 
Groups 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating activity 
types 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
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17. KB11N - Enter manual repostings of costs 
The authorization object for carrying forward cost center commitment is 
K_VRGNG. This authorization object protects manual actual cost postings, and 
allocations of planned and actual costs, which change the data of a whole 
controlling area (or larger areas). 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_VRGNG 
CO: Bus. 
Trans., 
Actual 
Postings and 
Plan/Act. 
Allocations 
ACTVT: Activity 
16 – Role for 
entering manual 
repostings of costs 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
CO_VRGNG: CO 
Business 
Transaction 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
Other activity values are 03 – Display, 06 – Cancel and 16 – Create. 
 
 
18. KO88 - Actual settlement: Order 
The authorization object for carrying forward cost center commitment is 
K_VRGNG. This authorization object protects manual actual cost postings, and 
allocations of planned and actual costs, which change the data of a whole 
controlling area (or larger areas). 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_VRGNG 
CO: Bus. 
Trans., 
Actual 
Postings and 
Plan/Act. 
Allocations 
ACTVT: Activity 
48 – Role for actual 
settlement 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
CO_VRGNG: CO 
Business 
Transaction 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
Other activity values are 03 – Display, 06 – Cancel and 16 – Create. 
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19. S_ALR_87005757 - Create distribution assessment cycle 
The authorization object for carrying forward cost center commitment is 
K_VRGNG. This authorization object protects manual actual cost postings, and 
allocations of planned and actual costs, which change the data of a whole 
controlling area (or larger areas). 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_VRGNG 
CO: Bus. 
Trans., 
Actual 
Postings and 
Plan/Act. 
Allocations 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating 
distribution 
assessment cycle 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
CO_VRGNG: CO 
Business 
Transaction 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
Other activity values are 03 – Display, 06 – Cancel and 16 – Create. 
 
 
20. KSU1 - Create actual assessment 
The authorization object for carrying forward cost center commitment is 
K_VRGNG. This authorization object protects manual actual cost postings, and 
allocations of planned and actual costs, which change the data of a whole 
controlling area (or larger areas). 
Authorization 
Object 
Description Fields Values Table Role Type 
K_VRGNG 
CO: Bus. 
Trans., 
Actual 
Postings and 
Plan/Act. 
Allocations 
ACTVT: Activity 
01 – Role for 
creating actual 
assessment 
N/A 
Organizational 
Role 
CO_VRGNG: CO 
Business 
Transaction 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
N/A 
KOKRS: 
Controlling 
Area 
Depends on the 
enterprise 
CSKS 
 
Other activity values are 03 – Display, 06 – Cancel and 16 – Create. 
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 Controlling Tables 
The tables that relate Controlling fields are the following: 
 
Every arrow (p.e CSLA) defines the name of the table that links two different 
fields (LSTAR and KOKRS, in this case). 
In order to search a table in SAP to display all results related to that specific data, 
SE16 is a transaction where we can browse any table. 
 
We type the name of the table, e.g. LFA1 (Vendor Master) and there is a list of 
all the fields that are associated to the table LFA1, such as MANDT (Vendor) and 
KTOKK (Vendor account group). 
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12   Appendix C: Solutions for Users’ Access Denial 
12.1.1 Solution to access: SU53 
 
 
The image above represents an example of transaction SU53. In this case, the 
authorization object that is missing is S_TCODE for the value SU3, which means that this 
user does not have access to this transaction.  
The solution to authorize this user should be: 
1. Check if this transaction is included in any of the existent roles in the system 
1.1.1. YES: In that case, check to what department this user works for 
   Then, check if the people working in that department have this role 
a. YES: Assign this role too to this user 
b. NO: Contact this user and his/her managers to understand why this 
user needs access to this transaction, and then, contact Internal 
Control to check if this complies with SoD matrix and not pose any 
risk for the company. 
 
1.1.2. NO: As this transaction is not included in any of the existing roles, consultants 
should check what this transaction is used for, and who should have access to 
this transaction. 
To analyze what this transaction is used for, we should trace this transaction, 
and verify the authorization objects that it checks. 
Check if the functionality of this transaction is equivalent to other functions in 
the system 
a. YES: Then, security consultants could include this transaction in a role 
with similar functions, and continue with step 1.1.1. 
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b. NO: Analyze it in depth detail and if necessary, contact the developer 
of this transaction to comprehend its functionality, and ask him/her 
who requested its development. 
 
Once this is done, security consultants could: 
1. If it does not pose any risk and the transaction 
development is correct:  Create a new role for this 
transaction, or include it in any of the existent roles that 
this user has. 
2. If this transaction is not correct and risky: Contact 
Internal Control about this problem and analyze it with the 
managers who requested its use. 
If the authorization object that appears on the SU53 screenshot is different than 
S_TCODE, it will mean that there are some authorization objects that are being checked 
during its process and the user has not access to them. This can either mean that there 
are some functionalities in the transaction that have not been authorized and, thus, they 
are disabled for the user; or it can mean that from this transaction there is a direct jump 
query to other transaction(s) and the user has not been authorized for this new 
transaction(s).  
 
12.1.2 Solution to access: ST01 
 
When SU53 is not enough explanatory, consultants can use the transaction ST01 for 
tracing the whole transaction and see every authorization object that is being checked. 
To activate the trace, we enter in 
ST01 and then, select Authorization 
check and click in ‘Trace on’. 
At this moment, the system starts 
tracing every authorization object 
that the system checks in this 
session from the user we are 
connected. 
Once we have executed the whole process of the transaction until we had the 
authorization check denial, we open again the transaction ST01 and select the schedule 
where this process was executed.  
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The result of ST01 when a user did not have all authorizations needed looks like this: 
 
Each of the lines listed indicate the authorization objects that are being checked by the 
system when executing the program coding of a transaction. Colors determine whether 
the user has access or not. 
 
However, this is the result when the user has access to the authorization objects 
checked. 
 WARNING: Determine which authorization objects are missing in the user privileges. 
 Show that system is searching for information in the program 
 Some additional values are missing in its configuration 
 User has access to these authorization objects 
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